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ABSTRACT
Strategic Planning 
for Hotel-Casino Projects
by
Franklin Neil Baker
Dr. Bernard Fried, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor o f Tourism & Convention Administration 
University o f Nevada, Las Vegas
Hotel-casinos have exhibited financial trouble and failure rates which exceed 30%. 
Even so, billions of dollars have been earmarked for continual development within the 
industry. The purpose of this study was to examine classical theories of strategic decision­
making when planning for new or expanded hotel-casinos and then determine if these 
theories work for the industry or if the industry is so unique that special measures must 
become part of the strategic-planning process.
Three factors related to strategic planning were selected for study: economic 
indicators, the product/service life cycle, the Altman Z Factor for bankruptcy prediction. 
Twelve Chief Financial Officers representing more than half of the hotel-casino properties 
were surveyed concerning their approaches to building or expanding properties to 
determine if and how these three factors were currently being used. Three research 
questions based on these factors were then examined and statistically tested for their value
iii
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in the planning process.
This study found that there was no correlation between the economic indicator of 
GDP and gross gaming revenues on either national or jurisdictional levels, indicating that 
GDP has little value in the strategic planning process of the hotel-casino industry. In fact, 
this study seemed to confirm earlier work which found gaming revenue to resist economic 
fluctuations. The Altman Z Factor, as it is currently used, offered hope in becoming 
useful to distinguish failure o f hotel-casinos, but it appeared that further work with the 
Altman Z Factor would be needed. The product/service life cycle did prove useful, 
however, since failure rates o f hotel-casinos were significantly greater when projects were 
opened in the maturity or decline stage o f the legalized gaming jurisdiction’s 
product/service life cycle. In summary, there are certain strategic decision-making tools 
that may offer assistance to the hotel-casino strategic planners.
IV
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CHAPTER 1
THE PROBLEM AND ITS PURPOSE 
United States’ lodging industry revenues and profits have continually increased 
during the past five years (Smith Travel Research, 1998). The U.S. gaming industry 
annual wager has also increased during the same period o f time (Christiansen, 1998). 
Perhaps because of this growth, hotel-casino news releases are replete with 
announcements o f construction progress, ground breaking, and notification o f hotel-casino 
development in nearly all o f the legalized gaming jurisdictions in the United States (e.g.. 
Bear Steams, 1997; Casino America, 1998; Hilton, 1998; Palermo, 1998). In Las Vegas, 
NV, there are six hotel-casinos under construction or recently opened (see Table 1.1 for 
details of individual properties) at estimated costs o f $8.8 billion and four others in 
advanced planning stages at a projected cost o f nearly $2 billion (Schlachter, 1998; 
Thompson, 1998). In Detroit, MI, three hotel-casinos, which will have projected 
construction costs of nearly $2 billion, have been approved and announced (McGraw & 
McConnel, 1998). Biloxi, MS, Vicksburg, MS, and Robinsonville, MS, have four hotel- 
casinos in various stages of construction or planning at a cost o f approximately $1.5 
billion (Casino America, 1998; Palermo, 1998). Atlantic City, NJ, anticipates as many as 
five new hotel-casinos with costs o f more than $3.8 billion (Bear Steams, 1998; McKee, 
1998). In addition, there are several riverboat casinos in Louisiana, Indiana, Illinois,
1
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Missouri, and Iowa, that are either building or considering construction of hotels 
(Nfidwest Casino Beat, 1998). Should all o f these hotel-casinos be completed within the 
next four years, total costs will most likely exceed $20 billion. The popular press (e.g.. 
Smith, 1998; Thompson, 1998) has cited experts questioning the wisdom of such a large 
investment.
Table 1.1
Selected New United States Hotel-Casinos in Various Construction or Planning Stages
Hotel-Casino Location Est. Cost Rooms Est. Comoletion
Bellagio (Mirage) Las Vegas $1.6 BÜ.. 3000 Oct., 1998 open
Mandalay Bay(Circus) Las Vegas $960 MÜ.K 4000 Mar., 1999 open
The Venetian (Sands) Las Vegas $2.6 BÜ 6000* Apr., 1999 open
Resort at Summerlin Las Vegas $500 Mil. 872 July, 1999
Beau Rivage (Mirage) BUoxi $600 Mil. 1800 Spring, 1999
Circus-Circus Gulfport $225 Mil. 1500 Summer, 1999
Paris (Hilton) Las Vegas $800 Mil. 3000 SepL, 1999
The New Aladdin Las Vegas $1.3 BU. 2600 Spring, 2000
Atwater/Circus-Circus Detroit $700 Mil. 500 2001
MGM Grand Detroit $700 Mil. 500 2001
Greektown/Chippewa Detroit $700 Mil. 500 2001
Le Jardin(Mirage) Atlantic City $2.0 BU. 2000 2002
MGM Grand Atlantic City $700 Mil. 2500 2002
Circus-Circus Atlantic City $600 MU. 2000 2002
Caesar’s Atlantic City $500 Mil. 1000 2002
Boyd Group Atlantic City $500 Mil. 1200 2002
Note, a = billions of collars, b = millions o f dollars.
* Venetian will open 3000 rooms in their first phase during April, 1999. Sources: Bear 
Steams, 1998; Casino America, 1998; McGraw & McConnel, 1998; McKee, 1998; 
Palermo, 1998; Schlachter, 1998; Thompson, 1998.
Before looking at the successes and troubles o f hotel-casinos, it is important to 
consider what actually constitutes the hotel-casino industry. At the present time, the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) numbers do not include hotel-casinos. SIC No. 
7011 has been assigned to hotels, and some, but not all, casinos fall under SIC No. 7993
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3for coin-operated amusement devices; but no single SIC number includes both 
characteristics. Furthermore, the number of hotel rooms and the type of gaming vary so 
widely between properties that comparable analysis requires a clearer definition of hotel- 
casinos than currently exists. For instance, the number of rooms at the properties ranges 
from five at the Colorado Central Station Casino in Black Hawk, CO, to 5,009 at the 
MGM Grand Hotel Casino in Las Vegas, NV (Bourie, 1998). Similarly, some so-called 
casinos are merely slot operations in bars and convenience stores while others include the 
full range of table games, slots, race and sports book operations, and bingo. Because two 
o f the major locales. Las Vegas and Atlantic City, require hotel-casino properties to have 
at least 200 rooms (Nevada Gaming Control Act, 1991; Casino Control Act, 1983), the 
definition of a hotel-casino is, for the purposes of this study, a property that includes 200 
or more hotel rooms and offers full casino-style gaming. Table 1.2 indicates by states, 513 
properties identified as casinos. However, only 271 of these properties contain both hotel 
rooms and casinos, and 158 are establishments that contain 200 or more rooms.
Therefore, the hotel-casino industry, as defined by this study, currently consists o f 158 
properties in 15 states.
The majority of properties in the hotel-casino industry have been successful by 
contributing positive cash flow from their operations. However, there has been an 
inordinate number of troubled properties resulting in bankruptcies, reorganizations, forced 
sales prior to closure, and outright closings (see Table 1.3). For the year 1997, Dun & 
Bradstreet (1998) Business Failure Statistics for 120 industries, which does not include
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 1.2
United States Casinos. Hotel-Casinos. and Hotel-Casinos with 200 or more rooms. 
Dec. 31. 1997
State Casinos Hotel-
Casinos
2 200 
rooms
Land-
based
Riverboat Native
American
AZ 12 1 0 0 0 0
CA 16 2 1 0 0 1
CO 47 10 0 0 0 0
CN 2 2 1 0 0 1
IL 9 3 1 0 1 0
IN 8 3 2 0 2 0
lA 12 5 1 0 1 0
KS 3 1 0 0 0 0
LA 15 6 5 0 4 1
MI 13 8 2 0 0 2
MN 17 10 6 0 0 6
MS 31 18 15 0 14 I
MO 11 4 3 0 3 0
NE 1 0 0 0 0 0
NV 208 160 106 105 0 1
NJ 12 12 12 12 0 0
NM 10 1 1 0 0 1
NY 1 1 1 0 0 1
NC 1 0 0 0 0 0
ND 6 3 0 0 0 0
OR 7 3 0 0 0 0
SD 37 8 0 0 0 0
TX 2 0 0 0 0 0
WA 17 0 0 0 0 0
WI 15 10 1 0 0 I
TOT. 513 271 158 117 25 16
Note: Number of hotel-casinos found and cross-checked by the following sources: Bourie, 
1998; Casino City, 1998; Sankey, 1998. Conflicting data occurred between the different 
sources concerning the names o f properties, number o f rooms, and gaming composition. 
Telephone calls were made to the specific properties to clarify apparent errors by the 
source publications. Specific properties are identified in Appendix A.
hotel-casinos as an industry, indicated that less than 0.4% o f all hotel properties fail, a 
figure that has not only remained relatively constant over the past fifteen years but has also 
stayed well below other industry averages (see Table 1.4). The highest rate o f failures for
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Table 1.3
Selected list of troubled hotel-casinos. 1975-1998
Property Location Date Mil. $ Status Memorandum
O oeratine
Tropicana Las Vegas. NV 1975 NMF Bankruptcy Acquired: Aztar
Holiday International Las Vegas. NV 1980 NMF Bankruptcy Restructured
Nevada Palace Las Vegas. NV 1980 NMF Bankruptcy Restructured
Silver Club(Mint) Sparks. NV 1981 NMF Bankruptcy Acquired
Treasury Las Vegas. NV 1985 NMF Licensing Acquired: San Remo
Sundance Las Vegas. NV 1986 NMF Bankruptcy Acquired: Fitzgerald’s
Riviera Las Vegas, NV 1986 NMF Bankruptcy Restructured
Contineiital Las Vegas. NV 1986 NMF Bankruptcy Restructured
Resorts International AtlarrticChy. NJ 1989 S1.035 Bankruptcy Restructured
H i ^  Sierra Lake Tahoe. NV 1990 NMF Bankruptcy Acquired: Horizon
Ormsby House Carson City. NV 1990 S13 Bankruptcy Restructured
Bally’s Grand Las Vegas, NV 1991 S180 Bankruptcy Restructured
Bally’s Grand Reno, NV 1991 $180 Bankruptcy Restructured
Gold River Laugfalin. NV 1991 $138 Bankruptcy Restructured
Riviera Las Vegas. NV 1991 $192 Bankruptcy Restructured
TrumpTaj Mahal Atlantic City, NJ 1991 $846 Bankruptcy Restructured
Main Street Station Las Vegas. NV 1992 $62 Bankruptcy Acquired: Boyd
Trump Castle Atlantic City, NJ 1992 $408 Bankruptcy Restructured
T run^  Plaza Atlantic City, NJ 1992 $396 Bankruptcy Restructured
Resorts International Allarrtic City, NJ 1994 $576 Bankruptcy Acquired: Sun International
Treasure Bay BiloxL MS 1995 $187 Bankruptey Restructured
Ormsby House Carson CiQr. NV 1995 $12 Bankruptcy Restructured
Four Queens Las Vegas, NV 1995 $67 Bankruptcy In reorganization
Gold River Laugfalin. NV 1996 $97 Bankruptcy Acquired: Full House
Sahara Casino RobinsonvUle.MS 1996 NMF Bankruptcy Acquired: Harrah’s
Silverton/Boomtown Las Vegas. NV 1997 $56 Bankruptcy Acquired: Roesky
Stratosphere Las Vegas. NV 1997 $334 Bankruptcy In reorganization
Sahara: Santa Fe Las Vegas. NV 1997 NMF Troubled Acquired: Win. Bennett
Pioneer Hotel L a u ^ in . NV 1997 NMF Troubled Loan Guarantee
Arizona Charlie’s 1 as Vegas. NV 1997 NMF Bankruptcy Reorganized
Player’s Island Mesquite. NV 1997 $57 Troubled Sold
Riverboat Hotel Reno. NV 1997 NMF Troubled Eventual Bankrutpcy
Sands: Greate Bay Atlantic City, NJ 1998 $224 Bankruptcy In reorganization
Maxim Las Vegas. NV 1998 NMF Bankruptcy In reorganization
Santa Fe Las Vegas. NV 1998 $90 Bankruptcy Involuntary
Diamonds Casino Reno. NV 1998 NMF Bankruptcy Acquired
Non-ooeratins
Atlantis: Playboy Atlantic City, NJ 1979 NMF BankrupUy Acquired: Donald Trump
Silverbird Las Vegas. NV 1981 NMF B an k ru p t Acquired: El Rancho
Mapes Hotel Reno, NV 1982 NMF Bankrugcy Closed
Marina Las Vegas. NV 1984 NMF Bankruptcy Acquired: MGM Grand
Aladdin Las Vegas. NV 1985 NMF Bankruptcy Restructured
Dunes (Anderson) Las Vegas. NV 1985 $103 Bankruptcy Restructured
Aladdin Las Vegas. NV 1992 NMF Bankruptcy Restructured
Sands Las Vegas. NV 1992 $38 Bankruptcy Restructured
Dunes (Nonguiko) Las Vegas. NV 1992 NMF Troubled Acquired: Mirage
H acien^: Santa Fe Las Vegas. NV 1996 NMF Troubled Acquired: Circus-Circus
Thunderbird Las V egs, NV 1996 NMF Troubled Clceed
El Rancho Las Vegas. NV 1996 NMF Troubled Closed
Note. NMF=no meaningful figure. The list o f troubled casinos was obtained from the 
following sources: Bersch, L., Federal Bankruptcy Trustee, (personal communication, 
February 25, 1998); Bybee, S., (personal communications, March 6, April 1, July 8, 
1998); Chanin and Company, 1993; Russell K., Mississippi Business Review, 1998; New 
Generation Research, 1998; Smith, J.L., (E-mail communication, April 2, 1998); Nevada 
Gaming Control Board, (List o f bankrupt properties, February 17, 1999).
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Table 1.4
Failure rates: Top ten industries of 120 industries. 1995-1997. compared to hotel-casino 
and related industries.
Rank Industry 1995 1996 1997e
1 Fishing, hunting, trapping 1.18% 2.55% 2.73%
2 Other business services 1.22% 1.28% 2.20%
3 Nonstore retailers 1.33% 1.67% 2.16%
4 Trucking & warehousing 1.22% 1.60% 2.08%
5 Miscellaneous business services 1.83% 1.80% 2.06%
6 Coal mining 2.25% 2.55% 2.02%
7 Management & public relations 2.47% 1.51% 1.87%
8 Holding & investment firms 1.55% 1.67% 1.85%
9 Services to buildings 1.41% 1.66% 1.77%
10 Construction 1.29% 1.38% 1.40%
> Hotel-casinos 2.00% 1.43% 2.02%
> Hotels & other lodging places 0.42% 0.30% 0.32%
> Eating & drinking places 0.92% 0.92% 1.00%
Note. Source: Dun & Bradstreet business failure reports 11997. 1998).
1997 lie within the fishing, hunting, and trapping industry (2.73%); other business services 
(2.20%); and non-store retailers (2.16%). Dun & Bradstreet (1997) defines business 
failure as:
Businesses that cease operations following assignment or bankruptcy; ceased 
operations with losses to creditors after such actions as foreclosure or attachment; 
voluntarily withdrew leaving unpaid debts; were involved in court actions such as 
receivership, reorganization or arrangements; or voluntarily compromised with 
creditors (p. 1).
From the population of 142 hotel-casinos (refer to Table 1.2), which excludes the 
16 Indian gaming properties due to lack of public information, 32 have been in various
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7types o f financial trouble as described by Dun & Bradstreet’s definition o f business failure. 
These 32 constitute a percentage of more than 22%, and most o f these have occurred in 
the past eight years when the typical percentage should have been 3.2% using the typical 
hotel failure rate (0.4% x 8 years). Including those ten properties which are no longer in 
operation in the population, 42 properties can be identified fi'om a modified population of 
168, which is a 25% rate. In addition, this year alone, five properties, or more than 3%, 
are presently in bankruptcy.
Dun and Bradstreet (1992, 1997, 1998) divides the reasons for failure into seven 
categories: neglect, disaster, fi-aud, economic factors, experience, finance, and strategy. 
Forty-three percent o f failures in the services industry, of which hotel-casinos would be a 
part, were attributed to economic factors. Within these economic factors, industry 
weakness and insufficient profits accounted for 35.4% of failures. Both industry 
weaknesses and insufficient profits can occur due to economic conditions and/or a firm’s 
position within its industry’s life cycle (see chapter 2 for further detail o f the industry life 
cycle). Another 39.1% o f failures in the service industry was due to finance. More 
specifically, heavy operating expenses and insufficient equity capital accounted for 30.8% 
of failures. Attainment o f sufficient revenues to cover these costs would have precluded 
failure. Measures o f demand forecast, therefore, become a crucial factor in the planning of 
an investment project. With economic and financial factors causing more than four out of 
every five failures, elements within these two areas need to be investigated as part o f the 
strategic planning process.
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8Problem Statement
There has been an excessive number of outright failures and financially troubled 
projects in the hotel-casino industry which might have been avoided if more strategic 
planning tools had been used. Economic and financial causes o f failure are often avoidable 
with appropriate strategic planning for economic, financial, and strategic factors that Dun 
and Bradstreet (1998) have noted. Interviews with hotel-casino executives (detailed in 
chapter 2) found that while all claimed to use a strategic planning process, they did not 
apply all parts of the process to their actual planning. Factors that they ignored need to 
be tested and, if useful, applied to the hotel-casino industry in the decision-making process 
to learn fi-om the problems that have occurred in the past and make better decisions in the 
future.
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose o f this study is to investigate certain elements o f strategic planning 
that could possibly be useful in the hotel-casino industry by analyzing three factors: 
economic indicators, product/service life-cycle, and Altman bankruptcy prediction. These 
planning considerations may assist in a more complete strategic decision-making process 
to build or expand a hotel-casino and determine when the commitment is a prudent one. 
Perhaps the use of these factors will also assist in reducing the failure rate o f future hotel- 
casino projects.
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9Research Questions
To determine the applicability o f  three potentially useful factors (economic 
indicators, product/service life-cycle, and Altman bankruptcy prediction) to strategic 
planning within the hotel-casino industry, three questions will be asked and answered:
1. Are hotel-casino industry revenues correlated to economic indicators on both 
national and jurisdictional levels? If  so, can this correlation be extended to help predict 
failed hotel-casinos which open during one year prior to and during the economic 
downturn?
2. Does the product/service life cycle apply to the hotel-casino industry on either a 
national or jurisdictional level? If  so, can this application be extended to help predict the 
success or failure of hotel-casinos?
3. Can the Altman Z Factor, a predictor of bankruptcy potential, be adapted to the 
hotel-casino industry and assess whether a hotel-casino corporation is strong enough to 
undertake a new investment?
Significance o f the Study
Answers to the research questions may help operators, lenders, investors, and 
regulators decide to construct or expand, finance, or approve a hotel-casino project by 
providing additional analytical data. If  economic indicators do apply to the hotel-casino 
industry, then perhaps construction or expansion may be better timed to coincide with a 
strong economy. If  the product life cycle concept also applies to the hotel-casino industry, 
then perhaps construction or expansion may similarly be timed to coincide with above
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average growth in industry revenues. I f  the Altman Z factor applies to the hotel-casino 
industry, a corporation may be better able to assess the risk o f investment in a new 
property. If  all, or even some, of these factors apply, then, this study may contribute to 
more successful properties and less troubled ones in the hotel-casino industry.
Limitations o f the Study 
This study is limited to those hotel-casinos, previously defined as 200-room hotels 
with accompanying full-scale gaming, with locations in the continental United States and 
those organizations which are publicly traded. It is also limited to a 25-year period 
beginning in 1974.
Organization o f the Dissertation 
The study is organized into five chapters. Chapter 1 includes background o f the 
problem, the problem statement, purpose of the study, research questions, significance of 
the study, and limitations. Chapter 2 includes a review o f both theory and literature. 
Chapter 3 details the methodology used, hypotheses, and tests of the hypotheses. Chapter 
4 presents the analysis of data arranged by research questions with findings, and Chapter 5 
is a summary of the study, giving conclusions, implications, and recommendations.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THEORY AND LITERATURE 
Three factors have led to the literature review: the need to understand the theory 
o f strategic decision-making as practiced in business and the current practice in the hotel- 
casino industry, the five research questions, and the newly created hotel-casino industry as 
used in this study. Of particular interest within strategic decision-making were the studies 
relating to external environmental and internal organizational assessments. The three 
research questions required studies of economic indicators and their relationship to 
industry revenues, literature concerning life-cycle descriptions by industries, bankruptcy 
prediction studies, demand and supply studies for lodging and gaming industries. Finally, 
a review of hotel-gaming articles and publications was undertaken to determine what areas 
had been researched and if the current study could stand on its own or if it needed to be a 
replication o f a  previous study. The theory, practice, and research of these areas have 
been combined into four multi-layered sections on strategic decision-making, capital 
budgeting, demand forecasting, and hotel-casinos.
11
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Strategic Decision-making: Theory, Practice and Research 
In order to understand how to determine whether or not a commitment is prudent, 
it is first necessary to understand the theories upon which strategic decisions to invest 
fimds are based in comparison to the practice that hotel-casino financial oflBcers currently 
follow. Guided interviews with eleven hotel-casino executives, representing nearly half of 
the properties, showed that their current strategic decision-making practices closely 
paralleled the theoretical underpinnings, but certain considerations were found to be 
missing fi’om the total process. More specifically, the cyclical considerations o f  business 
and product, internal financial strength analysis, and validation o f uncertain revenue 
demand could, perhaps, assist in the investment decision.
Any successful business begins with a “key idea” for (1) supplying a product or 
service, (2) that will satisfy a consumer need, (3) and in so doing will lead to an 
excess o f revenue over cost, (4) thereby supplying the originator of the idea with 
an incentive [profit] to continue to provide the supply (Schendel & Hofer, 1979, p. 
6).
In the hotel-casino industry, the "key idea” is to supply accommodations and 
entertainment together, satisfying the customers’ need for lodging, food and beverage, and 
recreational activities within one location. The firm maintains a high occupancy rate 
combined with a sufficient average daily room rate to generate satisfactory hotel revenues, 
while simultaneously providing the supply at efficient cost, thereby attempting to create a 
positive cash flow. Also, the revenue goals fi-om gaming are achieved through a 
marketing mix o f table games and slot revenues while the operational costs are maintained
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at a level to produce additional positive cash flow. Should the combined positive cash 
flow occur, it can then be a foundation for developing new supply by construction o f a 
new property or expansion o f the existing location. The strategic decision-making process 
is then activated to consider an increase in supply. This process lies within a theoretical 
framework that includes three distinct theories; strategic decision-making, capital 
budgeting, and demand forecasting.
Theorv and Practice o f Strategic Decision-making 
Strategic management is defined as “A process that deals with the entrepreneurial 
work o f the organization, with organizational renewal and growth, and more particularly, 
with developing and utilizing the strategy with which to guide the organization’s 
operations” (Schendel & Hofer, 1979, p. 11). Among the major tasks that comprise the 
strategic management process, three tasks—environmental analysis, strategy formulation, 
and strategy evaluation—combine to form the process of strategic decision-making 
(Duncan, 1972; Schendel & Hofer, 1979) and lead to the point at which a decision is 
made, described by Harrison (1996) as;
A moment in an ongoing process of evaluating alternatives related to a goal, at 
which the expectations o f the decision maker with regard to a particular course of 
action impel him to make a selection or commitment toward which he will direct 
his intellect and energies for the purpose of attaining his objective (p. 5).
The executives echoed this concept, one calling it the “go-ahead point” and another citing 
two instances o f the “preliminary decision” and the “go-ahead decision.” All of the 
executives interviewed unanimously agreed that due to the magnitude o f the capital
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investment in hotel-casinos, extensive analysis was taken prior to the decision. In this 
aspect of the decision-making process, practice and theory coincided. However, in two of 
the three tasks, environmental analysis and strategy formulation, that lie within the 
process, theory and practice were not as good a match.
Environmental Analvsis
“Environmental analysis includes all those factors that influence goals, strategy, 
and structure and which the firm does not directly control” (Utterback, 1979, p. 134). 
Environmental analysis is the controlling factor in strategic decision-making, and when an 
opportunity for development is not apparent, the continuing analysis becomes a moot 
point (Harrison, 1996). According to Twiss (1980), “The business environment has 
become more uncertain and changeable in recent years, and in this dynamic environment 
an ability to anticipate problems is o f considerable value” (p. 19). A corporation caimot 
orchestrate its environment; it must make predictions, not choices, about the business 
environment it expects to face in the future. Twiss (1980) stated, “The successful business 
o f the future will be those which leam to live with uncertainty and incorporate it within 
their decision-making processes” (p. 10). The importance of these predictions relies not 
only on the precision with which they can be made, but also in knowing what variables to 
examine in the first place (Child, 1979; Klein, 1979; MacMillan, 1979, Utterback, 1979).
It may be a more serious error to overlook a factor than to forecast it inaccurately 
(Schendel & Hofer, 1979). While the purpose of environmental analysis and forecasting is 
to provide needed input to both the strategy formulation and evaluation tasks, the number 
and magnitude o f major environmental factors may require major changes in the basic
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content o f strategies themselves. Furthermore, some factors are dependent on both time 
and place, for the environment changes from one year to the next, and what is appropriate 
for one locale may not be appropriate for another.
Specific environmental business factors that could be examined in the hotel-casino 
industry include an awareness of the current political arena, economic forecasts of national 
economic indicators, industry life cycle positioning, competitive competencies, and 
consumer demand and acceptance o f gaming. For instance, threats o f  national gaming 
regulation, movement in the international economic conditions, consumer demand, and 
strength o f competitors are factors that were analyzed by the hotel-casino executives 
interviewed. However, not all of them used economic forecasts of national economic 
indicators, and none included an assessment o f the industry life cycle. Because of this 
disparity between theory and practice, it is important to investigate whether hotel-casino 
revenues are correlated to economic indicators, and whether the product life-cycle concept 
applies to the hotel-casino industry.
Strategy Formulation
When the environmental analysis indicates an opportunity for future development, 
the firm’s financial planners look within the organization and perform an analysis of its 
strengths and weaknesses by appraising the major competencies of the total organization 
in the critical classifications of management, technology, policies, and resources (Harrison, 
1996). This internal appraisal ascertains fundamental areas of effectiveness and 
inadequacy. If  the appraisal is positive, the organization’s strengths exceed its 
weaknesses, and it is ready to pursue the opportunities in its external environment. The
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environmental analysis and internal appraisal results in a determination o f  the "strategic 
gap” (Harrison, 1996). The strategic gap reflects the posture between the current strategic 
position o f the organization and its desired strategic position (Harrison, 1986). If  a 
positive strategic gap exists, strategy formulation begins and is defined as the process that 
results in the plan that the firm will follow in taking advantage o f the environmental 
opportunity (Harrison, 1996).
In the hotel-casino industry, there are four strategies: build, expand, acquire, or 
become partners in properties (Nordling, 1998). For example, of the large firms, NCrage 
builds its own properties, Caesars uses expansion o f its existing properties, and Hilton 
seeks growth through acquisition of other firms and their properties. Marginal firms do 
not have the acquisition option but often rely on a partnership with larger firms (e.g., 
Primadonna with MGM Grand to build New York New York, and Boyd Gaming with 
Mirage Resorts in Atlantic City). The decision o f whether to activate one o f  these 
strategies rests on the corporation’s external and internal assessments. Only six 
companies (i.e.. Mirage, Starwood, Circus, MGM, Hilton, and Harrahs) have the internal 
strength which permits them to move toward implementation (Ader, 1998; Turner, 1998). 
However, the rest of the industry has marginal strength, at best (Ader, 1998; Turner,
1998). Those firms must undertake a thorough internal analysis of each o f  their strengths 
and weaknesses, but the most important factor rests in their ability to finance the project 
without putting the firm at risk of failure (Sullivan & Valdez, 1998). One measure o f the 
marginal firm’s financial strength is the Altman Z factor, (Altman, 1968) a bankruptcy 
prediction model, but the hotel-casino executives interviewed did not utilize this tool. It
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is, therefore, important to investigate whether the Altman Z factor for bankruptcy can be 
adapted to assess hotel-casino’s internal corporate financial strength.
Strateev Evaluation
Strategy evaluation can be defined as the final step which assesses the proposed 
plan before strategy implementation. Two basic questions need to be asked in the strategy 
evaluation task (Schendel & Hofer, 1979): First, has the existing strategy been any good? 
Second, will the existing/proposed strategy be any good in the future? The former 
question is necessary to show whether the in-place strategy needs to be changed. The 
latter question seeks to determine whether the current or contemplated strategy will lead 
to accomplishment of the firm’s objectives in the future given the changes that are 
anticipated in the firm’s business environment, its wealth, or even its aspirations.
Rumelt (1979) believes an evaluation of the existing strategy requires these steps:
(1) an identification of the existing strategy in terms of its components, including 
its underlying goal structure and environmental assumptions; (2) a comparison of 
results achieved against those established; (3) a comparison of environmental 
assumptions made by the strategy with the changes expected based on an analysis 
and forecast of the future environment; and (4) a determination o f whether the 
strategy appears capable of meeting its goals in light of the existing and the 
expected environment (p. 167).
If that determination is negative, then a new strategy will be required. In the case o f the 
hotel-casino industry, an analysis of current cash flows is weighed against the projected 
cash flows, the current risk is measured against any added risk that will have to be
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accepted, and the current stock valuation is compared to the anticipated price of common 
stock. In order to weigh those considerations, Schendel &  Hofer (1979) believe 
evaluation of the future worth o f an existing or proposed strategy can be accomplished 
using one or more o f  the following four approaches:
(1) an assessment of whether the objectives the strategy is designed to achieve are 
internally consistent and whether the strategy is consistent with those objectives;
(2) an evaluation o f the quality of the analysis and organization processes used to 
develop the strategy; (3) an evaluation of the content o f the strategy; and (4) an 
assessment o f  the ability of the organization to implement the strategy; (p. 17).
Should these evaluations and assessments be acceptable to  management and fulfill their 
responsibility to the organization stakeholders, the new strategy will become acceptable 
for implementation.
Based on interviews with hotel-casino executives, there is extensive strategy 
evaluation. Due to their diversification of properties, large firms (e.g.. Mirage, Starwood, 
Hilton, Circus, and Harrahs) can withstand an incorrect decision (Mayland, 1998), but 
marginal firms risk corporate failure if a bad decision is made, at which point the board of 
directors should become concerned with a “bet-the-company” situation (Sullivan &
Vargas, 1998). Strategic planning is a tool to help organizations plan for uncertainty more 
effectively than simply extrapolating opportunities fi-om current information (Twiss,
1980), a formula approach that seems be popular in the hotel-casino industry. However, 
while current practice seems to coincide with theory in the extent of their strategy 
evaluation, an incomplete analysis of environmental and internal factors earlier may still
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result in failure. This observation would seem to support the contention o f Webster and 
Hudson (1991), who argued that “the hospitality industry is generally slow to adopt good 
management practices” (p. 15).
The combination of environmental analysis, internal firm assessment, strategic gap 
analysis, and strategic evaluation lead to the strategic decision-making action. Hospitality 
researchers Webster and Hudson (1991) found that “it is difficult to make decisions 
concerning the organization without an understanding o f both the external and internal 
resources o f the organization” (p. 10). In the hotel-casino industry, the construction of a 
new property or expansion o f an existing one places enormous responsibility on those who 
process the projections and their assumptions because those factors underlie the risk 
commitment o f millions, or even billions of dollars. Because o f this responsibility, this 
study will examine those factors that may not have been fully considered by hotel-casino 
executives in their decision-making processes for constructing or expansion o f projects.
Literature on Strategic Decision-Making Research 
The early development o f  strategic decision-making dates back only to the 1950's 
and the work o f Simon (1957). Since that time there has been a plethora o f research on 
the subject. These studies have considered (a) the importance and effectiveness o f  
strategic decision-making (b) various processes used to reach a strategic decision, (c) 
strategic decision-making in specific industries, (d) strategic decision-making in stable and 
dynamic industries, (e) strategic decision-making for capital investments, and (f) structure 
o f the rational/normative strategic process.
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The Importance and Effectiveness of Strategic Decision-Making
“Strategic decisions constitute the critical variable in strategic management” 
(Child, 1972, p. 1), for they “deal with the long-term health of the enterprise” (Bass, 1983, 
p. 16). These decisions lead to crucial commitment o f resources, with significant impact 
on the firm as a whole and on its long-term performance (Marsh, Barwise, Thomas, & 
Wensley (1988). Hambrick and Snow (1977) accentuated the importance o f strategic 
decisions by pointing to those who make them, i.e., top management. Dean and 
Sharfinan (1996) using a longitudinal field study design o f 52 decisions in 24 companies, 
analyzed the effectiveness o f the decision process and found “that managers have the 
power to influence the success o f strategic decisions, and thus the fortunes of their 
organizations, through the processes they use to make key decisions” (p. 384). Other 
studies confirming the increased performance and profitability by strategic planning were 
offered by Ansoff, Avner, Brandenburg, Porter, and Radosevich (1970), Greenley (1986), 
Herold (1972), Pearce, Robbins, and Robinson (1987), Rhyne (1956), Shrader, Taylor, 
and Dalton, (1984), Thune and House (1970), Wood and LaForge (1979). While a few 
studies found no such relationship (e.g., Grinyer & Norbum, 1975; Kudla, 1980; 
Leontiades & Tezel, 1980), the majority of the research supported the value o f strategic 
planning.
Processes of Strategic Decision-Making
Studies o f the processes of strategic decision-making have shown three schools of 
thought: (a) rational, including bounded rationality and heuristics, (b) power and politics, 
and (c) the garbage can method. Analysts, using the early work by Simon (1957), adopted
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the rational process of strategic decision-making (Anderson, 1983; Andrews, 1971; 
Ansoff, 1980; Dean & Sharfinan, 1993; Frederickson, 1984; Frederickson & laquinto, 
1989; Frederickson & Mitchell, 1984; Hickson, Butler, Cray, Mallory, & Wilson 1986; 
îDtt & Tyler, 1991; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Lindblom, 1959; March & Simon, 1958; 
Mintzberg, Raisingham, &Thoret, 1976; Nutt, 1984; Simon, 1965). This process, 
analyzed by Quinn (1980), was described as an analysis o f environmental opportunity, 
organizational suitability, and the matching o f those characteristics to evaluate the 
decision. The rational model o f  strategy formulation, according to Hitt and Tyler (1991) 
remains dominant in both the practice and teaching of strategic management.
Rational decision-making. Cyert and March (1963) introduced the concept of 
bounded rationality, which suggests that there are limits to decision makers’ abilities to 
encompass all of the factors required in the rational approach. Huxham and Dando (1981) 
agreed that unsuccessful strategic decisions may result from bounded vision on the part of 
the decision makers. Simon (1957) mentioned the capacity of the limited human mind for 
formulating and solving complex problems. Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) also 
supported the existence of cognitive limits to the rational model. In fact, many studies 
supported the concept of a bounded rational process (e.g.. Carter, 1971; Cosier, 1981; 
Cosier & Schwenk, 1990; Dean & Sharfinan, 1993; Harrison & Phillips, 1991; Janis,
1982, 1989; Mintzberg & Waters, 1982; Nutt, 1989; Pinfield, 1986; Schweiger, Sandberg, 
& Rechner, 1989). More specifically, Wright (1980) suggested that decision makers may 
lack information or may act on inaccurate information, while Zackay and Wooler (1984) 
commented that schedules have to be met, budgets need to be observed, and time
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pressures may seriously restrict the actions that can be explored. Recently, Harrison and 
Pelletier (1997) combined earlier research by identifying three components o f the bounded 
rationality concept: information, time and cost constraints, and cognitive limitations. While 
no single theory of bounded rationality seems to exist, many variations have been 
described, such as, “decision by objection” (Anderson, 1983), “root vs. branch” 
(Lindblom, 1959), and “constricted, sporadic, flow” Hickson et al., 1986).
Heuristics is the most recent extension o f the rational process. Bames (1984), 
Busenitz and Barney (1997), Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 1987), Krabuanrat and Phelps 
(1998), Nisbett and Ross (1980), Schwenk (1984, 1986, 1988), and Starbuck and Milliken 
(1988) have offered heuristics as a means o f learning from previous mistakes. However, 
this process has not been shown adaptive to capital investment decision, only to strategic 
business practices and operational decisions.
Power and politics. Other researchers (e.g., Pettigrew, 1973; Sapolsky, 1972) 
concentrated their efforts on power and politics. These studies concentrated on the 
decision makers themselves rather than the process in reaching the decision. Eisenhardt 
and Zbaracki (1992) summed up these studies by showing that when “decisions were the 
result o f a process in which decision makers have different goals, they come together 
through coalitions, and the preferences o f the most powerful triumph” (p. 22-23).
Garbage can. Finally, a process known as the garbage can model was introduced 
by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972). In comparison to rational and political models, the 
garbage can model calls attention to the importance o f chance. According to Eisenhardt 
and Zbaracki (1992), “decision making occurs in a stochastic meeting o f choices looking
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for problems, problems looking for choices, solutions looking for problems to answer, and 
decision makers looking for something to decide” (p. 27). Eisenhardt and Zbaracki 
(1992) believed that Cohen and his colleagues “described decision making in highly 
ambiguous settings called organized anarchies and the model was largely a reaction to 
rational and political models o f choice which they believed lacked sufficient sensitivity to 
decision making in a complex, unstable, ambiguous world” (p. 27).
Strategic Decision-Making in Specific Industries
Studies of the rational and bounded rational process were conducted mainly in 
several manufacturing industries: computers (e.g.. Carter, 1971; Eisenhardt, 1989:), paint 
and coatings (e.g., Frederickson, 1984; Frederickson & Mitchell, 1984), and forest 
products (e.g., Frederickson & laquinto, 1989). Comparative manufacturing industries 
were researched by Dean and Sharfinan (1984) and Hickson, et al. (1986). Thomas (1978) 
considered the service industry as a whole while other non-manufacturing studies included 
a grocery retail chain (Mintzberg & Waters, 1982), a health service firm (Nutt, 1984), and 
governmental policy decisions (Allison, 1971; Anderson, 1983; Janis, 1982; Pinfield,
1986). However, there have been very limited studies for the hospitality industry. A 
description o f how to use a simple process planning model with examples from the U.S. 
hospitality industry was conducted by Reichel (1983), and strategy and structure in the 
U.S. lodging industry was examined by Schaffer (1984, 1986). Formalization o f the 
strategic process in the hospitality industry was studied by Nanus and Lundberg (1988).
Beals (1989), Beals and Troy (1982), Green (1979), Pandit (1986), and Rushmore 
(1986) used feasibility studies in detailing steps in the process o f hotel property
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development. Each study typically started with a feasibility study rather than beginning 
with an external environmental study combined with an internal firm assessment as 
suggested by the rational strategy making process. Beals and Troy (1982) gave credit to 
Downs (1966) who described the characteristics o f various economic studies as consisting 
o f four parts—market, marketability, feasibility, and appraisal—but included the feasibility 
study as only one component and, in fact, relegated it to third in the elements o f 
importance. It would appear that Down’s market segment is similar to the external 
environmental assessment, but there was no mention of an internal organizational 
assessment. The marketability and feasibility studies would be quantitative assessments to 
support the demand for the project and the profitability assessment for the hotel project. 
Slatter and Clark (1988) examined the characteristics o f corporate executives in the 
hospitality industry. One study by Quain, Render, and Higgins (1990) used the convention 
industry as its focus, and others considered location selection of restaurants, retail shops, 
and hotels (e.g., Tse, 1988; Tse & Olsen, 1988, 1989).
Case studies dealing with power and politics in strategic decision-making analyzed 
governmental decisions (e.g., Allison, 1971; Sapolsky, 1972) but were mostly concerned 
with educational organizations (e.g.. Hills & Mahoney, 1978; Pfeffer & Moore, 1980; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). However, Bower (1967) considered a service industry by 
analyzing a hospital surreal unit, while manufacturing field studies o f the computer 
industry were undertaken by Quiim (1980), Eisenhardt and Burgeois (1988, 1992), and 
Dean and Sharfinan (1993). The power-politics discussions do not appear to have been 
analyzed in the hotel-casino industry.
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Numerous field studies o f the garbage can process of decision-making dealt with 
educational organizations (e.g., Kreiner, 1976; Magjuka, 1988; Olsen, 1976; Weiner,
1976) and case studies of governmental decisions (e.g., March & Weissinger-Baylon,
1986; Pinfield, 1986; Rommetveit, 1976). Whereas the studies on education supported 
the concept, those on governmental decisions did not. Because the garbage can process 
has not been found in a profit-making industry, it is not applicable to the hotel-casino 
industry.
The rational and bounded rationality processes are most appropriate for the hotel- 
casino industry because of the large capital investment involved in construction or 
expansion of properties and because o f the focus on the process itself. A  study of the 
hotel-casino industry’s expansion via large capital investments must necessarily look only 
at the rational and bounded rationality processes since they are the only decision-making 
processes that encourage analysis of both external environmental factors and internal firm 
characteristics.
Strategic Decision-Making in Stable Versus Dvnamic Industries
A stable industry is one which has slowed in revenue growth, permits longer lead 
time, and exhibits limited potential for regenerating growth, while a dynamic industry is 
typically one in which there is constant change in technology, rapid introduction of new 
products or services, and decisions made in a speedy fashion. A number of studies (e.g., 
Anderson & Paine, 1975; Baldridge, 1971; Dess, 1987; Eisenhardt & Burgeois, 1988; 
Frederickson, 1984, Frederickson & laquinto, 1989, Frederickson & Mitchell, 1984,
Miller, 1987a; Mintzberg, 1973; Mintzberg & Waters, 1982; Nutt, 1976) have
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concentrated on strategic decisions in stable versus dynamic industries. The effectiveness 
o f rational, bounded rational and politics/power decision-making were correlated with the 
volatility o f the industry. Each of the studies has shown that rational processes are more 
useful when the industry is stable. The use of power and politics would seem to be more 
appropriate when an industry is dynamic or volatile. According to Eisenhardt and 
Zbaracki (1992), “The most prevalent argument is that more complex or turbulent 
environments require less rationality” (p. 21).
While firms in dynamic industries were continually seeking ways to modify their 
decision-making processes and maintain flexibility, those firms in stable industries had a 
tendency to become static and resist change (NCUer & Friesen, 1980; Nfintzberg, 1978; 
Quinn, 1980; Starbuck, 1983; Steinbruner, 1974; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985; Yasai- 
Ardekani, 1986). Often complacency set in when successful decision-making had 
occurred. Tushman and Romanelli (1985) suggested that over time, strategic processes 
“become routinized, commitment to established practices increases as groups become 
more rigid in their behavior patterns and decrease both the volume and diversity o f 
information processed” (p. 192). Tushman and Romanelli (1985) found there was a 
danger when even subtle changes occurred within a stable industry because the established 
routine would not allow for changes in the decision-making process.
The hotel-casino industry, when considering specific legalized jurisdictions, 
exhibits both stable and dynamic characteristics. In those jurisdictions which have 
matured, such as Nevada and New Jersey, a degree o f stability can be defined. But in the 
newly emerging areas, such as Mississippi and Indiana, dynamic characteristics can be
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noted. Therefore, a dualism in the hotel-casino industry would seem to be in evidence, 
and the appropriate strategic decision-making process would have to become a co­
requisite with the stage o f specific jurisdictional industry stability. According to Lorange
(1979), “in order to be effective, a firm’s strategic planning system must be designed to 
reflect its specific situational setting” (p. 226). Because this dualism exists, it is necessary 
to look at each legalized gaming jurisdiction and the current state of development. 
Strategic Decision-Making for Capital Investments
Rational decision-making has been found to be most appropriate when a capital 
investment decision is being considered. Mintzberg and Waters (1982), in studying the 
retail practices of a grocery chain, found that changes in strategy occurred over time, and 
when capital investments were required, the rational decision-making process was in 
evidence. Dean and Sharfinan (1993) and Hickson et al. (1986) also found that capital 
investment decisions relied most heavily on a rational method. Nutt (1984) disagreed in 
his analysis of health service firms by finding that the rational process was not followed. 
However, Kukalis (1991) accepted the hypothesis that “planning effectiveness is greater in 
companies with high capital intensive decisions” (p. 14). In addition, Keppler, Bamberger, 
and Gabele (1979) found that long-term commitment o f the firm’s resources influenced 
management to do more planning based on the conclusion that unpredictable changes in 
the environment could cause considerable risks with high costs. Carter (1971) found that 
“ ‘bet-the-company’ decisions involve more stringent analysis than less important 
decisions” (p. 413). The study by Dean and Sharfinan (1993) went further by combining 
the stability of the industry with the capital investment decision. They found that
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“decisions with higher stakes merit more costly decision strategies such as a rational 
process, because the potential improvement in outcome justifies the search and analysis 
costs involved” (p. 591). In the current study o f the hotel-casino industry, the stability in 
mature jurisdictions combined with the capital investment in construction or expansion o f 
properties would seem to support the use o f  the rational or bounded rational decision­
making process.
Structure o f the Rational Decision-Making Process
The structure o f the rational or bounded rational process for strategic decision­
making has been addressed in numerous articles (e.g.. Bourgeois, 1985; Frederickson, 
1984; IDckson et al., 1986; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Theoret, 1976; Mintzberg & 
Waters, 1982; Nutt, 1984; Pinfield, 1986). The structure o f the rational process has been 
defined as “a match between environmental conditions and organizational capabilities and 
resources” (Bourgeois, 1985, p. 548). The definition establishes a need for the decision 
process to include an analysis of those business environment conditions that could impact 
the judgment o f the decision-maker (Pearce & Robinson, 1983). According to Harrison
(1995), “Strategic decisions are made by the application of managerial perceptions 
conditioned by managerial values and experience to information obtained largely fi’om the 
external environment” (p. 5). In addition, an internal analysis of the organizations’ 
strengths and weaknesses must be addressed. These elements, external environmental 
business conditions and inherent organization characteristics, form the structure of the 
rational decision-making process and occur prior to any economic assessment o f the 
profitability o f a proposed hotel-casino development.
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Business environment conditions. Environmental business analysis is the initial 
phase o f the decision-making process (Aguilar, 1967; Al-Bazzaz & Grinyer, 1980; 
Anderson & Paine, 1975; Andrews, 1971; Armstrong, 1982; Bain, 1956; Bourgeois, 1980; 
Frederickson, 1984; Frederickson & Mitchell, 1984; Grinyer et aL, 1986; Hambrick, 1982; 
Hatten & Schendel, 1975; Javidan, 1984; Lindsay & Rue, 1980; Lorange, 1979; Lorange 
& Vancil, 1977; McCaskey, 1974; Miller & Friesen, 1980; Mintzberg, 1973; Porter, 1980; 
Quinn, 1980; Romanelli & Tushman, 1986; Scherer, 1980; Uyterhoeven, Ackerman, & 
Rosenblum, 1977). Research on business environment analysis seems to have focused on 
the perceptional accuracy o f organizations as well as that o f decision-makers and on what 
external factors make up the business environment. Snow (1976) found that 
management’s reactions to what it perceived and interpreted suggested that different firms 
can look at the same environmental conditions but construe them differently. Bourgeois
(1980) accepted Snow’s research but believed that for survival, all firms should be able to 
make the same interpretations of the environment. As firms grow in size, however, their 
ability to interpret environmental conditions seems to improve ( Lorange & Vancil, 1977; 
Mintzberg, 1973). Mintzberg (1978) saw that growth encouraged increasingly rational 
decision-making processes. Frederickson and laquinto (1989) found that larger firms 
used a more rational process which included activities such as searching widely for 
information, conducting extensive analysis, and using formal planning processes.
The accuracy o f an organization’s perception also depends on the decision maker. 
Zajac and Bazerman’s (1991) research included such topics as “the winner’s curse,” 
limited problem frames, and escalation of commitment. The authors suggested that
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“competitive blind spots may provide a partial explanation for such phenomena as industry 
overcapacity, new business failure, and acquisition premiums” (p. 46). This research 
occurred as a result o f  the earlier work by Oskamp (1965) dealing with overconfidence. 
According to Fischoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1977) and Alpert and Raiffa (1982), 
overconfidence occurs when decision-makers become overly optimistic in their preliminary 
assessment o f an opportunity and then are hesitant to adapt additional information about 
the situation into their assessment because o f their initial overconfidence. Bazerman
(1990) found that most decision-makers are overconfident in their ability to make 
estimations and do not acknowledge the actual uncertainties that exist. Phillips and 
Wright (1977) and Russo and Schoemaker (1989) examined the acceptability by decision­
makers to incorporate additional information and found them generally slow to 
incorporate additional information because o f their confidence in their existing 
assumptions and opinions. These environmental industry considerations of competition 
and confidence in decision-making abilities often become contributory factors within the 
external analysis and may likely impact construction or expansion decisions in the hotel- 
casino industry.
What factors should be included in an environmental analysis have been more 
clearly defined over the years. Dill (1958) and Duncan (1972) named five external 
components: customers, competitors, suppliers, regulatory groups, and technological 
requirements o f an industry. Kukalis (1991) added to the environmental components by 
listing the degree o f environmental complexity and the market life-cycle. According to 
Anderson and Zeithaml (1984), “research in marketing as well as in strategic management
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indicates that the product life cycle is likely a fundamental variable affecting business 
strategy” (p. 5). Two propositions were suggested by Hofer (1975): (a) “The most 
fundamental variable in determining the appropriate business strategy is the stage of the 
product [service] life cycle” (p. 798); and (b) “Major changes in business strategy are 
usually required during three stages o f the life cycle: introduction, maturity, and decline” 
(p. 799). Table 2.1, adapted from Duncan (1972), further subdivides the components and 
has been modified to include the additional environment considerations by Anderson and 
Zeithaml (1984), Hofer (1975), and Kukalis (1991).
Table 2.1
Components o f the External Task Environments o f Organizations
Customer SuDDliers Comoetitor Socio-Political Technoioeical
Distributors of 
Product/Service
New
Materials
For
Suppliers
Government
Regulation
Meeting New 
Technology
Actual Users of 
Product/Service
Equipment For
Customers
Public
Attitude
Improving New 
Technology
Product
Parts
Relations with 
Trade Unions
Environmental
Complexity
Product/Service Life- 
Cycle
An analysis of the business environmental conditions serves as a consideration of 
the economic risks (e.g., external nontechnological risks o f legal, regulatory, conditions, 
and events affecting the firm) and the commercial risks (e.g., market size, competition, 
customer needs) (Klammer, 1994). Adding risk to the strategic decision leads to a multiple
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attribute decision model (Klammer, 1994). Specific application of the environmental 
components was considered in 20 industries by Bourgeois (1985); however, there was no 
application in any service industries. Other researchers (e.g.. Beard, 1978; Bums & 
Stalker, 1961; Child, 1974; Frederickson, 1986; Miller, 1987a; Pitts, 1980; Tosie, et al. 
1973) have followed the same line of research, but have excluded the services industries. 
There do not appear to be any research studies that focus on environmental considerations 
in the hotel or gaming industries.
Consideration of economic indicators bv the hotel-casino industry. The eleven 
hotel-casino executives interviewed, representing almost half o f hotel-casinos in the 
United States, all used some form of strategic decision-making in determining whether to 
build or expand their properties. Only one, however, relied on economic indicators to 
assist in the decision-making process despite the fact that research has shown a clear 
coimection between a “healthy economy” and “a healthy and profitable industry or 
company” (Amling, 1970, p. 565). Although the United States economy has historically 
shown continual growth, it has done so through repeated business cycles of growth and 
contraction (Horn, 1993; Kacapyr, 1996; Lahiri & Moore, 1991; Link, 1991; Mayo, 1997; 
Moore, 1990; Niemira & Zukowski, 1994; Stock & Watson, 1993). Distinct industries 
have been affected differently by these cycles, but all industries have been impacted by 
them (Harrison, 1996). It therefore becomes important to look at how business cycles are 
forecast and which indicators may be appropriate for use in the hotel-casino industry.
Amling (1970) suggested that, “analysts can use the growth of the national 
economy to forecast the impact o f business cycles on the growth of an industry or
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company” (p. 565). He pointed to such economic indicators as the Federal Reserve Board 
Index o f Industrial Production, Gross National [Domestic] Product, National Income and 
Personal Income to show “that a healthy economy was a prerequisite for a healthy and 
profitable industry or company” (p. 565). One o f the leading investment advisory services. 
Value Line (1998), supports Amling’s assertion; “Estimates o f sales and earnings growth 
for industries and individual companies are derived by correlating sales, earnings, and 
dividends to appropriate components or sub-components o f the National Income 
Accounts” (April, p. 5) The business cycle position within the economy is assessed 
through the use of economic indicators. Once the appropriate economic indicators are 
analyzed the business cycle can be forecast in the short term, i.e., the next six to twenty- 
four months.
Longer term forecasts are captured by wave theory, first studied by Kondratieff 
(1935) and involving overall economic activity over 50- to 60-year cycles. Three other 
wave theories related to specific assets have also been advanced: Kitchen’s (1923) 
inventory cycles lasting 3 to 5 years, Juglar’s (1966) durable goods cycle comprising seven 
to eleven years, and Kuznet’s (1953) investment structures cycle encompassing twenty 
years. Resulting fi’om Schumpeter’s (1927) works, which were later confirmed by 
Rostow (1975), Kuznet proposed that actual expenditure be postponed or advanced to 
conform with short and long-term forecasts (Kacapyr, 1996). Because it deals specifically 
with construction or expansion of properties, the 1955 Nobel Prize winning Kuznet cycle 
approach would seem appropriate for the hotel-casino industry.
Economic indicators can be interpreted and manipulated in a number of different
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ways. Economic indicators are grouped as leading, concurrent, or lagging by the National 
Bureau o f Economic Research (Mayo, 1997). The leading indicators signal when there 
will be peaks or troughs in future business cycles so that the resulting impact on industries 
can be assessed. Because strategic decision-makers are interested in fiiture industry 
revenues, they need to follow leading indicators (Mayo, 1997). The United States 
Department o f Commerce publishes a Composite Index o f 11 leading indicators (Kacapyr, 
1996). These quantitative indicators must be interpreted and assessed in qualitative ways. 
As McNees (1990) stated, “The best forecasts are made, not by abandoning models or by 
abandoning judgment, but by blending both sources of information” (p. 287). Consensus 
forecasts are provided by Blue Chip Economic Indicators, Inc. (BCEI) and combine more 
than fifty economic forecasts each month (Kacapyr, 1996). The state of the art in 
economic forecasting today uses not only the consensus economic forecasts but also 
predictions appropriate to an industry and adjustments by the forecaster (McNees, 1990).
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which includes consumption, investment, 
government purchases, and net exports, is the most reliable statistic for monitoring the 
economy’s progress in terms o f demand (Kacapyr, 1996). In terms o f supply. National 
Income Accounts is the most reliable statistic. Within it. Personal Disposable Income 
(PDI) indicates money available for consumption expenditures. Consumption 
expenditures change in response to increases and decreases in individuals’ demand for 
goods and services, which is also affected by PDI. The United States Department of 
Labor annually surveys consumers as to their expenditures, and from this data, twelve 
classifications o f consumption evolve, one of which is recreation. The recreation
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classification is further subdivided into hard goods and services. The services segment 
includes casino gambling and sightseeing, two of the demand drivers for the hotel-casino 
industry (Turner, 1998). Variety and (Chirstiansen, 1997, 1998), armually develop the 
U.S. Leisure Economy expenditures and provide an additional estimate of amounts spent 
on both leisure hotels and gaming gross revenues. As accepted leading indicators, PDI 
and recreation expenditures have been used by industry analysts but GDP should also be 
considered by hotel-casino strategic decision makers due to the availability and accuracy 
o f predictions developed by leading U.S. economists.
Consideration of business cvcles bv the hotel-casino industry. Although the 
upward trend in total economic growth as well as in gaming and travel in the United 
States (Chirstiansen, 1997 & 1998; Turner, 1998) signals an increase in industry supply, 
the timing of construction or expansion should be coordinated with upward expansion in 
the business cycles to assure opening in a demand-intensive setting. According to Link
(1991), “Donald Trump’s multi-million dollar casino [The Taj Mahal] opened in Atlantic 
City when our economy was in the midst of a prolonged economic slowdown and did not 
start off with the bang that was anticipated at its conception.” In fact, the hotel-casino 
went bankrupt in just 12 months. Perhaps opening in a down economy was a factor that 
led to the failure. Link (1991) suggested that the introduction o f  a new product in a 
downturn of the business cycle can apply added pressure to the success of the venture, but 
when the economy is poised for an expansion, a new venture can be very profitable. 
According to Quek (1997), the hotel industry is cyclical, and developers should time 
investments according to the various regional business cycles. KPMG Peat Marwick LLP
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(1996) lists the shift in economic cycles as one o f  the five major trends in creating 
opportunities for the hospitality industry. Eadington and Hattori (1977) showed that 
gaming revenues had not been aftected by the national economy and coined the term 
“recession-proof’ (p. 28). According to Christiansen (1997), “The seesaw changes in 
position [Gross Gaming revenues and Personal Income] show that consumer spending on 
gambling is not independent of general trends in the economy...casinos and lotteries are 
not, as they are popularly supposed to be, recession-proof’ (p. 76). In fact, the work by 
Cargill (1979) has suggested that gaming revenues are affected by the business cycle. In 
addition, Ismail (1993) concluded that the lodging industry is negatively affected by the 
business cycle. Thus, along with economic indicators, hotel-casino strategic decision­
makers should also be assessing the overall economy and the business cycles within.
While economic indicators assess the economy business cycles, business cycles 
can, in turn, forecast movements in monetary policy, specifically interest rates (Link,
1990). Based on this finding. Link (1990) suggested that knowledge o f business cycle 
movement be used to establish the intrinsic discount rate used in the capital budgeting 
process. Thus, if economic indicators were to be used in the hotel-casino industry, 
strategic decision makers might be able to negotiate interest rates better and adjust their 
discount rates to more accurately reflect risk.
Nearly all business cycle analysis has been applied to industries concerned with 
industrial production. Moore (1987) studied a services industry approach. He found that 
the growth rate in services and the overall economy are very similar in their cyclical 
timing. As service industries, the entertainment, recreation, and, more specifically, the
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gaming industry should include business cycle analysis through the use of economic 
indicators in strategic decision-making, but to date, only Cargill (1979), Ismail (1993) and 
Rosa (1981) seem to have studied economic impacts in the lodging and gaming 
environment. While Ismail considered the lodging industry on a national scope, Cargill 
(1979) based his studies on the employment factor in Nevada, and Rosa (1981) restricted 
his study to Las Vegas, limiting its usefulness as a national study.
Consideration of product life-cvcles bv the hotel-casino industry. Just as stages in 
the business cycle can positively or negatively impact the opening or expansion o f  a hotel- 
casino, so can stages in the product life-cycle. Working with the League o f  Nations 
during the worldwide depression o f the 1930's, Haberben (1937) introduced the concept 
that each industry and related product has cycles o f growth, maturity, and decline. 
Additional refinements to the work of Haberben were undertaken by Grodinsky (1953), 
Kuznets (1965), and Mead and Grodinsky (1939). Their studies found the following: (a) 
during the early life o f a product or industry, extremely high and rapid rates o f growth will 
occur; (b) as the industry expands, over longer periods of time, the percentage rate of 
growth will diminish and fall to GDP growth rates near the end of the interval; (c) 
depending on the industry or product, growth rates will stagnate or actually fall below 
GDP rates; and (d) some industry or product life-cycles may actually decline or be 
eliminated. The life cycle o f an industry or product may range from six months to 30 years 
(Genesis Strategies, 1998).
While only one of the hotel-casino executives interviewed indicated that product 
life-cycle was a consideration, experts in strategic management include product life cycle
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in strategy formulation, planning, and decision-making (Anderson & Zeithaml, 1984; 
Hofer, 1975). Within the hospitality industry, Tse and Olsen (1989) mentioned, “For 
firms in the maturing hospitality industry to survive and grow they will have to depend 
upon their ability to strategically align themselves with the turbulent environment and 
select appropriate strategies to create défendable competitive positions” (p. 89). Past 
attempts to validate the existence of the life cycle have uncovered many shapes, durations, 
and sequences depending on the specific industry (Buzzell, 1966; Cox, 1967; Polli &
Cook, 1969; Rink & Swan, 1979). Knowledge o f the life cycle is, thus, critical to 
informed forecasting and strategy development. Day (1981) showed that product life­
cycles can be impacted fi"om sequentially unfolding segments. That is, a product or service 
that began in one area o f  the country may satiate the demand in that area, but its overall 
life cycle can be extended by introducing it to another area. The spread o f legalized 
gaming clearly fits this pattern.
Christiansen (1998) pointed out that the initial legalization of a gaming jurisdiction 
is typically accompanied by a rapid growth in gaming revenues which fulfill an unsatiated 
demand. Following this phase, gaming revenue growth rates typically decline but remain 
higher than the GDP growth rates (Christiansen, 1997) However, at some point, the 
growth rates will equal or fall below GDP (Christiansen, 1998), indicating a mature or 
declining stage of the product life cycle. In fact, gaming researchers and writers have 
already mentioned areas o f weaker growth or maturity within the industry (Ader, 1998; 
Christiansen, 1997, 1998; Palermo, 1998; Turner, 1998). These characteristics are mirror 
images of the product life-cycle theory. Because the hotel-casino industry would seem to
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contain revenue growth characteristics that can at least be partially explained by product 
life-cycle theory, it would also seem to be important to determine the shape, duration, and 
sequence o f the hotel-casino industry’s life cycle.
Characteristics o f phases within the life cycle have been analyzed by many 
researchers. Zaltman and Stiff (1973) were concerned with determinants of the rate of 
diftusion during the initial trajectory stage. Webster (1969) considered the perceived risk 
o f the probability of a negative outcome as a joint function of the financial exposure in the 
event o f failure coupled with uncertainty as to the outcome. The transition to rapid 
growth phase was analyzed by Porter (1980) when he considered three factors; (a) 
changes in the relationships with substitute products, (b) competitive entry strategies, and 
(c) the influence of repeat buying. An evolution to maturity in the life cycle results when 
the growth rate slows, and forces in this stage were researched by a number of studies: 
Buzzell (1981), Conley (1970), Thorelli and Bumett (1981), and Wasson (1978) 
concentrated on competitive turbulence in this phase of the product life-cycle. Day (1981) 
considered expanded market potential, and Erickson and Montgomery (1980) assessed 
buyer learning. The onset of decline was studied by Harrigan (1980), who concluded that 
some declining markets were more favorable than others if there were pockets of enduring 
demand, while Michael (1971) found it useful to distinguish a stage of petrification 
following decline if sales stabilized at some lower level.
An integral part of the product life-cycle concept is the identification of distinct 
stages, which reflect different opportunities and threats with respect to marketing strategy 
and profit potential (Kotler, 1980). Wind (1981) worked with identification of the
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boundaries and the variety of possible life cycle patterns. He concluded that one cannot 
avoid forecasting the future sales path o f the product if sensible judgments about the 
present life cycle position are to be made. Four distinguishing features o f life cycle phases 
were offered by Wind (1981); (a) a constraint on continual growth within a level o f 
saturation, (b) an S-shaped difiiision curve, (c) an assumption about the homogeneity o f 
consumers, and (d) no explicit consideration o f marketing decision variables. Heeler and 
Hustad (1980) found that “when the assumptions are not unduly limiting and there is 
sufficient prior sales data to obtain stable parameter estimates, reasonable forecasts can be 
achieved” (p. 1017). Improvements in the forecasting accuracy of the model have been 
sought mainly through the addition of decision variables (Bass, 1980; Doland & Jeuland, 
1981; Lillien (1980), Robinson & Lakhani, 1975). There are numerous variables that have 
been hypothesized to behave as leading indicators o f the top-out point when product sales 
growth slows to the GDP rate (Patel & Younger, 1978; Porter, 1980, Wilson, 1969). As 
Day (1981) explained, “The rate of decline will depend on changes in the demand for the 
benefits, or the ability of emerging substitute products to do a superior job o f delivering 
the benefits” (p. 65).
A realistic view of using product life-cycle in strategic decision-making is that life­
cycle analysis serves several different roles such as “an enabling condition, a moderating 
variable, or a consequence of strategic decisions” (Day, 1981, p. 65). According to Hofer 
(1975), ’’The product life c^cle is a versatile firamework for organizing contingent 
hypotheses about appropriate strategy alternatives” (p.505). It also directs “management 
attention toward anticipation of the consequences o f the underlying dynamics o f the
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served market” (Day, 1981, p. 65 ). There appears to be very little research o f product 
life-cycles in the services sector and none in the hotel-casino industry. Non-use o f this 
planning vehicle misses a potential factor that could sway or moderate a decision. Use of 
the factor could assist planners in the hotel-casino industry and might serve as an 
additional consideration that could moderate the failure rate of hotel-casinos.
Firm characteristics. Characteristics o f a firm include both quantitative and 
qualitative features. Bourgeois (1985) studied quantitative measures of organizational 
strengths and weaknesses. He used a “composite o f return on total assets, growth in net 
earnings, growth in earnings per share (EPS), improvement in profit margin (return on 
sales), and growth in capital averaged over the five years preceding data collection” (p. 
558). The growth measures, net earnings and capital, indicate increases in shareholder 
wealth. The other measures reflect the efficiency o f  management and the profitability o f 
the firm.
In addition to quantitative assessments, Harrison (1996) offered four qualitative 
categories for analysis: (a) management as indicated by the track record of top decision­
makers, (b) technology as indicated by the ability o f management to keep up with 
technological iimovations, (c) policies to provide governance and guidance, and (d) 
resources which include not only fiscal resources but human, physical and institutional 
resources o f the organization both in kind and quantity which are being utilized to 
maintain a competitive advantage in the external environment. Another study by 
Papadakis, Lioukas, and Chambers (1998) included systems, performance, size, and 
ownership as internal firm characteristics. The formal planning systems of an organization
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would be expected to include an analysis o f these firm characteristics (Armstrong, 1982; 
Miller, 1987b). Virtually all strategic initiatives require resources, and according to 
Bourgeois (1981) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), a resource perspective may be added 
to the determinants of strategic decision processes. Size of the firm was shown as an asset 
to decision-making by Child (1972) and Frederickson and laquinto (1989). However, 
Dean and Sharfinan (1993) and Hickson et al. (1986) disagreed and believed that size was 
a liability. According to Lioukas, Bourantas, & Papadakis, (1993), “corporate control, 
including private vs. public ownership, may decisively affect decision-making practices and 
processes” (p. 655).
Internal assessment of hotel-casinos through failure prediction. Any firm must 
analyze whether it is financially strong enough to enter into the development o f a new 
project. When that project involves two to four years to implement, such as the 
construction of a hotel-casino, the assessment must include a forward-looking prediction 
of the firm’s financial position, yet the consideration of whether the financial position will 
improve or deteriorate must be made prior to the start of the contracting phase of the 
development. Current or short-term projections can profoundly be affected during the 
project development stage when there are additional construction costs without 
accompanying revenues thereby creating a situation that could lead to failure. The 
expansion or construction of a hotel-casino project typically falls into an extended 
development period, but the consideration o f possible financial failure must be made prior 
to the signing of construction contracts. Therefore, an understanding of financial failure 
projection models would seem appropriate as one element for the strategic decision
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makers as they perform an internal assessment o f their firm prior to the go-ahead decision.
Forecasting financial failure allows for timely decisions to be made relative to the 
reallocation of assets to more efficient uses (Cook & Nelson, 1998), and the ability to 
forecast potential failure provides an early warning system so that an appropriate 
allocation o f resources can take place (Lev, 1974). Numerous models have been 
developed over the past 60 years beginning with the early work o f Fitzpatrick (1931). 
These models have ranged fi-om relatively simple univariate approaches of one financial 
ratio to the use of multiple discriminant analysis involving as many as 32 ratios. More 
recently, the use of neural networks through computer analysis has made the forecasts 
more accurate (Altman, Marco, & Varetto, 1994).
Beaver (1966, 1968) and Altman (1968) were the first researchers to develop 
financial failure models with the ability to predict future bankruptcy potential (Cook & 
Nelson, 1998). The significance of their work was twofold: (a) financial ratios could be 
used to predict failure, and (b) available ratios could not be used indiscriminately because 
some ratios were more accurate in their predictive ability than others. Beaver (1966,
1968) used univariate ratio analysis and market price information in his model. In 
addition, he introduced a dichotomous classification test in which a firm’s ratio was 
compared with the ratio of other firms by placing it in an array; that introduced a cut-off 
point based on previous experience with failed and non-failed firms through the use o f 14 
financial ratios. Wilcox (1971) used the earlier work o f Beaver and was able to predict 
financial failure for a period of up to four years before bankruptcy. His method was to 
identify the distance from failure of a firm at a particular point in time by using a stochastic
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cash flow model; he then measured a firm’s financial progress by noting any movement 
indicating the potential of financial failure.
Altman (1968) used the multivariate approach to forecast financial failure to 
overcome the potentially conflicting indications that may result fi'om using a  single 
variable. He adopted the use o f multiple discriminant analysis, i.e., an analysis which 
enables variables to be classified into groups and then attempts to find the linear 
combination o f variables that best discriminates between groups after the discriminant 
function has been computed. A single discriminant value or score can be computed for 
predictive purposes (SPSS, 1975). Altman (1968) named the discriminant value Zeta and 
the model became know as the Altman Z-score. His model produced a 95% accuracy rate 
for predicting financial failure within the first year and 72% in the second year. Further 
research with the Altman Z-score found even higher accuracy rates (Altman, Halderman,
& Narayanan, 1977). Moyer (1977), in a replication o f the Altman model, was able to 
improve the forecasting accuracy to 90% and 83% respectively. However, Moyer was 
able to move three years ahead and obtain a success rate of 73%.
Blum (1974) proposed the use o f his Failing Company Model to predict business 
failures. His work was able to predict financial failure four to five years ahead o f the event 
with a 70% accuracy factor. The most advanced early-warning model was developed by 
Rose and Giroux (1984) by developing an eighteen-variable predictive model which 
proved to be successful in predicting bankruptcies extending into the seventh year prior to 
failure. Their accuracy of prediction ranged from a low of 78% in year six to a high of 
94% in year one. Addressing the impact o f inflation, Norton and Smith (1979) found that
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there was no significant difference between adjusted and unadjusted financial ratios.
Research in the area o f financial failure predictions has made available the means 
for firms to analyze, monitor, and correct their financial weaknesses. Although the 
research has typically been conducted in manufacturing and financial industries, the same 
ratios have been suggested for service industries (Altman, 1968; Appetiti, 1984; Aziz & 
Lawson, 1988; Blum, 1974; Deakin 1972; Edmister, 1972; Gentry, Newbold, & Whitford, 
1985; Laitinen, 1989, 1993; Libby, 1975; Lincoln, 1984; Ohlson, 1980; Rose & Giroux, 
1984; Sheppard, 1994; Shumway, 1998; Tamari, 1984; Zavgren, 1985). There does not 
appear to be research specific to the hotel-casino industry. However, the magnitude o f 
investments in the hotel-casino industry and the length of the construction process seem to 
be elements that would make such research appropriate for the industry.
Summary o f the Structure of Strategic Decision-Making
In conclusion, Papadakis, Lioukas, and Chambers (1998) found that in the 
broadest context, the external environment and internal context of the firm are the 
foundations fi-om which all strategic decision-making should flow. These two elements 
were found to receive only cursory considerations within the hotel-casino project planning 
processes. Once the two structural components have been aligned, patterns, links, and 
chains o f causation must be tested both forward and backwards (Einhom & Hogarth, 
1987). According to the researchers, “forward thinking is similar to a mathematical 
algorithm; the decision maker selects available data, evaluates the variables and then 
predicts (or calculates) an outcome: backward thinking is more suggestive and intuitive 
requiring judgment and diagnostic analysis” (p. 6 6 ). This retrospective thought process
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involving a potential future event (Kukalis, 1991) may enhance hotel-casino project 
decision-making and lead to more profound environmental and organizational analysis.
Hotel-Casino Studies 
There have been limited attempts to establish an industry encompassing both hotels 
and casinos. For investment tracking. Value Line (1998) has combined a number of firms 
and named the industry hotel/gaming; however, it includes such non-gaming hotels as 
Marriott, the gaming machine company International Game Technology, and Jackpot 
Enterprises, a Las Vegas route gaming company. Turner (1998) of Salomon Smith 
Barney publishes an Annual State o f the Industry Report: Gaming, but its analysis is 
restricted to only the casino gaming industry and related gaming revenues without 
considering other sources o f income to the corporations, specifically lodging, food and 
beverage, entertainment, and other sales/revenue contributions. Ader (1998) of Bear 
Steams Equity Research issues the annual Global Gaming Almanac, which focuses on 
gaming revenues and also includes gaming machine manufacturers and route gaming firms. 
There do not appear to be any other investment analysts that attempt to concentrate their 
studies on the same industry definition as used in this study.
Decomposing industry segments into its two elements, hotels, and casinos, 
numerous studies and popular press articles in the hotel industry were found in such 
categories as human resources, marketing, legislation, as well as accounting, financial, 
taxation, and security measures. Many articles profiled specific corporations in the 
industry and their operating procedures. Teare and Boer (1991) edited Strategic
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Hospitality Management: Theory and Practice for the 1990s. but failed to include any 
articles on corporate strategic planning of new or expanding properties. Beals (1989), 
Beals and Troy (1982), and Turkel (1995) were highly critical of the current procedures 
used in feasibility studies. Turkel (1995), a staff hotel expert with ITT for seyen years, 
stated that “of the hundreds of hotel feasibility studies I read, none concluded that a 
project should not be built and that the deal was therefore feasible” ( p. 56).
In the casino element o f the industry, numerous studies and popular press articles 
concerned legalization, legislation, and regulation; gaming history; gambling addiction; 
social and economic impacts; marketing; operations management; human resources; and 
accounting, finance, and taxes. Reiman (1993) analyzed strategic management in Las 
Vegas, concentrating on strategic operational procedures dealing with human relations 
and marketing, but not on corporate strategic planning for new projects. Corporate 
strategic planning was considered by Macomber (1993), who discussed forecasting 
requirements for a new hotel-casino property, and by Thompson (1993), who pointed out 
risks that must be considered by a gaming property. Howeyer, of the more than 2000 
articles or studies located, only the previous three studies involved strategic planning, and 
only one o f three studies, Macomber (1993), could offer any important contribution.
There did not appear to be any studies dealing with the failures that have occurred in 
either industry or the reasons why the failure rate has been so excessive when the 
industries are combined into a hotel-casino industry.
The noticeable lack of interest in researching the elements of planning for hotel- 
casino property construction or expansion seems to point to a need to explore current
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industry practices and procedures that might offer assistance to strategic planners. The 
emphasis on strategic management of operations and competitive advantage are valuable, 
but without equal consideration of strategic planning o f construction or expansion to 
include a total strategic planning process, a most vital link would seem to be missing in the 
total strategic management processes.
Conclusion
While the literature reviewed comes from different perspectives, it all points to the 
fact that there is a considerable amount o f theory existing in the process o f planning for 
strategic development in many industries and that the theory may be readily transferrable 
to the service industry and specifically to the hotel-casino industry. However, there is an 
apparent lack of research in the use of this theory in the hotel-casino industry, which may 
point to one reason for the high rate of failure in hotel-casinos.
There are many areas that could be explored for inclusion in the strategic planning 
process. However, this study will attempt to utilize the theory that exists, hypothesize 
three elements that might be newly considered, and test their adaptability to the hotel- 
casino industry. The study does not attempt to be all inclusive but, rather, a beginning to 
the consideration of items that may lead to more successfiil project developments.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTERS
METHODOLOGY 
The problem of failure and financial troubles in hotel-casino development was 
established in Chapter 1  o f this study. Chapter 2 reviewed the contemporary theory and 
studies that have been undertaken in strategic management and strategic planning within 
the United States’ manufacturing and service industries and pointed out that there have 
been minimal studies done in strategic development of hotel-casinos. To investigate 
various means o f enhancing the hotel-casino planning process in lieu of contemporary 
theory, three research questions were presented. This chapter develops and explains the 
methodology used to explore those research questions.
Using an ex post facto design, the methodology is separate for each o f the research 
questions. Each question is restated by the development of null ?nd alternative hypotheses 
concerning the applicability and, in some cases, the value to the strategic planning process. 
The explanation of methodology for each question includes the following: (a) data used, 
(b) how data was obtained, and (c) the statistical, accounting, economic, and financial 
procedures used in assessing the data.
Research Question 1 : Economic Indicators 
Cargill and Eadington (1975, 1976) concluded that gross gaming revenue (GGR)
49
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was not affected by the national economy and GGR was “recession-proof,” but their study 
took place almost a 50quarter of a century ago. Ismail (1993) recently showed that 
lodging revenues, one portion of the hotel-casino industry revenues, was negatively 
impacted by the national economy. However, Wheaton and Rossoff (1998) found that 
“demand for hotel night stays moves very closely with U.S. GDP.” With the passing of 
time and the contradiction between the economy’s impact on the two main sources of 
revenue in the hotel-casino industry, it may be time to revisit the issue. Thus, the first 
research question asks: Are hotel-casino industry gaming revenues correlated to economic 
indicators on both national and jurisdictional levels? If so, can this correlation be extended 
to help predict failed hotel-casinos which open during one year prior to and during the 
economic downturn? To examine the impact of the national economy on gaming revenue 
and how it pertains to strategic planning for hotel-casino projects is a three-step process.
Step Number 1  : National Economv to Gaming Revenues 
The first step was to compare the national economy to gaming revenues. The 
national economy was represented by percentage change in gross domestic product (GDP) 
because such change in GDP is the sole indicator of a recession as established by the 
National Bureau o f Economic Research (NBER), which defines a recession as “two 
consecutive quarters o f negative growth in GDP ” (1993 Economic Report of the 
President, p. 42). The gaming revenue portion of the hotel-casino industry was 
represented by percentage change in GGR. While GGR includes all gaming properties, 
not just hotel-casinos, it is still an accurate indicator of hotel-casino gaming revenues 
because these properties account for more than 80% of total gaming revenues in Nevada
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(1997 Nevada Gamine Abstract) and 100% o f the total gaming revenues in Atlantic City, 
NJ (Ader, 1998). The combined revenues o f these two legalized gaming jurisdictions 
account for more than 50% of total gaming revenues (Turner, 1998). GGR is available 
from three sources: Turner’s 1998 State o f the Industry report: Gaming. Ader’s 1998 
Global Gaming Almanac, and Christiansen’s (1997, 1998) Annual Gross Wager. GDP is 
ayailable from the U.S. Department o f Commerce. These four sources proyided the data 
for research question 1 . Because the definition o f a recession is based on quarters, GGR 
and GDP were compared on a quarterly basis beginning with the first quarter o f 1971 and 
ending with the fourth quarter of 1997. The quarterly data for both GGR and GDP were 
seasonalized. This time period was selected because 1977 was one year before the first 
gaming jurisdiction outside o f Neyada was approyed and signaled a moye by the gaming 
industry from a regional to national scope. It also includes three recessions, 1978-79, 
1980-81, and 1990-91, and encompasses a time frame following previous studies of the 
topic. The hypothesis for the first step in this process can be formalized as:
Hypothesis 1.1
H „ :  % A  G G R ^ ( q n . ( q n . l ) ]  *  ^ ^^ K q iK q n -l)]
H,; % A  GGR{(<p^q i^)] =  % A  G D P [(q ^ (p .,)]
Where:
% A GGRj(ç^q„.i)j is the percentage change in Gross Gaming Reyenue between 
quarters after the quarters haye been seasonalized.
% A GDP[(qn<qn-i)] Is the percentage change in Gross Domestic Product between 
quarter after the quarters haye been seasonalized.
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The Pearson Product-moment (Pearson r) measure o f correlation was calculated to 
determine the correlation between percentage change in quarterly GGR and percentage 
change in quarterly GDP, and serve as a test statistic for the hypothesis acceptability. The 
Pearson r  correlation coefficient involving continuous data is calculated to show the linear 
relationship between two variables and is the most widely used measure o f relationships 
involving continuous scales (Schumacher & McMillan, 1993). The Pearson r is calculated 
through the following equation:
N Z X Y -(IX )(IY )
Pearson r =  j ------------------ — -i------------------- -------
VN^X^-(^X)^* VNXY" - (YJf
Where:
^X Y  is the sum o f the XY cross products,
X is GDP[(q^q^i)j 
Y is GGR((q^q^i)
^X  is the sum o f the X values,
£Y  is the sum o f the Y values,
%[X^  is the sum o f  the squared X values,
£Y^ is the sum o f the squared Y values, and 
N is the number o f  pairs of values.
Hg states that % a GGR (^q^<p,.i)j is not correlated, at a .05 level o f significance with 91 
degrees of freedom, to movements in the % a  GDP^ q^^ qn-i)]- states the alternative 
hypothesis that % a  GGR£(<p^ q^ Dj is correlated, at a .05 level o f significance with 91 
degrees of freedom, to movements in the % a  GDPfj^^^^ijj.
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While a lack of correlation between the two variables may indicate a tendency for 
GGR not to follow the same upward and downward trends of GDP, a significant 
correlation may indicate that GGR does, indeed, have a tendency to reflect GDP trends. 
This knowledge may become useful to strategic planners for hotel-casino projects. The 
Pearson r was computed by software available in SPSS version 7.5 (Norusis, 1997).
Should the null hypothesis not be rejected, it will be necessary to examine the data 
for quarterly lead and lag indicators and apply the same hypotheses testing and test 
statistic to the eight quarters leading the GDP and the eight quarters lagging the GDP.
The reason eight quarters was designated related to the time period for building a hotel- 
casino generally considered to average two years or eight quarters. It would be necessary 
to test the additional 16 hypotheses and a matrix o f concurrent, lead, and lag Pearson r 
correlations will be used to determine wether the null or alternative hypotheses would be 
significant.
Step Number 2: Legalized Gaming Jurisdictions
The second step in the process was to decompose the data into distinct legalized 
gaming jurisdictions and follow the same procedure as in step 1  to determine if there was a 
correlation between the percentage change in quarterly legalized gaming jurisdiction 
(GGR„) and the percentage change in quarterly national economic indicator (GDP). 
Although there are ten legalized gaming jurisdictions containing hotel-casinos as shown in 
Table 3.1, this step was limited to only four of the legalized gaming jurisdictions because 
the other seven did not have gross gaming revenues during the recession periods.
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Table 3.1
Legalized Gaming Jurisdictions which Contain Hotel-Casinos
No. Gaming Jurisdiction Location Variable Name Number Hotel-Casinos
1 Las Vegas Nevada LVGGR 61
2 Reno/Sparks Nevada RSGGR 18
3 Lake Tahoe Nevada LTGGR 6
4 Atlantic Citv New Jersev ACGGR 12
5 Mississippi Mississippi MSGGR 15
6 Louisiana Louisiana LAGGR 4
7 Missouri Missouri MOGGR 3
8 Indiana Indiana INGGR 2
9 Illinois Illinois ILGGR 1
10 Iowa Iowa lAGGR 1
Other includes Indian 19
TOTALS 142
Notes. Appendix A - U.S. Casino Data Base
The hypothesis for the second step in this process is:
Hypothesis 1.2
%A GGRn[(qn-(<#-l)] *
H,: % A  GGRg[(qn-(<p-l)] ~ GDP[(q^q^i)]
Where:
% A  GGRn[(^<p i^)] is the percentage change in jurisdiction Gross Gaming Revenue 
between quarters after the quarters have been seasonalized.
% A  GDP[(q,^^i)j is the percentage change in Gross Domestic Product between 
quarter after the quarters have been seasonalized.
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The Pearson r  measure o f correlation, previously described, was calculated to determine if 
there was a correlation between GGR, and GDP, and to serve as the test statistic for the 
hypothesis acceptability. states that GGR^ is not correlated, at a .05 level o f 
significance with the appropriate degrees o f freedom, to movements in the GDP. H, states 
the alternative hypothesis that: GGR^ is correlated, at a .05 level of significance with n 
degrees o f fi-eedom, to movements in the GDP.
While a lack of correlation between the two variables may indicate a tendency for 
GGR„ not to follow the same upward and downward trends of GDP, a significant 
correlation may indicate that GGR^ does, indeed, have a tendency to reflect GDP trends. 
This knowledge may also become useful to strategic planners for hotel-casino projects by 
considering the legalized gaming jurisdiction for their developments. The Pearson r  will 
be computed by software available in SPSS version 7.5 (Norusis, 1997).
Step Number 3: Successful and Troubled Projects 
Had step 2 been successful (see results in chapter 4), the third step in the process 
would have involved assigning the 142 hotel-casinos (see Appendix A) plus those hotel- 
casinos which have failed and not reopened (see Table 1.3) into two groups. Group 1 
would have included those hotel-casinos that opened in a time period that was within two 
years prior to the first quarter o f a recessionary period or during a recessionary period. 
According to Rushmore (1986), the first two years o f  a project’s life are the most crucial 
in creating continual demand for occupancy. Group 2 would have included those hotel- 
casinos that opened prior to two years o f the first quarter o f a recessionary period. Each 
o f these two groups would have been subdivided based on failure and success. The hotel-
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casinos which have been listed as failed or troubled in Table 1.3 would have been 
identified as Group 1 failure hotel-casinos GPIF; successful hotel-casinos opened under 
the same time parameters would have been identified as GPIS. Group 2  failure hotel- 
casinos would have been identified as GP2F, and successful hotel-casinos similarly 
identified as GP2S. Only GPIF and GP2F hotel-casinos would have been compared 
because the purpose was to determine if recessions have a greater impact on failure.
The statistical technique o f  chi-square goodness-of-fit test (%^ (Churchill, 1995) 
would have been used to determine if there is any significant failure rate difference in the 
two groups at a level o f .05. To employ this test it is necessary to calculate the expected 
number o f cases that would fall in each category and to compare that with the observed 
number actually falling in the category using the statistic;
=  2  ---------------
E,.
Where:
Oj is the observed number o f cases falling in the /th category (GP^F or S),
Ej is the expected number o f  cases falling in the fth category (GP^F or S /  GPJ; 
k  is the number of categories (4).
The Chi Square would have been computed by software available in SPSS version 7.5 
(Norusis, 1997).
The hypothesis for the third step in the process would have been formalized as:
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Hypothesis 1.3
GP1F = GP2F 
H,: GPIF # GP2F
Where:
GPIF are those hotel-casinos in Group I which have failed, and 
GP2F are those hotel-casinos in Group 2 which have failed.
The acceptance of the null hypothesis would have indicated that there is no significant 
difference in failure rates between the two groups and negate further development o f the 
consideration o f economic indicators in success or failure to the hotel-casino industry 
strategic planning processes. However, should the alternative hypothesis have been 
accepted, indicating that there may be value to considering the economic indicators, two 
more statistical processes would have been applied, a chi-square contingency table and the 
index of predictive association.
Step Number 3 - Subprocess 1
According to Churchill (1995), the contingency coefficient indicates the strength of 
the association between the variables. When there is no association between the variables, 
the lower limit o f the contingency coefficient (C J is zero. The upper limit (CuJ is a 
function of the number of categories for two perfectly correlated variables and is 
determined by the formula:
Cui= N (r-l)/r
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Where;
r is the number o f rows (GPl and GP2) assuming the number of columns 
are equal to the number of rows.
The development o f parameters of the range of the contingency coefficient would provide
a range for placement o f the computed contingency coefficient and provide a means of
describing how strong the variables are correlated with one another. A high association
would have indicated a strong relationship, and a low association would have indicated a
weak relationship (Churchill, 1995).
The contingency coefficient (C) formula is:
C =  N%-/n4-%2
Where;
n is the sample size of active hotel-casinos plus those that failed and 
were not reopened), and
is the chi-square.
Should a relatively weak association have been evidenced by the contingency coefficient, 
the process would have been terminated indicating that there is limited applicability o f 
economic indicators to the development o f hotel-casino projects. However, if there had 
been a relatively strong association indicated, a measure o f predictive ability would have 
been determined.
Step Number 3 - Subprocess 2
The index of predictive association (A ^), described by Churchill, (1995), is 
appropriate for nominally scaled variables. There are both criterion variables (A), which in 
this study are the success or failure characteristics o f the hotel-casinos, and predictor
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59
variables (B), the time prior to the beginning of a recession. The index o f  predictive 
association measures the relative decrease in probability o f error by taking account of the 
B classification (time) in predicting the A classification (success/failure), over the error of 
prediction when the B classification (time) is unknown, caused by the difficulty o f 
predicting when a recession might occur. The index o f predictive association varies fi-om 0 
to 1. It is zero if the B classification (time) is of no help in predicting the A classification 
(success/failure) and 1 if the B classification (time) completely predicts the A classification 
(success/failure).
Assuming that the A classification (success/failure) is being predicted fi-om the B 
classification (time), then the index o f predictive association is calculated as follows;
^A.B -
n - n ^
Where;
n^ is the largest marginal fi-equency among the A classifications 
(success/failure),
n^ n, is the largest fi-equency in the 6 th row (or column) of the table.
According to Churchill (1995) this would demonstrate the two important questions in 
association analysis. First, is there association between the criterion (success/failure) and 
predictor (time) variables, or are they independent? Second, if they are dependent, by 
how much are predictions about the criterion variable (success/failure) improved by taking 
into account the important predictor (time) variables? Had the analysis o f  Research 
Question 1 reached this final stage, it would have become possible to make predictions of
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the association between success or failure of hotel-casino projects when opened within 
two years of the first quarter of a recessionary period.
Research Question 2; Product Service Life Cycle 
The second research question continued to explore the analysis o f the external 
environment of the hotel-casino industry by considering the life cycle for the demand of 
gaming products/services offered. The specific question was: Does the product/service 
life cycle for gaming revenues apply to the hotel-casino industry on either a national or 
jurisdictional level? If so, can this application be extended to help predict the success or 
failure of hotel-casinos? Ismail (1993) concluded that the lodging industry appeared to be 
in the maturity stage of its industry product life cycle. Although there have been comments 
that certain legalized gaming jurisdictions appear to be experiencing maturity (Ader, 1998; 
Christiansen, 1997, 1998; Turner, 1998), there have not been any definitive studies to 
develop a product/service life cycle (PSLC) in the gaming industry. Therefore, it seemed 
necessary to create a preliminary description of the gaming PSLC and then apply it to 
answer the two questions.
Product/Service Life-Cvcle Development 
The baseline for establishing the gaming product/service life cycle involved using 
total U.S. gross gaming revenue fi*om 1975 through 1997. Despite the existence o f 
legalized gaming in Nevada starting in 1931, the baseline year o f 1975 was selected 
because it allowed three years of base data prior to the existence o f gaming as a national 
industry. Growth rates o f U.S. GDP (U.S. Dept. Of Commerce, 1998) for these 23 years
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of gaming established the basis against which each legalized gaming jurisdiction’s gross 
gaming revenue (GGRJ was compared. Data for both USGGR and GGR^ were available 
from Ader (1998), Christiansen (1997, 1998), and Turner (1998). Designations of the 
four stages related to growth rate changes within any PSLC have been identified as 
introduction, growth, maturity, and decline (Hofer, 1975). Various researchers (e.g., 
Amling, 1970; Anderson & Zeithall, 1984; Hofer, 1975; Vrind, 1981) agree that the 
introductory stage of the PSLC indicates a very high rate o f growth, perhaps as much as 
three times the GDP, which typically averages 3-4% over time (Amling, 1970). During 
the PSLC growth stage, the comparable growth rate tapers off to a rate o f perhaps double 
the GDP (Amling, 1970). The maturity stage o f the PSLC is defined as that point where 
the industry revenue growth is approximately equal to  the growth rate of the GDP 
(Amling, 1970). Finally, the decline phase o f the PSLC will be less than the growth rate of 
GDP (Amling, 1970).
Comparisons of Legalized Gamine Jurisdictions Stages to Gaming PSLC 
With an industry life cycle established, the stage o f legalized gaming jurisdiction 
growth was determined by a GGRJ GDP index. The index was developed by dividing the 
GDP growth rate into the GGR, growth rate. Based on Amling’s (1970) work, the 
standards of the PSLC were set at introduction (>2.5), growth (2.5 to 1.5), maturity (<1.5 
to 1), and decline (<1). The stages were then identified by comparing the index to the 
standards set during the years of the legalized gaming jurisdiction development.
Opening of Hotel-Casino Properties in the Gaming PSLC 
With jurisdictional PSLCs established, hotel-casino openings were categorized by
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the gaming PSLC stages. Financially troubled hotel-casinos within each o f these four 
categories were then identified in order to compare the failure rates for hotel-casinos 
opening during the first two stages with hotel-casinos opening during the last two stages. 
The hypothesis for this step in the process was formalized as:
Hypothesis 2.1
H.: GPSLCIF = GPSLC2F 
H.: GPSLCIF ^ GPSLC2F
Where:
GPSLCIF is the failed number o f hotel-casinos opening in the introductory or 
growth stages of a PSLC, and
GPSLC2F is the failed number o f hotel-casinos opening in the maturity or decline 
stages o f a PSLC.
The statistical technique o f chi-square goodness-of-fit test (%^ ) (Churchill, 1995) was used 
to determine if there was any significant difference in the failure rate o f the two groups at 
a level of .05. To employ this test it was necessary to calculate the expected number o f 
cases that would fall in each category and to compare that with the observed number 
actually falling in the category using the statistic:
.  [ 0 . - E , r
'=• E,
Where:
<9, is the failure rate o f cases falling in GPSLCIF,
E, is the failure rate o f cases falling in GPSLCIF; 
k  is the number of categories (2 ).
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Hg stated that the failure rate o f Group 1 hotel-casinos is equal to the failure rate o f Group 
2 hotel-casinos at a .05 level o f significance with the appropriate degrees o f fi-eedom. H, 
stated that the failure rate o f group 1  hotel-casinos is not equal to the failure rate o f Group 
2 hotel-casinos at a .05 level o f significance with the appropriate degrees o f fi-eedom.
The acceptance o f the null hypothesis would indicate that there is no significant 
difference in failure rates between the two groups and would negate further development 
o f the consideration of gaming industry PSLC in success or failure to the hotel-casino 
industry strategic planning processes. However, should the alternative hypothesis be 
accepted, there may be predictive value to considering the gaming industry PSLC when 
planning for the development o f a hotel-casino project, and two more statistical processes 
were applied, a chi-square contingency table and the index of predictive association. 
Chi-square Contineencv Table
According to Churchill (1995), the contingency coefficient indicates the strength of 
the association between the variables. When there is no association between the variables, 
the lower limit o f the contingency coefficient (CJ is zero. The upper limit (CgJ is a 
function o f the number o f categories for two perfectly correlated variables and is 
determined by the formula:
Cui= /  (r-l)/r
Where:
r is the number o f rows (GPl and GP2) assuming the number of columns 
are equal to the number o f rows.
The development of parameters o f the range of the contingency coefficient provided a
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range for placement of the computed contingency coefficient and provided a means of 
describing how strong the variables are correlated with one another. A high association 
indicates a strong relationship, and a low association indicates a weak relationship 
(Churchill, 1995).
The contingency coefficient (C) formula is:
C =  Nx^ /n  + x^
Where:
n is the sample size, and 
X^  is the chi-square.
Should a relatively weak association be in evidence by the contingency coefficient, the 
process would have been terminated indicating that there is limited applicability of 
economic indicators to the development o f hotel-casino projects. However, if a relatively 
strong association were indicated, a measure o f predictive ability would be determined. 
Index o f Predictive Association
The index of predictive association ( .^ .^b), described by Churchill, (1995), is 
appropriate for nominally scaled variables. There are both criterion variables (A), which in 
this study are the success or failure characteristics of the hotel-casinos, and predictor 
variables (B), the stages o f the PSLC. The index of predictive association measures the 
relative decrease in probability o f error by taking account of the B classification (PSLC) in 
predicting the A classification (success/failure), over the error of prediction when the B 
classification (PSLC) is unknown, caused by the difficulty o f predicting when a change
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might occur. The index of predictive association varies from 0 to 1. It is zero if the B 
classification (PSLC) is o f no help in predicting the A classification (success/failure) and I 
if the B classification (PSLC) completely predicts the A classification (success/failure).
Assuming that the A classification (success/failure) is being predicted from the B 
classification (PSLC), then the index of predictive association is calculated as follows:
^A-B =  *’-----------------------------
n - n ^
Where:
n^ is the largest marginal frequency among the A classifications 
(success/failure),
n^n is the largest frequency in the 6 th row (or column) of the table.
According to Churchill (1995), this would demonstrate the two important questions in 
association analysis. First, is there association between the criterion (success/failure) and 
predictor (PSLC) variables, or are they independent? Second, if they are dependent, by 
how much are predictions about the criterion variable (success/failure) improved by taking 
into account the important predictor (PSLC) variables? Since the analysis o f Research 
Question 2 reached this final stage, it became possible to make predictions o f the 
association between success or failure o f hotel-casino projects opening in various stages of 
the PSLC.
Research Question 3 : Altman Z Factor
The Altman Z Factor (Altman, 1968, 1977, 1994) allows firms not only to predict 
bankruptcy but also to assess their internal financial strength when making major
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investment decisions. While many bankruptcy prediction models exist (e.g.., Beaver, 
1968; Blum, 1974; Deakin, 1972; Fitzpatrick, 1931; Wilcox, 1971; Zavgren, 1985), the 
Altman Z Factor model, a landmark study and most widely used model (Patterson, 1998), 
appears to be the most adaptive to the hotel-casino industry because it uses publicly 
available financial data and provides predictions five years prior to bankruptcy. The 
Altman method has been used by credit analysts to establish default probabilities for 
corporate loans, by portfolio managers considering stock and bond investments, and in 
reorganization plans filed under the Bankruptcy Act (Brigham & Gapenski, 1996). The 
Altman model predicts bankruptcy with an accuracy of nearly 90% during the two years 
prior to failure and an accuracy o f 70% when extended to five years before failure 
(Altman, 1977). The Altman Z Factor htis been tested in other industries but has not been 
applied to firms in the hotel-casino industry. Question 3 thus asks: Can the Altman Z 
Factor, a predictor o f bankruptcy potential, be adapted to the hotel-casino industry and 
assess whether the corporation is strong enough to undertake a new investment?
Altman’s (1968, 1983, 1994) development of the discriminant function for 
bankruptcy prediction resulted in an algorithm defined as:
Z  = 0.012X1 + 0.014 X2 +  0.033X3 +  O.OOO6X4 + 0.999X5
Where:
X, is net working capital/total assets and expressed as a percentage rather than a 
decimal,
X; is retained eamings/total assets, defined as retained earnings on the balance 
sheet, not the addition to retained earnings for the year and expressed as a 
percentage.
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X) is earnings before interest and tax (EBIT)/total assets and expressed as a 
percentage,
X4  is market value of common and preferred stock/book value of debt, i.e., the 
computation o f [(shares of common outstanding)(price per share of 
common) plus (shares of preferred outstanding)(price per share of 
preferred)] is divided by the balance sheet value of total debt, including all 
short-term liabilities and expressed as a percentage, and
X5  is sales/total assets not expressed as a percentage.
The Z values that result have been categorized into three levels: (a) less than 1.81, 
indicating that bankruptcy is highly likely, (b) 1.81 to 2.99, indicating a zone o f ignorance,
i.e., not predictive o f either bankruptcy or non-bankruptcy, and (c) greater than 2.99, 
indicting that bankruptcy is not likely (Altman, 1964).
Testing the Altman Z Factor for the Hotel-Casino Industrv 
Determining the usefulness of the Altman Z Factor in the hotel-casino industry 
required two steps. The first step was to test the Altman Z Factor against its criteria both 
on highly capitalized, successful hotel-casino corporations and on financially troubled or 
failed hotel-casino corporations. The second step was to compare the Altman Z Factors of 
corporations with newly opened or acquired successful hotel-casinos to the Altman Z 
Factors o f corporations with newly opened financially troubled or failed hotel-casinos. 
Applicabilitv o f the Altman Z Factor to the Hotel-Casino Industrv
Successful hotel-casino corporations were defined as those exhibiting the highest 
capitalization, significant locations, and profitable operations with positive cash flows and 
stable stock prices. In addition, the successful corporations had to be publicly traded. As 
o f December 31, 1997, the ending time period of this study, twelve such corporations
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were identified (See Table 3.2) as being large enough to be traded on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), which requires a high level of capitalization, profits, and revenues.
ITT, owner of the Caesar’s locations, was excluded due to its diversified holdings and 
limited concentration in the hotel-casino industry.
Table 3.2
Selected Publicly Traded Successful Hotel-Casino Corporations
No. Corporate Name Stock
Symbol
Elxchange Market Value 
Capitalization
Hotel-Casino
Locations
1
Name
Aztar Comoration AZBi—1 NYSE S 313 680 290 00
Locations
2 Boyd Gaming B’® NYSE $ 777 047 968 00 Locations 7
3 Circus Circus CIR NYSE $2 721 180 000.00 1 1
4 Grand Casinos GND NYSE $ 836 802 00 3
5 Harrahs Entertain. HET NYSE $2 020 720 000 00 6
6 Harvevs Casino HVY NYSE $ 185 442 644 00 2
7 Hilton Hotels HLT NYSE $7.704.060 000 00 9
8 MGM Grand MGG NYSE $2 336 790 382 00 5
9 Mirage Resorts MIR NYSE $4.553.725.842.00 6.5
1 0 Rio Hotel RHC NYSE $ 545.352.710.00 1
11 Showboat. Inc. SBO NYSE $ 389.313.715.00 2
L2 Jîtation Casinos STN_ _ NYSF. $ 469 278 180 00 6
Note. Sources of financial cata and locations for individual firms fi'om 10-K filings with
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Since the ending date o f this study, the 
following events have occurred: Hilton Hotels spun off a subsidiary known as Park Place 
Entertainment, Inc. and acquired Grand Casinos; in addition, Harrah’s Entertainment has 
consolidated Rio Hotel and Showboat within their holdings.
Failed or financially troubled hotel-casino corporations were defined as those that 
had declared bankruptcy since 1978, received an audit statement including the
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questioning o f the firm’s ability to continue as a going concern, or had continuing 
accumulated deficits rather than increasing retained earnings. The 1978 date was set to 
allow for three years of publicly available financial data to stay within the parameters of 
the study and prior to the failure. Also, those failed or troubled corporations had to be 
publicly traded or required to file SEC reports. Twelve such corporations were identified 
(See Table 3.3).
Table 3.3
Selected Publiclv Traded or SEC Filing Failed or Troubled Hotel-Casino Corporations
No. Corporate
Name
Stock
Symbol
Exchange Market Value 
Capitalization
Hotel-Casino
Locations
1 Ballv Entertainment NYSE $440.731.616.00
Ciinos
0
2 Becker Gaming. Inc. No Market Locations 1
3 Boardwalk Hotel BWLK NASD $30.512.573.00 1
4 Claridge Hotel No Market 1
5 Elsinore Com. ELSO-B OTC $10.488 583 00 1
6 Greate Bay Casino GBCC OTC $5.809 022 00 1
7 Griffin & Sun Int’l. s m NYSE $3.472097 00 1
8 Gold River Hotel No Market 1
9 Plaver’s Int’l. PLAY NASD $175.190 812.00 0
10 Sahara Gaming No Market 2
1 1 Stratosphere Corp. TOWV NASD No Market 1
1 2 Tnimn Hotels DIT NYSF. $190.127 163 00 3
*4ote. Sources of financial data and locations for individual firms fi'om 10-K filings with
the Securities and Exchange Commission. Specific hotel-casinos related to the 
corporations are (1) Daily’s Grand, Las Vegas and Reno, (2) Arizona Charlies, Las 
Vegas, (5) Four Queens, Las Vegas, (6 ) Sands, Atlantic City, (7) Resorts International, 
Atlantic City, (9) Player’s Island, Mesquite, NV, (10) Sahara Hotel, Las Vegas.
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Test o f Successful Hotel-Casino Corporations
Hypothesis 3.1 was developed to test the utility of the Altman Z Factor with the 
successful hotel-casino corporations. Since an Altman Z Factor greater than 2.99 
indicates that bankruptcy is unlikely, it was assumed that the combined three-year 
averages of the most recent annual financial statements o f each corporation would be 
greater than 2.99 (the cut-off level for corporations that were not expected to go 
bankrupt);
Hypothesis 3.1
Hq! Mean AZFhcso ^ 2.99 
H,: Mean AZFhcso ^  2.99
Where:
Mean AZFhcso the average Altman Z Factor of successful hotel-casino firms;
2.99 is the lowest Altman Z Factor for firms that do not indicate bankruptcy 
Acceptance of the null hypothesis would indicate that these successful hotel-casino firms, 
as a group, have average Altman Z Factors less than or equal to 2.99, which would also 
indicate that those firms were either facing bankruptcy or that the probability of 
bankruptcy could not be determined. On the other hand, should the alternative 
hypothesis be accepted, the Altman Z Factor would confirm the contention that the firms 
are not facing bankruptcy and would have the financial strength to develop a new 
property.
The single means t-test was computed to test the hypotheses. This procedure is
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appropriate when a single sample of data, the mean Altman Z Factor of either failed or 
successful projects, is compared to a population with a known mean (Noursis, 1997).
The sample sizes were compared to t values at the 95% confidence interval in a t 
distribution. This procedure required the computation o f a f statistic which is 
accomplished by:
t — (Mean AZFhcso - 2.99)/Sucso
Where:
Mean AZFhcso is the average Altman Z Factor o f successful hotel-casino firms; 
Shcso is the standard deviation o f the distribution.
Test o f Financially Troubled Hotel-Casino Corporations
Hypothesis 3.2 was developed to test the utility o f the Altman Z Factor with the 
failed or financially troubled hotel-casino corporations. Since an Altman Z Factor of less 
than 1.81 indicates impending bankruptcy, it was assumed that the combined 3-year 
average Altman Z Factor prior to the bankruptcies of these nine corporations would be 
less than 1.81:
Hypothesis 3.2
Hg: Mean AZFhcit > 1.81 
H,: Mean AZFhcft ^ 1 81
Where:
Mean AZFhcft is the average Altman Z Factor o f failed or financially troubled 
hotel-casino firms, and
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1.81 is the highest level of the Altman Z Factor indicating bankruptcy is not likely 
or unknown.
Should the null hypothesis be accepted, the Altman Z Factor would indicate that these 
troubled hotel-casinos are not likely to incur bankruptcy, even though they are presently 
in bankruptcy or considered troubled. However, if the alternative hypothesis is accepted, 
the Altman Z Factor would be correctly forecasting bankruptcy, a condition known to be 
true because o f the failure or troubled position o f those hotel-casino corporations.
A single mean t-test was computed to test the hypotheses. This procedure is 
appropriate when a single sample of data, those o f failed o r successful projects, are 
compared to a population with a known mean (Noursis, 1997). The sample sizes were 
compared to t values o f the 95% confidence interval in a f distribution. This procedure 
required the computation o f a t  statistic which is accomplished by: 
t — (Mean AZFfj^pj- - 1-81)/Shcft
Where:
Mean AZFhcft is the average Altman Z Factor o f successful hotel-casino firms; 
Shcft is the standard deviation of the distribution.
Comparison o f the Altman Z Factor for Successful and Troubled Hotel-Casino Firms 
If the null hypotheses of either 3.1 or 3.2 is accepted, then the Altman Z Factor 
appears not to be applicable to the hotel-casino industry. If, however, both alternative 
hypotheses are accepted, then the second step o f comparing the Altman Z Factors o f the 
two groups would need to be implemented. To do so would require determining the 
Altman Z Factors two years prior to the opening or acquisition of a hotel-casino
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property, then comparing average Altman Z Factors o f the successful corporations to the 
average Altman Z Factors o f failed or troubled corporations. The Altman Z Factor two 
years prior to the opening o f a new property was incorporated as reflective of the 
financial situation when the “go-ahead” decision was made, assuming that two years is 
the average time fi’ame between the decision to construct and the completed 
construction.
Hypothesis 3.3 would compare the combined mean Altman Z Factors of the 
successful hotel-casino corporations with the combined mean Altman Z Factors o f the 
financially troubled hotel-casino corporations;
Hypothesis 3.3
H^: Mean AZFhcso ^ Mean AZFhcft 
H g  h d e a n  A Z F h c f t  >  h f e a n  A Z F h c f t
Where;
Mean AZFhcso is the average Altman Z Factor of successful hotel-casino firms. 
Mean AZFhcft is the average Altman Z Factor o f financially troubled firms. 
Acceptance o f the null hypothesis would indicate that the Altman Z Factor had no 
predictive ability for the two groups and that the measure is o f no value in determining 
the financial strength of a hotel-casino corporation. However, if the alternative 
hypothesis is accepted, the Altman Z Factor may have been a valuable measure of 
assessing corporate strength.
A paired samples t-test statistic would be used to compare the means of the
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combined Altman Z Factors o f the two groups. This procedure is appropriate when 
single samples o f data are compared (Noursis, 1997). The sample means would be 
compared to t values at the 95% confidence interval. Should this test confirm the 
acceptance of the alternative hypothesis, the Altman Z Factor could be useful as a 
measure of the financial strength of a hotel-casino corporation anticipating building or 
acquiring a new hotel-casino.
Conclusion
The methodology for answering the three research questions developed numerous 
hypotheses and the statistical means for accepting or rejecting each hypothesis. When 
actual data replaced the variables assigned in each research question, the results provided 
a basis for analysis that, in some cases, offer a measure o f assistance in making better 
strategic decisions in the hotel-casino industry while providing methods to lower the rates 
o f hotel-casino failures.
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CHAPTER 4
DATA AND RESULTS 
Following the methodology outlined in Chapter 3, the resulting data for the three 
research questions are presented in this chapter. The hypotheses for each o f the questions 
were tested step-by-step, and the results are described in a summary for each question.
Research Question 1 ; Economic Indicators 
The first question and its corollaries were: Are hotel-casino gaming industry revenues 
correlated to economic indicators on both national and jurisdictional levels? If  so, can this 
correlation be extended to help predict failures o f hotel-casinos which open during one 
year prior to and during the economic downturn? This question anticipated a three-step 
process for analysis: (a) comparison of the national economy, using Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) to the Gross Gaming Revenues of the economy (GGR), (b) comparison o f 
four legalized gaming jurisdiction revenues (GGRJ to GDP, and (c) further analysis if 
either or both of the first two questions showed a significant correlation.
Comparison of Gross Domestic Product to Gross Gaming Revenue 
For the first step in the analysis, GGR for each quarter from 1975 through 1997 was 
chained to 1992 dollars and deseasonalized. This process was composed o f the 
following steps as outlined in Anderson, Sweeney, and Williams (1995):
75
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1. The gross gaining revenues were obtained from each jurisdiction and totaled for each 
quarter from 1971 through 1997 to create total quarterly U.S. gaming revenues (see Table 
4.1) Although the period to be studied was 1975 through 1997, all quarters o f 1971- 
1974 were included to provide a basis for computations necessary in 1975.
2. The chain-type price indexes for 1992 GDP were obtained from the December 1997 
Survev o f Current Business. U.S. Department o f Commerce (1998) and used as divisors 
for each quarter o f gross gaming revenue to restate the quarterly gross gaming revenues in 
1992 chained dollars.
3. A four-quarter moving average was developed for each quarter by summing the four 
quarters and dividing by four, followed by centering the moving average through adding 
two sequential quarters and dividing by two.
4. Seasonal irregular values were computed by dividing the 1992 chained dollars o f gross 
gaming revenue by the centered moving average.
5. A seasonal index for each quarter was determined by finding the average o f each 
quarter and smoothing the index to a value of four.
6 . The 1992 chained dollar gross gaming revenue was divided by the seasonal index to 
determine the deseasonalized chained gross gaming revenue.
7. Finally, the difference between two adjacent quarters was divided by the preceding 
quarter to determine the quarter-to-quarter growth rates. The completed computations 
are shown in Table 4.2.
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Table 4.1
Quarterly Gamine Revenue by Legalized Gaming Jurisdictions. 1971-1997 fSmml
YEAR C£Y àÇ SD ÎÇ lA ÇO MS Ik LA Q i MO WV EL Dk ys
GGR GGR GGR GGR GÇR GGR OCR ÇGR GGR CGR GGR GGR GGR GGR OCR
141.56 514136
W l: 2 I5&62 515*32
1971 J 1S5.55 519535
W l:4 147.6 514730
1972:1 165.92 516532
1972:2 179.26 517936
1972:3 210JU 52103*
1972:4 175.12 5175.12
1973:1 194-7 5194.7»
1973:2 223.59 522339
1973:3 249.15 524*35
1973:4 2#9.45 52*935
1974:1 223.51 522331
1974:2 255.17 525537
1974:3 2*199 52923*
1974:4 241.26 524136
1975.1 252.26 525236
197SJ 29K99 529*39
1975J 31&9I 531631
1975.4 269.27 526*37
197C.1 2*9.23 529933
197&2 3:1.79 5311.79
197&3 351 3 6 535136
197C.4 3*934 530*34
1977.1 34536 534536
19772 37331 537331
1977J 419.41 5419.41
1977.4 3 793 537930
197B.1 41337 541337
197&2 457.14 1931 5476.05
1 9 7 U 516.4 6332 559032
197M 45939 5134 550933
1979.1 4 9*3 49.01 554731
1979.2 5 *5 3 7 64.79 557035
1979J 5 9 0 3 570432
1979.4 525 3 7 97.77 1
(table continues)
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YEAR NV AC SD IG ÎA ÇO MS ÎL LA Q i MO WV EL
o m CGR GGR GGR CGR GGR CGR GGR CGR CGR GGR GGR GGR CGR CGR U A G G R
19M.1 57839 12738
19903 57831 15136 m t s i
19903 63636 19736 S » M 2
1990A 5993 146.11 S7S5A1
1991.1 591.41 201 • S792A1
19913 646.73 254 SfM .73
19813 68937 358 S1.M «J7
1981.4 60634 286.78 SM3A2
19823 639.05 300 S » » J S
19923 66543 363 S1.8ZtA3
19823 723.45 450 S1.173A5
1982.4 5993 380.16 S«7»A<
1983.1 65433 335 SM 9J3
19833 70332 491.45 S1.194A7
19833 794.19 521.72 SIJISA *
1983.4 69239 422.77 SI.1IS .K
1984.1 75738 42934 si.irr-K
19843 74638 47432
19943 92931 577.42 S1.4MA3
1984.4 741.01 462.67 S U M A 7
1985.1 912.13 49737 XljW .T*
19853 84574 52833 S U 7 4 J 7
19853 889.78 634.44 S U 2 4 J 2
1985.4 76634 52036 $ l j r 7 J 0
1986.1 83437 49931 S1A33AS
19863 97435 57739 3 1 ,4 5 2 ^
19863 91531 6633 S1A7M 1
1986.4 95637 5303 $ I j r 7 J 7
1987.1 95632 54599
19873 979.76 62933
19873 103931 727.44 $I,7*5.7S
19873 949.67 59231 S 1 ^ 2 .4 «
19883 103506 60337 3IA3K43
19883 105035 69936 SI,74»J1
19883 112576 78575 S1511.51
1989.4 10493 64631 S1A3CJ1
(table continues)
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YEAR HY àç SD ÎQ lA ÇQ MS ÎL LA Q i MO EL DE
OTR, GSB OCR CGR GGR CGR GGR GGR GGR GGR GGR GGR CGR CGR GGR Ü 8.C G R
19893 1398.08 65631 S  1.75439
19893 131834 70983 S  182 8 8 7
19893 131330 81837 8X03X77
1989.4 135438 63131 231 S  1,78780
1990.1 137X 2 65437 631 21.77 S 18 5 5 8 2
19903 130439 77835 731 21.77 S X 1 1 2 8 2
19903 136931 829.72 930 21.77 S X Z 3080
1990.4 138X77 69837 631 21.77 S  X01482
19913 135X45 65932 7 8 2 6735 1X44 S  2 4 0 3 8 7
19913 X40039 72135 930 6735 1X44 S  2 3 1 5 2 3
19913 1340.04 86523 1136 6735 1X44 5 X 4 0 0 8 2
1991.4 131135 69547 782 6735 1X44 2X13 5X 12X 06
1992.1 130031 75X43 8 3 6 20134 1783 4502 2784 5 6 8 4 5 X 5 1 0 8 8
19923 1.41635 798.79 1X07 20134 1783 4502 3088 5X15 5 X 5 7 5 7 4
19923 131030 92X74 1X09 20134 17.43 4502 30.42 59.05 5X 80X 79
1992.4 137639 74132 8 3 6 20134 1783 4502 2X12 54.19 5X 47X 58
199X1 137030 74432 931 381.09 1131 6515 18587 15X34 5 X 0 7 5 8 5
199X2 136X84 83935 1084 381.09 1131 6515 20386 15033 5 3 3 8 5 8 8
199X3 1313.10 95187 14.09 381.09 1131 6515 20233 15787 5  3469.78
199X4 138137 769.49 931 38189 1131 6535 18682 14489 1X23 5 X 1 2 8 8 2
19943 1.70502 72431 9.75 58782 2631 81.42 34593 24X73 14X57 23.66 53 4 9 9 .7 5
19943 1396.61 85686 1137 58782 2X21 81.42 38134 24X31 15X22 2X32 X52 5  448X 34
19943 133538 997.75 1431 58782 2X21 8182 37X00 255 8 5 15X88 2986 4 3 6 5 4 4 8 4 3 3
1994.4 1.77032 84830 9.75 58782 2X21 8182 349.40 23483 14501 2X41 X55 5  438 0 8 8
1995.1 1.76030 84X02 9.76 78684 11388 9X09 406.19 29X68 25086 100.01 5 4  79035
19953 1.78430 94X59 11.48 786.64 11X98 9X09 44785 29X57 27558 119.70 1184 5X 0 2 2 3 1
19953 132132 1.068.70 1433 786.64 11388 9X09 44385 30784 27334 12X65 1X44 5  5437.76
19954 1300.63 89230 9.76 786.64 11388 9X09 41036 28X37 25X56 120.08 10.15 630 5 5 0 2 X 6 2
19963 137834 87687 9.06 97X02 16336 10282 44X38 284.64 28785 12X45 8436 4X09 5  54 2 4 8 0
19963 132X14 97734 1X66 97X02 16336 10X92 49184 28X70 31781 14X56 1783 9X31 4X09 5 5 6 0 X 7 5
19963 139886 1.08X24 1386 97X02 16X26 10282 487.76 29515 31432 15507 3036 9X11 4X09 5 5 8 5 X 7 2
1996.4 132546 887.74 9.76 97X02 16336 10282 45085 27080 29X54 147.02 1X05 9732 4X09 5  544081
19973 131230 924.77 9 3 5 188437 174.13 10786 47X15 26536 29589 15988 21789 74.73 5  541881
19973 1337.43 98738 1089 188437 174.13 10786 52X33 261.69 32X20 19135 2780 23X72 74.73 5  64 6 9 8 9
19973 138433 1.081.79 14.15 188437 17X13 107.66 51581 275 1 7 323.43 20X48 47.08 25X72 74.73 5X 4 1 1 8 1
1997.4 136736 91182 9 3 5 180437 17X13 10786 47X88 25X56 29885 19186 2680 25187 74.73 5 X 8 6 2 8 7
i ^ ote. Sources for 
(1971-1997), New
Gross Gaming Revenue: Ader (1998), Nevada Gaming Abstracts 
Jersey Casino Commission (1978-1997), Turner (1998)
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Table 4.2
Chained Quarterly U.S. Gross Gaming Revenue and GDP Data. 1971-1997 fSmmJ
SCTWiiiay USGGR GDP
Y«ur A ctu I Chaiiwd Real USGGR 4Q tr. Ceatered Irregular ScaMoal DeseaseeaHzed Quarlcriy Q uutetljr
OTR. U 5G G R IbOcx 51992 Clialnedn992Sl M«v. A vc. Mov. At e . Vmlae lad n * Chained CGR Growth Rate G n w th  R-te
1971:1 S 14136 03150 S 44980 base base base base base base b a s t
19713 S 15882 03193 S 49X77 base base base base base base b a s t
19713 S 18555 03225 5 57535 base base base base base base b a st
1971:4 S 14780 03253 5 45X74 S 49381 base base base base base b a st
1972:1 5 1 6 5 9 2 03301 5 50X64 S 50732 S 500.47 1.00433 038142 550935 base b a s t
19723 5 1 7 9 3 6 03323 S 53985 S 517.79 S 51X46 1.05268 1.01191 550X43 -0 .69% 9.60%
19723 5  21088 03350 5 629.49 S 53133 S 52436 130004 188053 5485.47 -4 .14% 4.20%
1972:4 5 1 7 5 1 2 03393 5 51X12 5 546.93 S 539.13 035733 032615 558X12 19.91% 7.10%
1973:1 5194.70 03438 5 56632 S 56285 S 55489 182060 038142 5565L39 -2 .87% 11.20%
19733 5 2 2 3 3 9 03496 5 63936 S 58787 $  57536 1.11158 181191 556X59 0 .57% 2.80%
19733 5 248.15 03563 S 69X46 S 60482 S 59X24 1.16808 1.08053 555181 -2 .95% -1 .20%
1973:4 5  209.45 03624 5 57735 S 62087 S 61234 034384 032615 5661.17 19.82% 4.20%
1974:1 5 22331 03698 5 60481 S 62980 5 62483 036731 038142 563X87 -3 .71% -3.90%
1974:2 5 25517 03779 5 67533 S 63831 S 634.05 1.06494 181191 562639 -1 .58% 1.50%
19743 528X 98 03893 S 72689 S 64X12 S 64X32 1.13167 188053 5594.45 -5 .13% -4 3 0 %
1974:4 5 24136 0.4014 S 601.05 S 65130 S 649.01 032610 032615 5700.76 17.88% -2.60%
19751 5 25236 0.4104 S 614.67 S 65486 S 65X18 034104 038142 566535 -5 .02% -5 .40%
19753 5 2 8 8 8 9 0.4167 S 69X28 S 65837 S 65X72 1.05568 181191 564X99 -2 .49% 3 .70%
19753 531X81 08244 5 63X12 S 63538 S 647.13 037681 188053 559X90 -7 .72% 7.70%
19754 5 2 6 8 3 7 08321 S 62085 S 64033 S 637.75 037350 032615 568881 14.98% 4.70%
197X1 5 28933 0.4368 5 66X16 5 65X10 S 64X17 1.02475 838142 565X40 ^ J 9 % 9.70%
197X2 5311.79 08417 S 70589 S 65535 S 653.68 187987 181191 564538 -1 .89% 2.80%
197X3 5 35136 0.4478 S 78538 S 693.72 S 67X49 1.16530 188053 562482 -3 J 7 % 1.60%
197X4 5 3 0 8 3 4 0.4556 S 678.09 S 70883 S 70087 036750 032615 575X76 21 .23% 3.80%
1977.1 5 3 4 5 8 6 0.4631 S 74684 $ 72930 S 71X61 183927 038142 573X22 -3 .24% 4.90%
19773 5 37381 0.4708 $ 79339 S 75132 S 74031 187265 181191 573180 -0 .10% 8 3 0 %
19773 5 419.41 0.4774 S 87833 S 77436 S 76X79 1.15173 188053 570535 -3 .49% 6.70%
1977.4 5 3 7 9 8 0 08855 S 78X29 S 800.41 5 78739 039352 032615 5850.17 20 .43% -0.10%
19783 5 4 1 3 3 7 0.4939 $ 838.17 S 82X24 S 81183 183244 038142 582780 -2 .70% 1.60%
19783 547X 05 03043 S 94338 S 860.74 S 84139 1.12113 181191 583X08 0 .59% 16.00%
19783 5 5 8 0 3 2 03132 S 1.130.79 S 92381 S 89237 136731 188053 5825.78 -0 .76% 3.70%
1978.4 5 50933 03237 S 97X71 S 97186 S 947.73 182741 032615 5182X30 23 .9 2 % 4.60%
1979.1 5 54731 03346 S 1,02X77 S 181X06 S 99486 1.02906 038142 5181X70 -0 .94% 0 3 0 %
19793 5 5 7 0 8 5 03470 S 1 8 4 2 8 7 5184X 78 S 1,030.42 181208 1.01191 5181X30 0 .45% 0.90%
19793 5 70432 03582 S 1 8 6 1 3 9 5 1875.49 S 1,059.14 1.19115 1.08053 598080 -3 .74% 2.60%
1979.4 5 62X14 03692 $ 189X 76 51405 .75 5 1,09082 1.00380 032615 51,17738 20 .14% 1.00%
(table continues)
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ScaaaoaV GDP
XSSL Chained Real USCGR 4 0 tr . Centered Irregular Scascnal Deaaasoeallsed Quancitr QlartKtjr
S I B , U 3.G G R Index 51992 Chained 09925) M ot.  Avc . Mov. Avc. VahK Inde*- Chained GGR Grewth Gl,i»tli
19S0.1 S 70536 03825 5 141135 51,15X 79 5 1,12947 1.07321 038142 $ 1 4 5 0 3 6 -2 J 9 % 2.00%
19803 S 729.67 03959 5 1424.48 5 1 4 9 8 4 0 5 1,17540 1.04167 1.01191 $1.16136 0.96% -9 J 0 %
19803 S 83332 03093 5 1468.49 5 1 4 2 4 3 2 5 1 4 1 1 4 6 1.12953 138053 $ 1 4 2 1 4 7 -3.48% -0.40%
198X4 5 75531 03257 5 140732 5 1 4 5 3 4 4 5 1439.03 037465 032615 $ 1 4 3 7 3 3 1 9 3 1 % 8.10%
1981.1 S 79X41 03419 5 143438 51458 .77 5 1 45X 95 038290 038142 $1479.74 -4 3 4 % 7.70%
19813 S 980.73 03535 5 147842 5 1 4 9 7 4 3 5147X 00 1.07850 131191 $ 1 4 6236 -1 3 1 % <1.50%
19813 5 1 ,0 4 6 3 7 X6665 5 146935 5 1 4 4 7 4 9 5 142X41 1.18719 1.08053 $ 1 4 2 3 3 5 -3.10% 4.90%
1981.4 5 89X62 X6785 5 141735 5 1 4 7 4 3 5 5 1 4 6 1 4 7 036752 032615 5X 46932 20.10% -1.90%
19823 5 93935 0.6885 5 146X91 5 1 3 0 7 4 1 5 1 4 9 X U 038043 038142 $ 1 3 1 7 3 7 -3.56% -6.50%
19823 5 1328.43 03971 5 1,47540 5 1,43145 5 1,419.43 133936 131191 $1,40X73 -1.04% 1.70%
19823 5 1,17X45 0.7069 5 1.65939 51.45X 06 $ 1,44X81 1.15053 1.08053 $143X 28 -4.81% -2.00%
1982.4 $ 97936 X7146 5 147032 5 1,46743 51 ,46030 033847 032615 $1 4 7748 18.12% 0.50%
1983.1 5 98933 0.7212 5 1471.78 51 .46940 51,46841 033413 038142 $1,49X32 -5.13% 3.90%
19833 5 1,19437 X7284 5 134043 5141X 71 5 1,490.10 1.10068 1.01191 $1,47X57 -1.59% 8.90%
19833 5 1 31X 90 0.7350 5 1,79044 5 1 4 4 3 4 9 5 1 4 2 7 3 0 1.17246 1.08053 $1.41X20 -4.03% 7.40%
1983.4 5 141X 16 0.7419 5 140X11 5147X 34 5 1 4 5 9 3 2 836365 032615 $1,68440 19.18% 7.70%
1984.1 5 1,18732 0.7500 5 148X69 5 1,629.07 5130X 71 038751 038142 $1,633.06 -3.04% 9.60%
19843 S 1 3 2130 0.7562 5 131432 5 1,62X77 5 1,62532 039323 131191 $130X 78 -1.61% 6.40%
19843 51,40X 93 X7625 5 134X15 51.63X 47 5 1,629.62 1.13226 1.08053 $1408.17 -6.14% 3.00%
1984.4 5 1 3 0 X 6 7 0.7682 5 146X87 5135X 41 5 1,644.44 835283 032615 $1,77547 17.73% 2.60%
1985.1 51399 .70 0.7764 5 1.67431 5 1 3 7 5 4 4 5 1 3 6 3 3 2 130612 038142 $ 1 3 9543 -4.52% 4.20%
19853 5 1 3 7 4 3 7 0.7825 5 1,75X64 5 1,71037 5 1 3 9X 95 1.03762 131191 $137X 03 -1 J 2 % 2.00%
19853 5 1 3 2 4 3 2 X7SS0 5 133449 5 1,73235 5 1.72131 1.12340 138053 $149X 49 -4.75% 5.90%
1985.4 5 1 3 8 7 3 0 0.7944 5 1,620.72 5 1.74X41 5 1,73938 033162 032615 $1378.40 17.88% 2.60%
198X1 5 1 3 3 X 9 8 X7981 5 1,671.44 5 1,745.77 5 1,74X09 035725 038142 $1,779.16 -5.28% 5.10%
198X2 51 ,45234 03026 5 1309.79 5 1,759.06 5 1,75X42 1.03274 131191 $1,73130 -2.66% 0.40%
198X3 5 1 3 7 8 3 1 03081 5 135X48 51.76X 86 5 1,761.46 140901 138053 $1330.19 -5 .87% 2.20%
198X4 5 1 3 8 7 3 7 03144 5 1.70446 51,78X 72 51,77X29 036048 032615 $131X 77 17.52% 2.20%
1987.1 5130X 81 03211 5 133044 5132X 42 5 1 3 0 4 4 7 1.01422 038142 $1338.74 -1.02% 2.60%
19873 5 1 3 0 9 3 9 03268 5 134X41 5 1 3 5 8 4 7 5 1 3 4 1 4 0 1.05697 131191 $ 1 3 1933 -1 .03% 4.10%
19873 5 1,765.75 03335 5 X11X48 5 1 3 9 9 3 2 5 1 3 7 9 4 0 142733 138053 $1,739.15 -1 .43% 3.60%
1987.4 5134X 48 03408 5 133444 5 1 3 3X 42 5131X 12 035742 032615 5 X 0 0 3 1 18.96% 6.00%
1988.1 51338 .43 03469 5 1334.62 5 1 3 5 8 4 1 5 134X 46 039443 038142 $138X 30 -1.19% 2.40%
19883 5 1.74931 03556 5 X04441 5 1 3 8 2 3 9 5137X 75 1.83733 1.01191 $ 1 3 4746 -1 .75% 4.10%
19883 5 1 3 1 1 3 1 03667 5 240X50 5 2304.74 5 1 3 9 3 3 6 140615 138053 $ 1 3 4 5 4 7 -5 J 5 % 2.40%
1988.4 5139X 31 03746 5 1,93943 5X 03039 5X 81737 836118 032615 5X178.77 18.07% 5.10%
(table continues)
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ScaaanaV USGGR COP
X sc Chained Raal USGGR 4Q tr. Centered Irregnftar Scaeanal D«Maaanallcad Qoanerly Q a c ttr
o m U 3.G G R Index 51992 Chained n992S) Mnv.AvE. Mov. Avc. Valne Index* ChalnMlGGR Cmnrth Rate Cl «util
19t».X S 1.75449 03844 5 1383.71 5X 04X 26 5 X037.13 047378 048142 5X07X70 -4 .73% 4.00%
1M 94 5 1 3 2 8 .4 7 03940 5 X04547 5X 04X 58 5X 04X38 1.08892 131191 5X 01944 -2 .72% 3.00%
5X 831.77 03013 5 X25447 5X 85X 69 5X 04930 1.89986 1.08053 5 1 3 9 6 3 5 -6 .07% 2.20%
1989.4 $ 1 ,71748 03091 5 136644 5X 06X 40 5X 059.04 045498 042615 5X223X3 17J!1% 0.40%
19984 S 1 3 5 5 4 2 03201 5 X12X44 5X 0 9733 5X080.11 1.02179 048142 5X 11940 -* .67% 3.90%
19984 S X 11242 03320 5 X 266.ll 5X 15X 84 5X 12533 1.06619 L01191 5X100.42 -0 .90% 1 J 0 %
19984 5 X 23838 03419 5 X36841 5 2 4 8 1 3 8 5  X I6742 1.09283 138853 5X 00530 -4 .51% 1.90%
19984 5 X 8 1432 03514 5 X I1735 5 X 2 1 9 3 8 5X 20844 046242 042615 5247X 01 18.46% 4.00%
19914 5X 18X 87 03626 5 X184.7S 5 X 23441 5X 22639 048189 048142 5X269.06 -4 .50% 2.10%
19914 5 X 2 1 5 4 3 03702 5 X28X27 5 X 23830 5  X 23646 1.02893 131191 5X 21044 -2 .60% 1.80%
19914 5 X 4 8 8 3 2 03770 5 X45744 5 X 26834 5X 249.72 139233 138053 5X08X06 -5 .80% 1.00%
19914 5 242X 86 03838 5 2458.76 5 X 2 7 1 3 7 5 X 2 6535 045269 042615 5X 44834 17.51% 1.00%
1992.1 5 X 5 1 8 4 8 03914 5 XS3X4S 5X 35738 5X 31442 139416 048142 5X 35845 -3.61% 4.70%
19924 5X 57X 74 03981 5 X588.64 5 X 4 3 2 4 3 5 X 39545 137744 131191 5X 36647 0 J 7 % 2.50%
19924 52388 .79 1.8817 5 X79634 5 X 5 1 6 3 7 5X 47435 1.12987 1.88853 5X298X2 -3 .24% 3.00%
1992.4 5X 47X 58 1.8888 5 X 45I31 5 X 5 9 0 3 4 5X 55340 845986 842615 5X757.12 2 0 J 9 % 4 J 0 %
199X1 5 X 8 7 5 3 5 13185 5 X 02038 5 X 71134 5X 65839 1.13923 048142 5X701.19 -2 .03% 0.10%
199X2 5X 28X 68 13238 5 3 4 0 9 4 8 5 X869.11 5X 79042 1.15887 1.01191 5X 75739 2.09% 2.00%
199X3 5X 369.78 13283 5 3 4 7 7 3 4 5X 9 8 9 4 6 5 2 32943 1.11874 138853 5X 71843 -1.70% 2.10%
199X4 5 X 1 2842 13352 5 X02X24 5 3 4 3 X 1 6 5 3.068.76 048741 842615 53 4 0432 21.91% 5.30%
19944 5339 9 .7 5 1.8418 5 X 83946 5 3 4 3 6 3 6 5X 23446 1.18695 848142 5X29531 -0.27% 3.00%
19944 54 ,1 8 8 4 4 13474 5 3 39838 5 X 5 3 4 4 4 5 3 4 3 5 3 5 1.16391 131191 53495X 2 3.02% 4.70%
19944 5 4 3 8 4 4 3 13539 5 447X 87 5X 78X 54 5 33 5 8 3 4 1.16886 1.88853 53486X 5 -0 .26% 1.80%
1994.4 5 4 4 8 8 3 8 1.8687 5 3 36848 54 ,81843 5 3 3 8 0 3 3 131532 0.92615 54X 1138 2 4 3 8 % 3.60%
1995.1 5 4.79835 13693 5 4,48847 5 4478.48 54 ,09846 139323 048142 54.17537 -0 .86% 0.90%
19954 5X 02241 1.8749 5 4,67X35 54446 .79 5 446X 68 1.89613 1.01191 54X1X44 0.88% 0 J 0 %
19954 5 5437.76 13803 5 4 3 4 1 3 8 5 441X 57 5 4,438.18 1.11538 138853 54,100.02 -2 .67% 3.00%
19954 5 532X 62 13868 5 4 3 2 5 3 0 5 4 ,67938 5 4396.73 138632 042615 54363X 7 21.05% 2.20%
199X1 5X 42X 88 13935 5 4 3 6 8 4 2 54 ,79934 5 4,73936 134649 048142 5 4 3 2932 -2 .69% 1.80%
199X2 5X 68X 75 1.8986 5 X 09938 5 4 3 86 .73 5 4 3 5 3 4 9 1.85881 X01191 54,796.17 -0 .69% 6.00%
199X3 5X 85X 72 1.1059 5 549X 27 5 4 3 9 4 4 5 5 4 3 5 8 3 4 1.06901 138053 5 4 4 8139 -4 .47% 1.00%
199X4 5X 44831 1.1110 5 439741 5X 86X 43 S X828.49 047391 042615 55,429.45 18.50% 4 J 0 %
19974 5 531831 1.1178 5 5 4 8 7 4 8 5X 144.17 5X 18X 38 1.83603 048142 55,19944 -4 .23% 4.90%
19974 5X 16939 14227 5 X49X59 5X 24339 5X 19X 63 135814 1.81191 55,13X51 -1 J 0 % 3 3 0 %
19974 5X 41141 1.1268 5 X 69848 5 5 4 4 X 5 5 5X 29232 137586 138053 5 4 3 9846 -4 .56% 3 3 0 %
1997.4 5X 86X 87 1.1388 5 5 4 6 4 3 6 SSA S»J« 1 5X 48836 049328 042615 5533133 19.05% 3.00%
Note. Sources for Gross Gaming Revenue: Ader (1998), Nevada Gaming Abstracts 
(1971-1997), New Jersey Casino Commission (1978-1997), Turner (1998)
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Chaining and deseasonalizing gross gaming revenue created an equivalent to the 
chained 1992 dollar GDP, which then allowed the calculation o f the Pearson r. As 
presented in Table 4.3, only a 0.006 concurrent correlation existed between the GGR and 
GDP, indicating that there was a very low positive correlation between the two variables. 
This test statistic for Hypothesis 1.1 with n >100 at a .05 level o f significance, indicated 
that the nuU hypothesis should be accepted unless the correlation was equal to or 
exceeded 0.195. In other words, the null hypothesis indicated that there was no 
measurable level o f correlation between GGR and GDP so that the use of projected 
changes in GDP would be of very little use in accepting this indicator as a strategic 
planning tool to assess the environmental conditions for a hotel-casino project. The lack 
o f correlation also seemed to validate the contention of Cargill (1979), and Cargill & 
Eadington (1976) when they stated that gaming revenues were not affected by general 
economic conditions.
Table 4.3
Correlation o f total gross gaming revenues IGGRJ to gross domestic product TGDPl for 
the quarters beginning 1975 and ending 1997
Measure Variable GGR GDP
Pearson r GGR 1.000 .006
Correlation GDP .006 1.000
Significance GGR .952
(2-taUed) GDP .952
Number of GGR 103 103
Quarters . . ._  .CDP. . 103 103
Note. Summary of SPSS output of Pearson r correlation
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Leading and Lagging Quarter Comparison o f GGR and GDP
Since the concurrent quarters o f GGR and GDP did not indicate a significant 
relationship, computations o f eight lead quarters of GDP to GGR and eight lag quarters 
was undertaken. The test statistic for Hypothesis 1.1 with n >100 at a .05 level of 
significance, indicated that the null hypothesis should be accepted unless the Pearson r 
correlation was equal to or exceeded 0.195 (Gravetter & Wallnau, 1992). In no quarter 
did the Pearson r  reach the required level as shown in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4
Matrices of Pearson r correlations for eight lead and lag quarters of USGGR to GDP
Period Lead Correlations Concurrent Correlations Lag Correlations
Concurrent 0.006
1 Quarter -0.046 -0.140
2  Quarters 0.108 0.029
3 Quarters 0.034 -0.062
4 Quarters 0.039 -0.013
5 Quarters -0.040 -0.059
6  Quarters 0.080 -0.034
7 Quarters -0 . 0 1 0 -0.047
8  Quarters -0 . 0 1 0 -0.024
' ^ ote. Summary o f SPSS correlation printouts for conditions and quarters
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Comparison of Gross Domestic Product to Jurisdictional Gross Gaming Revenue 
The second step in research question 1 involved decomposing the GGR by legalized 
jurisdictions to determine if correlations existed between GDP and GGR for each gaming 
jurisdiction. The same procedures utilized in step 1 were undertaken for three areas in 
Nevada—Las Vegas, Reno, and Lake Tahoe—as well as for Atlantic City, New Jersey. 
Those jurisdictions had a longer history o f operation than the newly developed areas. In 
addition, those areas were in operation during periods of recession while the newer areas 
were not, the last period o f recession having occurred in late 1990 and early 1991. The 
data for each of the four areas are presented in Tables 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8.
Table 4.5
Ouarterlv Gross Gaming Revenues for Las Veeas. 1971-1997 and Ouarterlv GDP fSmm')
ScMooaV LVCCR GDP
YEAR A c to l Real LVCCR 4 Q lr. C calcre6 Im fo im r S f i iw i l PfHntHlttTffi Q oartcrly Qourlcrfy
QTR- LVCCR (1992S) M®v. At e , M ar. A re m g Index- Chained OCR Growth Rate Growth Rate
1971:1 S 97.00 S 30734 b est base base base base base base
1971:2 S 98.84 S 30935 base base base base base base base
1971:3 S 106.92 $ 33133 base base base base base base base
1971:4 S 97.15 s 298.65 $ 31132 base base base base base base
1972:1 S 11530 s 34839 $ 322.18 $ 317.05 1.10073 1.03814 $ 305.40 base base
1972:2 $114.87 s 345.68 $ 33131 $ 326.70 1.05811 039054 $ 329.82 7J99Vo 9.60%
19723 $127.42 s 38036 $ 343.42 $ 33732 1.12760 1.00245 $ 336.49 2.02% 4.20%
1972:4 $118.63 s 349.63 $ 356.16 $ 349.79 039954 036888 $ 361.03 7^9% 7.10%
1973:1 $140.68 s 409.19 $ 37132 $ 363.69 1.12511 1.03814 $ 35033 -2.96% 11.20%
19733 $14737 s 42135 $ 390.11 $ 380.66 1.10663 039054 $ 38430 9.70% 2.80%
19733 $153.02 s 429.47 $ 40239 $ 39635 1.08384 1.00245 $ 39538 2.86% -1.20%
1973:4 $ 145.12 s 400.44 $ 415.09 $ 408.74 037970 036888 $ 421.87 6.73% 4JÏ0%
1974:1 $ 165.72 $ 448.13 $ 424.82 $ 41936 1.06710 1.03814 $ 40433 -4.11% -3.90%
19743 $172.42 $ 45636 $ 43338 $ 42930 1.06304 039054 $ 43330 7.11% 1.50%
19743 $ 178.94 $ 459.65 $ 441.12 $ 43735 1.05098 1.00245 $ 436.28 0.69% ^ 3 0 %
1974:4 $16730 $ 41634 $ 445.15 $ 443.13 033999 036888 $ 45737 4.83% -2.60%
1975.1 $18734 $ 45634 $ 447.17 $ 446.16 1.02259 1.03814 $ 429.77 -6.03% -5.40%
19753 $19637 $ 471.73 $ 451.04 $ 449.10 1.05038 039054 $ 453.40 5.50% 3.70%
(table continues)
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ScnsauV LVCCR CDP
XEAR Actaal Real LVCCR 4 0 tr . Cetrtertd Irrecwiar Senmnal DeatasotBUard Qnarterlr OoarurlT
OTR. LVCCR Chained n992$l Mov.A tc. Mnr. A r t Value Index- Chained GGR Growth Rate C l «« lb  Rale
19753 $199.69 $ 440.15 $ 456.04 $ 45334 037048 1.00245 $452.43 -0 ^ 1 % 7.70%
1975.4 $186.80 $ 43231 $ 450.11 $ 453.07 0.95417 036888 $467.62 3 3 6 % 4.70%
1976.1 $207.19 $ 47434 $ 454.63 $ 45237 104856 1.03814 $435.75 -6 3 2 % 9.70%
19763 $20633 $ 46630 $ 453.42 $ 454.03 1.02835 039054 $45837 5 .19% 2.80%
19763 $223.49 $ 499.08 $ 468.16 $ 460.79 1.08311 1.00245 $459.67 0.28% 1.60%
1976.4 $209.06 $ 458.87 $ 47430 $ 471.48 037325 0.96888 $486.62 5 .86% 3.80%
I977.I $24735 S 53435 $ 489.85 $ 48232 1.10828 1.03814 $464.61 -4 J 5 2 % 4.90%
19773 $247.09 $ 524.83 $ 50433 $ 497.09 1.05580 039054 $501.84 8.01% 8 J 0 %
19773 $263.81 $ 55360 $ 517.71 $ 511.02 1.08136 1.00245 $509.77 1.58% 6.70%
1977.4 $257.03 $ 529.41 $ 53535 $ 52633 1.00548 036888 $543.44 6.60% -0.10%
1978.1 $302.13 $ 611.72 $ 554.64 $ 54439 1.12244 1.03814 $52437 -3 .40% 1.60%
19783 $30360 $ 600.04 $ 573.44 $ 564.04 1.06382 039054 $569.43 8.47% 16.00%
19783 $31932 $ 62360 $ 59034 $ 58319 1.06941 1.00245 $580.77 1.99% 3.70%
1978.4 $31139 $ 595.74 $ 60733 $ 59934 039417 036888 $618.48 6.49% 4.60%
1979.1 $357.89 $ 669.45 $ 62136 $ 614.74 1.08900 1.03814 $592.16 -4 J 6 % 0.20%
19793 $33632 $ 61531 $ 625.75 $ 623.86 038614 0.99054 $629.82 6 J 6 % 0.90%
19793 $37137 $ 665JO $ 636.43 $ 631.09 1.05421 1.00245 $62935 -0 .04% 2.60%
1979.4 $357.84 s 628.67 $ 644.66 $ 64034 038147 0.96888 $661.12 5 .01% 1.00%
1980.1 $416.79 $ 71532 $ 656.18 $ 650.42 1.10009 1.03814 $62632 -5 .23% 2.00%
19803 $38634 $ 64833 $ 664.46 $ 66032 038185 039054 $666.62 6 .40% -9 J 0 %
19803 $406.43 $ 667.04 $ 664.89 $ 664.67 1.00357 1.00245 $663.05 -0 .54% -0.40%
1980.4 $407.63 $ 651.48 $ 67039 $ 667.74 037564 036888 $689.19 3.94% 8.10%
1981.1 $408.78 $ 636.83 $ 650.92 $ 660.76 0.96379 1.03814 $636.48 -7 .65% 7.70%
19813 $ 42331 $ 648.06 $ 650.85 $ 650.89 039566 039054 $657.11 3 J 4 % -3.50%
19813 $ 424.43 $ 636.80 $ 64339 $ 647.07 038413 1.00245 $645.49 -1 .77% 4.90%
1981.4 $ 419.68 $ 61834 $ 635.06 $ 639.18 036772 0.96888 $659.71 2 J 0 % -4.90%
1982.1 $ 45038 $ 654.44 $ 639.46 $ 63736 1.02695 1.03814 $61335 -6 .95% -6.50%
19823 $ 44366 $ 635.00 $ 63630 $ 63733 039557 0.99054 $64332 4.90% 1.70%
19823 $ 455.48 $ 64433 $ 638.08 $ 637.14 1.01130 1.00245 $63538 -1 J 0 % -2.00%
1982.4 $ 46376 $ 64738 $ 64534 $ 641.71 1.00915 0.96888 $66232 4 J 1 % 0.50%
1983.1 $ 461.42 $ 639.79 $ 641.68 $ 64331 039423 1.03814 $619.87 -6 .41% 3.90%
19833 $ 466.04 $ 639.81 $ 64388 $ 64238 039616 039054 $648.42 4 .61% 8.90%
19833 $ 48636 $ 66233 $ 647.43 $ 645.15 1.02693 1.00245 $64338 -0 .75% 7.40%
1983.4 $ 47334 $ 636.66 $ 644.70 $ 646.06 0.98545 0.96888 $666.82 3 .61% 7.70%
1984.1 $ 520.19 $ 69339 $ 658.15 $ 651.42 1.06472 1.03814 $627.49 -5 .90% 9.60%
19843 $ 47037 $ 62302 $ 653.70 $ 65532 0.94831 039054 $66219 5 .53% 6.40%
19843 $ 51237 $ 67232 $ 656.12 $ 65431 1.02643 1.00245 $65331 -1 J 4 % 3.00%
1984.4 $ 50439 $ 65737 $ 66130 $ 658.71 039796 036888 $679.87 4.06% 2.60%
1985.1 $ 573.65 $ 738.86 $ 67362 $ 66636 1.10780 1.03814 $64246 -5 .50% 4.20%
19853 $ 56368 $ 719.08 $ 696.88 $ 684.75 1.05014 039054 $69139 7.60% 2.00%
19853 $ 557.43 $ 707.40 $ 705.68 $ 70138 1.00873 1.00245 $69937 1-20% 5.90%
1985.4 $ 539.02 $ 67832 $ 710.97 $ 70832 035793 036888 $731.07 4 .50% 2.60%
1986.1$ $ 50037 $ 75312 $ 71438 $ 71362 1.05543 1.03814 $686.45 -6 .10% 5.10%
19863 $ 59833 $ 745.49 $ 72038 $ 71738 1.03889 039054 $724.44 5.53% 0.40%
19863 $ 59316 $ 73378 $ 72733 $ 724.06 1.01205 1.00245 $72229 -0 J 0 % 2.20%
1986.4 $ 60310 $ 73932 $ 74343 $ 734.83 1.00611 036888 $758.43 5 .00% 2.20%
1987.1 $ 696.02 $ 847.67 $76631 $ 75437 1.12368 1.03814 $726.66 -4 .19% 2.60%
19873 $ 67734 $ 819.47 $ 784.81 $ 77536 1.05662 039054 $78297 7.75% 4.10%
(table continues)
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SmwaenV LVCCR CDP
YEAR A ctual Rami LVGGR 4 Q tr. C m u n é Ir rv fo lv D iiM nm iH w d Q m n a i}
Q TR . LVGGR C tainad(1992$) M m r.A rf. M ar.A v f. V alor Imdrx* ChataM dCG R G raw thR al, CfO TthRU T
19873 % 689.05 $ 826.69 $ 80829 $ 79635 1.03785 1.00245 $794.60 1.49% 3.60%
1987.4 J  675.04 $ 80285 $ 824.17 $ 81623 038361 036888 $842.45 6.02% 6.00%
1988.1 Î  746.41 $ 88134 $ 83259 $ 82838 1.06393 1.03814 $79735 -5.28% 2.40%
19883 S 72031 $ 84246 $ 83834 $ 835.46 1.00837 039054 $843.45 5.70% 4.10%
19883 $ 760.79 $ 87730 $ 851.12 $ 844.73 1.03915 1.00245 $84X67 -0.09% 2.40%
1988.4 $ 76633 $ 876.89 $ 869.62 $ 86037 1.01920 036888 $888.00 5 J 8 % 5.10%
1989.1 S 81331 $ 92030 $ 87936 $ 874.49 1.05238 1.03814 $84237 -5.14% 4.00%
19893 S 81939 $ 91634 $ 897.88 $ 888.62 1.03142 039054 $897.11 6.50% 3.00%
19893 S 827.84 $ 91830 $ 908.06 $ 90237 1.01719 1.00245 $900.77 0.41% 2.20%
1989.4 S 828.46 $ 91130 $ 916.66 $ 91236 0.99884 0.96888 $941.66 4.54% 0.40%
1990.1 S 970.44 $ 1.054.71 $ 95026 $ 933.46 1.12989 1.03814 $899.17 -4.51% 3.90%
19903 S 94938 $ I.0 I865 $ 975.79 $ 963.02 1.05776 039054 $97233 8.13% 1 J 0 %
19903 S 979.42 $ 1,039.83 $1,006.12 $ 99036 1.04933 1.00245 $98834 1.68% -1.90%
1990.4 $ 970.75 $ 1.02034 $1.03338 $ 1,019.75 1.00057 036888 $1.05231 6.47% -4.00%
1991.1 $ 1.04737 $ 1,08736 $ 1.041.70 $ 1.03734 1.04860 1.03814 $999.42 -5.04% -2.10%
19913 $ 1.038.08 $ 1,06936 $ 1.05432 $1.048.11 1.02085 039054 $1.058.12 5.87% 1.80%
19913 $1,03430 $ 1,058.85 $ 1.05928 $ 1.05630 1.00185 1.00245 $1.05432 -0 J 6 % 1.00%
1991.4 $ 99030 $ 1,007.63 $ 1.056.10 $ 1,057.69 035267 036888 $1.091.66 3.54% 1.00%
19921 $ 1.063.62 $ 1.07285 $1.05232 $ 1.05421 1.01768 1.03814 $1.015.49 -6.98% 4.70%
19922 $ 1.03938 $ 1.04126 $ 1.045.15 $ 1,048.74 0.99287 039054 $1,058.76 4.26% 2.50%
19923 $ 1,078.01 $ 1,076.18 $ 1,049.48 $ 1,04731 1.02756 1.00245 $1.044.76 -1 J 2 % 3.00%
19924 $ 1.047.18 $ 1.038.05 $ 1.057.08 $ 1,05328 038554 036888 $1.087.11 4.05% 4 J 0 %
1993.1 $ 1,14638 $ 1.125.75 $ 1.07031 $ 1.063.70 1.05834 1.03814 $1.024.62 -5.75% 0.10%
19933 $ 1,125.60 $ 1.099.43 $1,084.85 $1,07738 1.02028 039054 $1.087.88 6.17% 2.00%
19933 $1,119.13 $ 1,08833 $ 1.087.89 $1,08637 1.00180 1.00245 $1,083.72 -0 J 8 % 2.10%
1993.4 $1,129.81 $ 1.09139 $1,10123 $1.09436 039711 036888 $1.129.71 4.24% 5 J 0 %
1994.1 $135230 $ 1398.04 $ 1.14430 $1.12276 1.15611 1.03814 $1.08132 -4 J 7 % 3.00%
19943 $130637 $ 124725 $ 1,18125 $ 1.16278 1.07265 039054 $1,173.89 8.54% 4.70%
19943 $138634 $ 1315.63 $1238.08 $1209.67 1.08760 1.00245 $1306.71 2.80% 1.80%
1994.4 $ 1386.27 $ 130634 $ 1 291 36 $ 1265.02 1.03314 036888 $1305.65 8.20% 3.60%
1995.1 $ 1.41330 $ 1321.71 $1297.88 $129432 1.02068 1.03814 $134735 -4.47% 0.90%
19953 $137039 $ 1375.46 $ 13 043 3 $ 1301.41 038006 039054 $1313.84 5 J 3 % OJO%
19953 $ 1,446.48 $ 133836 $ 1310.77 $ 1307.85 1.02379 1.00245 $1304.66 -0.70% 3.00%
1995.4 $ 1.489.27 $ 137134 $ 1326.87 $ 131882 1.03982 036888 $1361.17 4 J 3 % 2.20%
1996.1 $130032 $ 137222 $1339.49 $1333.18 1.02928 1.03814 $138430 -5.65% 1.80%
19963 $ 1.410.17 $ 1283.61 $ 134 133 $134031 035755 039054 $135332 5 J 8 % 6.00%
19963 $ 1.436.69 $ 1299.11 $ 1 3 3 1 3 7 $133635 037199 1.00245 $133339 -1.48% 1.00%
1996.4 $ 1.436.44 $ 129293 $1311-97 $ 1321.77 0.97818 036888 $136432 2 3 2 % 4 J 0 %
1997.1 $134337 $ 138126 $ 131423 $ 1313.10 1.05191 1.03814 $1364.86 -7.28% 4.90%
19973 $ 1314.61 $ 1349.08 $ 133 039 $132241 1.02017 039054 $1335.05 5J55% 3 J 0 %
19973 $ 131939 $ 134839 $ 134 296 $1336.78 1.00884 1.00245 $133332 -0.11% 3 J 0 %
1997.4 $ 1373.73 $ 139268 $ 136 730 $ 1355.43 1.02748 0.96888 $ 1398.9 7 ] 4.91 % 3.00%
Notes. Sources for LVGGR are the Nevada Gaming Control Board, Annual Gaming 
Abstracts (1970-1997); $1992 Chained Index is from U.S. Department o f Commerce. 
(1998); GDP Quarterly Growth Rates are from U.S. Department o f Commerce. (1997).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
88
Table 4.6
Quarterly Gross Gaming Revenues for Reno. 1971-1997 and Ouarterlv GDP CSmm)
S cuoaaV RSGGR CD P
Y EAR A ctual Real RSCGR 4 Q tr. C cadcrad IiT tf iilir S n ia n a l DeaeaaauaHxed Q uarterly Q w rteH y
Q m RSCGR (W 7 S ) M ar A v t M ar. A rc. V alue Index- C hained OCR C row th R ate C i.w d i R ale
1971:1 % 2633 $ 8422 ba st base base base base base base
19713 S 33.87 $ 106.08 base base base base base base base
19713 S 43.15 $ 133.80 base base base base base base base
1971.4 S 2930 $ 90.07 $ 10334 base base base base base base
1972.1 S 2838 S 8597 $ 10398 $ 103.76 0.82858 0.87561 $11830 base base
197X2 S 34.73 $ 10451 $ 10339 $ 103.78 1.00703 1.04271 $9933 -16 .01% 9.60%
19723 S 43.40 $ 12935 $ 10X53 $ 103.06 135707 1.14677 $89.87 -9 .71% 4 3 0 %
197X4 $ 31.81 $ 93.75 $ 103.45 $ 10X99 091032 0.93490 $110.16 22.58% 7.10%
1973.1 S 30.43 $ 8831 $ 104.08 $ 103.77 0.85299 0.87561 $11831 7 .58% 1 1 3 0 %
19733 S 41.49 $ 11868 $ 107.62 $ 10595 1.12117 1.04271 $10132 -1 4 J 4 % 2.80%
19733 S 51.03 $ 14332 $ 111.04 $ 10933 130997 1.14677 $9534 -6 .09% -1 3 0 %
1973.4 S 3532 $ 9801 $ 11X11 S 11137 0.87846 093490 $11934 25.18% 4 3 0 %
1974.1 S 3X01 $ 8636 $ 111.62 $ 111.86 0.77381 097561 $127.75 7 .05% -3.90%
19743 S 44.10 $ 116.70 $ 111.12 $ 11137 1.04783 1.04271 $10691 -1 6 3 9 % 1 3 0 %
19743 S 5233 $ 134.42 $ 10892 $ 110.02 132175 1.14677 $9594 -10.17% -4 3 0 %
1974.4 S 4130 $ 10339 $ 11037 $ 10939 094337 093490 $117.23 22.18% -2.60%
1975.1 S 36.13 s 8804 $ 110.64 $ 110.45 0.79706 097561 $126.14 7.61% -5.40%
19753 $ 50.10 $ 12033 $ 11132 $ 111.08 1.08240 1.04271 $10633 -1 5 3 5 % 3.70%
19753 S 60.62 s 10931 $ 105.83 $ 10867 1.00497 1.14677 $94.76 -11.04% 7.70%
1975.4 S 4635 s 10737 $ 106.19 $ 106.01 1.01189 093490 $11339 19.65% 4.70%
1976.1 S 46.87 s 10730 $ 111.00 $ 10839 098810 0.87561 $124.02 9 3 8 % 9.70%
19763 $ 57.83 s 130.93 $ 113.68 $ 11234 1.16544 1.04271 $107.74 -13.13% 2.80%
19763 S 6833 s 153.04 $ 12463 $ 119.16 138435 1.14677 $10390 -3.56% 1.60%
1976.4 $ 56.48 s 12397 $ 12881 $ 126.72 097828 093490 $13534 30.45% 3.80%
1977.1 S 55.47 $ 119.78 $ 13193 $ 13037 091878 0.87561 $148.89 9.84% 4.90%
19773 S 7134 $ 15133 $ 137.08 $ 13450 1.12659 1.04271 $128.99 -1 3 3 6 % 8 3 0 %
19773 S 8X72 $ 17337 $ 14X14 $ 139.61 134113 1.14677 $121.74 -5.62% 6.70%
1977.4 S 70.79 $ 145.81 $ 147.60 $ 14497 1.00650 093490 $15495 2 7 3 8 % -0.10%
1978.1 S 6402 $ 129.62 $ 150.06 $ 148.83 097095 0.87561 $16997 9.69% 1.60%
19783 S 93.80 $ 186.00 $ 15868 $ 15437 130493 1.04271 $14804 -12.90% 16.00%
19783 S 118.01 $ 22995 $ 17X84 $ 165.76 138724 1.14677 $14434 -2 3 6 % 3.70%
1978.4 S 91.67 $ 175.04 $ 180.15 $ 17630 099175 093490 $18879 30.61% 4.60%
1979.1 S 8838 s 16532 $ 189.08 $ 18462 0.89548 0.87561 $210.84 11.68% 0 3 0 %
19793 S 10X01 s 186.49 $ 18930 $ 189.14 098599 1.04271 $18139 -13.97% 0.90%
19793 S 128.17 $ 229.61 $ 189.12 $ 189.16 131387 1.14677 $16495 -9.07% 2.60%
1979.4 $ 10423 s 183.12 $ 191.13 $ 190.13 096313 093490 $20336 -2 3 3 9 % 1.00%
1980.1 $ 9833 s 16881 $ 19X01 $ 19137 098117 0.87561 $21878 7 3 8 % 2.00%
19803 $115.70 s 194.16 $ 19392 $ 19297 1.00619 1.04271 $185.06 -15.41% -9 3 0 %
19803 $13X89 s 21810 S 191.05 $ 19X49 1.13309 1.14677 $167.85 -9 3 0 % -0.40%
1980.4 $110.18 s 176.09 $ 18939 $ 190.17 092597 093490 $203.41 21 .19  % 8.10%
(table continues)
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SaaMMi/ RSGGR CDP
YEAR Actual Real RSGGR 4Qtr. Centered Irregular Saaeaual DcscaaauaHaed Ouartwfj Qttvtcrir
om RSGGR 11992$) Mer. Art. Mer. A r t Value Index* Chained GGR Growth Rate CrawIbRate
1981.1 S 108.06 S 16854 S 189.17 $ 18953 0.88962 0.87561 $216.11 62 5 % 7.70%
198IX $ 13X41 s 20X62 s 191X9 $ 19053 1.06511 1.04271 $18X44 -15.58% -3 3 0 %
1981J S 150.62 s 22559 s 193.26 S 19X27 1.17534 1.14677 $167.67 -8.10% 4.90%
1981.4 $117.21 s 17X75 s 19X42 S 19X84 0.89581 053490 $28657 23.02% -4 3 0 %
1982.1 $11557 $ 167.86 $ 19X30 S 19X36 0.87261 057561 $21959 6.51% -6 3 0 %
tfïïza $134.24 $ 19X57 $ 189.79 $ 19155 1.00797 1.04271 $18X22 -16.60% 1.70%
19SZJ $ 1 5 5 5 7 $ 22052 $ 18855 S 18957 1.16473 1.14677 $16457 -10.02% -2.00%
19SZ.4 $122.29 $ 171.13 $ 18754 s 188.15 050957 053498 $20155 22.06% 0 3 0 %
1M3.1 $ 1 1 5 5 3 $ 16851 $ 186.13 $ 18754 855869 857561 $21X61 6.14% 3 3 0 %
I f t X l $ 1 5 3 5 9 $ 21858 $ 19853 $ 18858 151786 154271 $18057 -15.42% 8.90%
1 9 8 U $177-38 $ 24153 $ 19551 $ 19X27 154866 1.14677 $16854 -6l71% 7.40%
19t3.4 $ 1 3 8 5 2 $ 18755 $ 19954 $ 19753 054684 053498 $211.71 25.62% 7.70%
19S4.1 $143.46 $ 19158 $ 20751 $ 20X78 853867 057561 $23X73 9.93% 9.60%
1984,2 $ 1 6 8 5 2 $ 22X59 $ 21051 $ 28951 156444 154271 $28055 -13.83% 6.40%
19SAJ $18X 47 $ 23950 $ 210.11 $ 21056 153768 1.14677 $18X44 -8.53% 3.00%
1984.4 $ 1 4 6 5 7 $ 19057 $ 21056 $ 21053 850564 053490 $226.19 22.76% 2.60%
19SS.1 $14X 27 $ 18354 $ 20855 $ 28955 857277 857561 $239.78 6.48% 4.20%
1985.2 $ 1 7 1 5 8 $ 21952 $ 288.06 $ 28858 1.85842 154271 $19956 -16.61% 2.00%
198SL1 $19X 48 $ 24553 $ 28951 $ 28854 1.17572 1.14677 $18X11 -8.93% 5.90%
1985A $14X 28 $ 179.10 $ 206.72 $ 288.17 856838 053490 $22256 22.27% 2.60%
1986.1 $ 1 4 1 5 6 $ 177.75 $ 28SJ5 $ 286.84 856278 057561 $23531 5.68% 5.10%
198CJ $168.11 $ 28956 $ 20X96 $ 284.16 152597 154271 $195.79 -16.79% 0.40%
198CJ $188.43 $ 23358 $ 19957 $ 20152 1.15769 1.14677 $17654 -10.29% 2 3 0 %
1986.4 $ 1 5 7 5 8 $ 19352 $ 20X47 $ 20157 855956 853490 $21X72 22.82% 2.20%
1987.1 $ 1 5 4 5 9 $ 188.64 $ 20650 $ 28454 852892 857561 $23353 8.45% 2.60%
1987.2 $ 1 7 9 5 7 $ 21658 $ 20758 $ 28759 154585 154271 $19858 -15.10% 4.10%
19S7J $197.48 $ 23653 $ 20859 $ 288.44 1.13624 1.14677 $181.76 -8.48% 3.60%
1987.4 $ 1 6 8 5 7 $ 20054 $ 210.72 $ 20951 855728 853490 $224.42 23.47% 6.00%
1988.1 $ 1 6 6 5 6 $ 196.88 $ 21X58 $ 21155 852642 857561 $241.72 7.71% 2.40%
1988.2 $196.74 $ 22954 $ 21553 $ 21455 157323 154271 $20X48 -14.99% 4.10%
1988.3 $ 2 8 7 5 7 $ 239.15 $ 21650 $ 21651 1.10687 1.14677 $18834 -8.24% 2.40%
1988.4 $17X 12 $ 19650 $ 21X49 $ 216.00 851111 853490 $23154 22.54% 5.10%
1989.1 $16X61 $ 18356 $ 21X44 $ 21X97 855932 857561 $24436 5.77% 4.00%
1989.2 $ 1 8 8 5 2 $ 28X26 $ 28552 s 28858 056785 154271 $20852 -17.98% 3.00%
1989J $ 2 1 7 5 4 $ 241.47 $ 206.10 s 28551 1.17329 1.14677 $17957 -10.45% 2.20%
1989.4 $19X 73 $ 21X80 $ 20950 s 288.00 151924 853490 $22258 23.97% 0.40%
1998.1 $17X 25 $ 18751 $ 210.74 $ 21052 859812 857561 $248.19 7.96% 3.90%
1998.2 $ 213.43 $ 229.80 $ 21752 s 214.88 156971 154271 $28531 -14.52% 1 J0 %
1998-3 $ 2 2 6 5 8 $ 248.15 $ 21759 $ 21756 158539 1.14677 $18955 -7.72% -1.90%
1998.4 $198.12 $ 28854 $ 216.15 $ 21652 856131 853490 $231.70 22 3 0 % -1.00%
(table continues)
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ScanoaV RSGGR GDP
YEAR Actual Real RSGGR 4Q tr. CcalcrW Im fu la r Saamaml Dc m s m b I M Q o r tK tr Q avtta ly
OTR. RSCGR fl992$) M ar.Ars. Mar A r t VmW Index- C k a M G C R C rM feR ate C rM tb Rate
1991.1 s i7 s .e s $ 1*550 $ 21550 $ 21X57 055697 957561 6 .40% -2.10%
19913 S 21650 $ 22336 $ 21434 S 21432 154022 154271 S206JZ -16 .40% 1.80%
19913 S24X4S $ 24139 $ 21635 $ 21X24 135306 134677 s ir jM -« .94% 1.00%
19915 S 20X44 $ 20554 $ 215.67 $ 21X96 055361 953490 S231.M 23 .07% 1.00%
1992.1 S 19654 $ 19*34 $ 21*56 $ 21732 05117* 957561 sz«a .i» 7 .44% 4.70%
19923 S 23153 $ 23157 $ 22154 $ 230.00 155397 1.04271 -14 .99% 2 3 0 %
19923 $25X 56 $ 25X13 $ 22237 $ 22155 134201 1.14677 S193JM -8 3 9 % 3.00%
1992.4 $20*50 $ 2065* $ 22233 $ 22250 053065 953490 SM 7J* 23.08% 4 3 0 %
199X1 $10651 $ 1*352 $ 21*55 $ 22059 053111 957561 S2SZ.M 5 .95% 0.10%
199X2 $2 5 5 5 4 $ 24930 $ 22X26 $ 221.05 132*70 154271 n i2.M -15 .89% 2.00%
199X3 $ 2 3 5 5 7 $ 22*50 $ 21732 $ 22039 153*19 134677 -9 .43% 2.10%
199X4 $2 1 9 5 9 $ 21X41 $ 21*5* $ 21750 057525 953490 s a s is r i 2 1 3 3 % 5 3 0 %
1994.1 $206.45 $ 19*37 $ 22X17 $ 22033 059942 057561 S 3 S IM 8.01% 3.00%
19943 $23430 $ 22X70 $ 21X72 $ 21*54 152170 154271 S 2M 3t -1 6 3 5 % 4.70%
19943 $25732 $ 244.16 $ 21951 $ 21756 132173 1-14677 -9 .61% 1.80%
1994.4 $22030 $ 2075* $ 21*5* $ 21954 054905 053490 S234.2» 23.44% 3.60%
1995.1 $20450 $ 19152 $ 21654 $ 21756 05*03* 057561 n tM s t 6.10% 0.90%
19953 $249.06 $ 231.71 $ 21*54 $ 21754 156365 1-04271 S2M S1 -1535% 0 3 0 %
19953 $27951 $ 259.10 $ 22X5* $ 220.71 137396 1-14677 S l* l4 « -7 .88% 3.00%
1995.4 $2 5 0 3 2 S 2305* $ 23*3* s 22X43 1.02330 053490 SM l.lZ 2 5 3 8 % 2 3 0 %
1996.1 $2 2 1 5 0 $ 20257 $ 23059 $ 22953 05*170 0-S7561 S2«r25 8.76% 1.80%
19963 $ 251.17 $ 22*53 $ 23032 $ 230.61 059142 1-04271 S221.lt -15 .67% 6.00%
19963 $27056 $ 244.74 $ 22653 $ 22X43 157143 1-14677 S199.19 -9 .93% 1.00%
1996.4 $23230 $ 20937 $ 2213* $ 22X95 053444 053490 S23*.SS 2 0 3 6 % 4 3 0 %
1997.1 $21752 $ 19456 $ 2193* $ 22033 05*444 0-S7561 5.04% 4 3 0 %
19973 $25950 $ 23137 $ 22031 $ 219.74 1553*0 1.04271 S2lt.74 -1 6 3 5 % 3 3 0 %
19973 $277.71 $ 24656 $ 22034 $ 22033 131*61 1.14677 SIÏ2.M -8 .83% 3 3 0 %
19975 $23956 $ 21X27 $ 22139 $ 22051 0560*5 053490 S 2 1 tja 22 .99% 3.00%
Motes. Sources for RSGGR are the Nevac a Gaming Contre Board, Annual G
Abstracts (1970-1997); $1992 Chained Index is from U.S. Department o f Commerce. 
(1998); GDP Quarterly Growth Rates are from U.S. Department o f Commerce. (1998).
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Table 4.7
Ouarterlv Gross Gaming Revenues for Lake Tahoe. 1971-1997 and Ouarterlv GDPCSmm’)
ScaaanaV LTCCR GDP
YEAR Actual RcalLTGGR 4Q tr. Ccolcrcd Im c a la r Scasaoal Dcscaaaoallnd Qnanerly Q o i t t t t r
OTR. LTCCR fl992$) Mar. Arc. M ar. Avfc taàex* Chained CCR Grawth Rate Growth Rate
197IJ S 1456 S 4557 bast base base base base base base
19715 S 2X64 s 64.64 bast base base base base base base
19715 s 2954 5 9056 bast base base base base base base
I971A s 1652 S 50.71 $ 62.76 base base base base base base
197X1 s 1759 s 5X29 S 64.77 S 6X77 053560 050200 07X30 base base
197X2 s 2X41 s 7X45 S 6652 S 6X49 157566 059420 56X07 -&89% 9.60%
197X3 s 3159 s 9450 s 6753 s 6 65 7 150904 157776 56X10 -20.78% 430%
197X4 s 1X76 s 5X29 5 6056 s 6759 051670 X04596 50052 S 3J5% 7.10%
197X1 s 17.74 s 5150 s 6 753 s 6X05 0.75031 050200 577.16 -3.59% 1130%
197X2 s 2 657 s 7650 s 6 952 s 6X53 150904 X99420 56X92 2.80%
197X3 s 3X71 s 9451 s 69.42 s 6952 156761 157776 56455 -21.28% -130%
197X4 s 21.44 s 5956 s 7059 s 6951 054626 054596 50X64 S 2J2% 430%
1974.1 s 1X07 s 5153 s 705 5 s 7052 0.72564 X00200 179.73 -3.52% -3.90%
19745 5 2951 s 7752 s 7X55 s 7X40 159600 059420 57X01 -11.19% 130%
19745 s 3952 s 10259 s 7X42 s 7159 153002 157T76 $5555 -20.98% -430%
1974.4 s 2451 s 6056 s 7X65 s 7X54 052007 054596 $0X74 53 J6% -2.60%
197X1 s 2156 s 5150 s 7254 s 7X75 0.71211 050200 $0X40 -3.81% -5.40%
197X2 s 31.49 s 7X57 s 7X43 s 7X64 154030 059420 $73.05 -11.42% 3.70%
197X3 s 4X41 s 60.79 s 6X06 s 6754 050404 157776 $5X63 -27.96% 7.70%
197X4 s 2X00 s 59.71 s 6X36 s 6X71 X93723 054596 $7X31 43.10% 4.70%
1976.1 s 2650 s 6051 s 64.07 s 64.71 053042 050200 $7X37 -2.57% 9.70%
19765 s 3X63 s #0.67 s 6554 s 64.71 154663 X99420 $6550 -11J0% 2.80%
19765 $ 4X00 s 10X49 s 7X27 s 7051 1.42933 059420 $70.71 8.65% 1.60%
1976.4 s 3152 s 6950 s 7754 5 7655 050491 157776 $5953 -1SJ8% 3.80%
1977.1 s 3157 s 6756 s 7957 s 7051 056450 050200 $09.12 48.95% 4.90%
19775 s 39.77 s 04.47 s 0X53 $ 0055 1.05526 059420 $0051 -9.66% 83 0%
19775 s 5X67 s 11X42 s 0X51 s 0X02 157071 157776 $64.19 -20.27% 6.70%
1977.4 $ 37.0# s 7657 s 0X31 s 0451 050404 054596 $99.70 55.44% -0.10%
197X1 s 3X24 s 6750 s 0X14 s 0X22 X7S969 050200 $9653 -3.16% 1.60%
197X2 s 4151 $ •1 5 2 $ 0450 s 0452 056572 059420 $0X31 -11.71% 16.00%
197X3 s 56.19 s 109.49 s 0X77 s 0454 150133 157776 $6555 -22.82% 3.70%
197X4 s 3X00 s 7X56 s 0252 s 0X29 057114 054596 $9X46 49.53% 4.60%
19795 s 3X92 s 67.19 s 0X79 s 0250 051145 050200 $9350 ^ .6 5 % 030%
19795 $ 46.17 s 04.41 s 0X41 s 0X10 151571 059420 $0350 -9.97% 030%
19795 s 6X00 s 11750 s 0551 s #456 159567 157776 $66.10 -20.91% 2.60%
1979.4 s 4X62 s 7653 s 0653 s 0652 059090 054596 $10150 53.83% 1.00%
1900.1 s 4X42 s 7454 s 0056 s #7.45 055242 050200 $99.14 -2.49% 2.00%
19005 5 5151 s 0654 s 0 950 s 0X60 050040 059420 $09.19 -10.04% -930%
19005 s 6959 s 11X72 s 0 756 s 0X40 150527 157776 $6955 -2 2 3 6 V , -0.40%
19005 s 4X59 s 7756 s 0 052 s 0059 050159 054596 $104.13 5037% 8.10%
(table continues)
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S c a « a V LTCCR GDP
YEAR A e tm l Real LTCCR 4Q tr. C m ttn é Inregwfai- Scaaooal DeaeaaanaOzed Quarterly Quarterly
OTR. LTCCR 0992$) M«r. Arm , Mor. A r t V ah» Index* Chained CCR CrawthRale GraadhRate
19S1.1 S 5153 S 795 7 S 0 9 5 7 S 0059 059957 050200 $100.79 -3 .21% 7.70%
19015 S 4255 S 9X07 s 9150 s 905 9 155713 059420 $9151 -9 .50% -3 3 0 %
19015 s 01.77 s 12259 s 94.04 s 9252 152029 157776 $72.72 -20 .27% 4.90%
1901.4 s 44.19 s 40.00 s 91 5 5 s 9255 0.73322 054596 $109.75 50 .92% -4.90%
1902.1 % 4959 s 7251 s 0951 s 90.73 050024 050200 $10257 -6 .27% -6 3 0 %
19025 s 5959 s 04.77 s 075 3 s 0052 055065 059420 $0053 -13 .55% 1.70%
19025 s 7954 s 11154 s 0 452 s 0X40 150536 157776 $6755 -24 .60% -2.00%
1902.4 s 40.71 s 40.14 s 0 4 5 4 s 0453 050027 054596 $9959 48 .6 7 % 0 3 0 %
1903.1 s 5159 s 7154 s 0451 s 0450 054452 050200 $9X44 ^ .2 7 % 3.90%
19035 $ 5152 s 70.44 s 00 5 3 s 0252 055694 059420 $0259 -1 3 3 5 % 8 3 0 %
19035 s 91.41 s 12457 s 03 5 4 s 0159 151677 157776 $44.17 -22 .40% 7.40%
1903.4 s 5250 s 7050 s 0 4 5 4 s 0350 054501 054596 $99.10 5 4 3 6 % 7.70%
1904.1 s 4454 5 0X55 s 07 5 2 s 0453 059437 050200 $9754 -1 .66% 9.60%
19045 s 7057 s 9355 s 9 3 5 7 s 9059 153046 059420 $9151 -6 .49% 6.40%
19045 s 9259 s 12050 s 92.70 s 9353 159010 157776 $7259 -20 .09% 3.00%
1904.4 s 50.79 s 7453 s 94.11 s 93.40 051933 054596 $110.41 51 .48% 2.60%
190X1 s 44.73 s 035 7 s 9 3 5 7 s 9354 050040 050200 $10659 -3 .64% 4 3 0 %
190X2 s 7252 s 9359 s 9 3 5 0 s 9353 059633 059420 $9457 -1 1 3 8 % 2.00%
190X3 s 9552 s 120.71 s 9 3 5 5 s 9X47 159130 157776 $7X15 -2 2 3 3 % 5.90%
190X4 s 5350 5 47.72 s 9 1 5 5 s 9255 0.73335 054596 $109.17 4 9 3 3 % 2.60%
1904.1 s 5952 s 7455 s 09.14 s 9050 053100 050200 $10254 -6 3 2 % S 1 0 %
19045 s 40.79 s 0X71 s 0 7 5 7 s 0051 057166 059420 $00.72 -1 3 3 5 % 0.40%
19045 s 0954 s 11152 s 0 4 5 3 s 04.10 159294 157776 $4750 -24 .05% 2.20%
1904.4 s 4150 s 7X74 s 0 4 5 3 s 0X93 050139 054596 $10150 50 .74% 2.20%
1907.1 s 4951 s 0X14 s 09 5 0 s 0050 056520 050200 $10050 -1 3 5 % 2.60%
19075 s 0050 s 9754 s 9 2 5 2 s 905 5 157162 059420 $9157 -8 3 3 % 4.10%
19075 S 10359 s 12454 s 9X75 s 9450 152406 157776 $7353 -1 9 3 0 % 3.60%
1907.4 S 4454 5 7754 s 9 4 5 3 s 9X94 050533 054594 $113.40 54 .02% 6.00%
1900.1 s 02.42 S 9752 s 9 9 5 7 s 9755 059663 050200 $110.71 -2 3 7 % 2.40%
19005 s 0453 S 9954 s 995 2 s 99.40 059067 059420 $9957 -9 .70% 4.10%
19005 S 104.02 s 12052 s 90.47 $ 9954 151170 157776 $7751 -22 ,46% 2.40%
1900.4 S 4759 s 7454 s 9 0 5 0 s 90.43 X70169 054596 $11655 50 .10% 5.10%
1909.1 s 7157 s 0959 s 9 4 5 0 s 9751 051693 050200 $11051 -5 .10% 4.00%
19095 s 7151 s 7959 s 9 1 5 4 s 9357 055123 059420 $9451 -14 .40% 3.00%
19095 S 11155 s 12354 s 92.44 s 9250 154207 157774 $7250 - 2 3 3 2 % 2.20%
19095 S 0152 s 9050 s 9X71 s 9457 055671 054596 $11150 5 4 .45% 0.40%
1990.1 s 04.11 s 9151 s 9 4 5 4 s 9X97 055251 050200 510XS1 -2 .15% 3.90%
19905 s 0750 s 9355 s 99 5 0 s 9752 055440 059420 $9050 -9 .49% 1.20%
19905 S 10759 s 114.45 s 9 7 5 0 s 9049 1.16407 157776 $77.00 -21 .73% -1.90%
1990.4 S 7153 s 7 457 s 9352 s 9X50 X70505 054596 $11259 46 .46% ^ .0 0 %
(table continues)
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LTGGR GDP
YEAR Actual RcalLTGGR 4Q lr. Ccstered Irregular Scasuaal DewaconaËaad Quarterly Qnarlcrly
om LTCCR 11992$) Mar. A r t Mar. A r t Value lude** Chained GGR GrawtkRate Growth Rate
1991.x S 7650 S 79.7# S 90.72 S 9X17 056562 05*200 $10450 -7.43% -2.10%
19915 $ #751 S #959 s #955 S 905# 059677 05942# $9050 -13.11% 1.80%
19915 5 10056 s 10X72 s #657 s # #56 156256 157776 $69.15 -23.84% 1.00%
1991.4 S 6X96 s 67.10 s #450 s #55# 0.7#130 054596 $10152 46.81% 1.00%
1992.1 S S X ll s #353 s #551 s #X41 05*156 05*200 $9653 ^ .6 2 % 4.70%
19925 S SXS9 s #455 s #4.43 s #557 05#6S6 05942# SSX66 -11.54% 230%
19925 S 11150 s 11X61 s #655 s #X54 X304S2 157776 $6654 -21.85% 3.00%
1992.4 S 6355 s 6250 s SX50 s # 657 0.72613 054596 $10X75 51.99% 430%
19935 S #053 s 72.77 s #453 s # 457 052*21 05*200 $9652 -5.43% 0.10%
19935 S 107.79 s 1055# s #954 s #659 151173 05942# $#759 9.18% 2-00%
19935 $ 7751 s 7X09 s #0.41 s #45# 05*360 157776 $6650 -23.90% 2.10%
199X4 S 6253 s 60.40 s 7959 s # 055 0.75365 054596 $94.74 42.46% 530%
19945 $ 7457 s 7 157 s 7#56 s 7952 050943 05*200 $#959 -5.43% 3.00%
19945 S 7654 s 7X17 s 70.13 s 7455 05S6S6 05942# $7457 -16-77% 4.70%
19945 S 10656 s 10X39 s 76.71 s 7X42 15S102 157776 $5756 -22.95% 1.80%
1994.4 S 9059 s #X69 s #353 s 7 95 7 1572*6 054596 $9451 6431% 3.60%
19955 S 66.74 s 6X41 s # 057 s # 155 0.76256 05*200 $9250 -1.71% 0.90%
19955 S #053 s 7 454 s #153 s #055 052317 05942# $ (1 5 2 -1237% 030%
19955 S 10550 s 9 75# s #0.03 s #053 150920 157776 $63.03 -22.49% 3.00%
19955 S 7X44 s 7X23 s 7657 s 7#55 0521*9 054596 $9X61 46.95% 230%
1996.1 S 7256 s 6653 s 77.72 s 7759 056317 05*200 $#752 -530% 130%
19965 S 7356 s 6753 s 7557 s 76.79 05754# 05942# $7754 -11.75% 6.00%
19965 S 975# s # 756 s 7X51 s 7459 1.17772 157776 $5X45 -2432% 1.00%
1996.4 S 7253 s 6X64 s 7157 s 7X69 050306 054596 $#553 47.00% 430%
19975 S 6X65 s 56.41 s 6951 s 7059 0.79907 05*200 $#053 -6.86% 4.90%
19975 S 7259 s 6 459 s 6S50 s 6#56 05337# 05942* $6955 -1334% 3 30%
19975 S 9257 $ # 159 s 675# s 6 754 150704 157776 $5X09 -2334% 330%
1997.4 S 6659 s 5 959 s 6X47 s 6 65 * 059317 054596 $7X34 4736% 3.00%
Notes. Sources for LTGGR are the Nevada Gaming Control Board, Annual Gaming 
Abstracts (1970-1997); $1992 Chained Index is from U.S. Department o f Commerce. 
(1998); GDP Quarterly Growth Rates are from U.S. Department o f Commerce. (1998).
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Table 4.8
Ouarterlv Gross Gaming Revenues for Atlantic City. 1978-1997 and GDP CSmml
SeaaumMi ACGGR CDP
YEAR Actual Real ACGGR 4Q tr. Ccutand Irregular S i u i w l DeseasomaSzed Q uarterfy Q u a ttr lf
om ACGGR (1992$) Mont. A re. M or. A re. Vabte /ndec* ChainedGG R C roortkR ate G row th R ate
19715 $ 1X91 S 3752 base base base base base base base
197X3 S 6352 $ 12X06 base base base base base base base
197X4 S 5154 $ 9754 base base base base base base base
19795 s 4951 $ 9150 $ 0X02 base base base base base base
19795 s 64.70 $ 11 (53 $ 10X25 % 9X14 100674 152623 $9563 base base
19795 s 11352 $ 20450 $ 12X01 $ 11X13 1.72763 1.17560 $100.40 S.08*/. 2 .60%
19795 s 97.77 $ 171.77 $ 14659 $ 13755 105151 052534 $14X32 47.61% 1.00%
19M 5 s 12750 $ 21959 $ 17X37 $ 16253 104947 057203 $10X09 25.47% 2.00%
19M 5 s 15151 $ 25352 $ 21254 $ 19530 100012 152623 $19041 2 J7 % -93 0 %
19M 5 s 19756 $ 32454 $ 24250 $ 22756 152674 147560 $19341 1.58% -0.40%
190X4 s 16X11 $ 26550 $ 26571 $ 25359 154522 052534 $274.49 41.99% 8.10%
19015 s 20150 s 32755 $ 292.70 $ 279.20 1.17174 057203 $31950 16.54% 7.70%
19015 s 254.00 $ 30X60 $ 32X39 $ 30954 105565 152623 $30153 -S.71% -3 3 0 %
19015 s 35X00 $ 537.13 $ 37951 $ 353 5 0 152163 1.17560 $30047 -0.45% 4.90%
19015 s 20X70 $ 42257 $ 41X91 $ 399 0 6 155063 052534 $43157 43.69% -4.90%
19025 s 300.00 $ 435.73 $ 44X05 $ 4 32 5 # 1.00751 057203 $49549 14.84% -6 3 0 %
19025 s 363.00 $ 520.73 $ 479.07 $ 462 5 6 1.12576 152623 $450.74 -9.03% 1.70%
19025 s 45X00 $ 63X50 $ 50353 $ 491 5 0 109519 147560 $41X00 -7.25% -2.00%
19025 s 300.16 $ 53159 $ 53156 $ 517 5 9 1.02702 052534 $55945 33.79% 0 3 0 %
1903.1 s 335.00 $ 46450 $ 53X45 $ 5 3 4 5 5 056047 057203 $612.79 9.55% 3 3 0 %
19035 s 49155 $ 674.70 $ 57X94 $ 557.70 100979 152623 $543.44 -11 J2 % 8.90%
19035 s 521.72 $ 70952 $ 59525 $ 50X10 lO lllO 1.17560 $49X55 -8.26% 7.40%
19035 s 422.77 $ 56955 $ 604.72 $ 599 5 9 054977 052534 $64X39 30.06% 7.70%
19045 s 42954 $ 57255 $ 631.71 $ 61001 05259# 057203 $70X29 9.24% 9.60%
19045 s 47452 $ 62754 $ 61954 $ 625 7 7 150235 1.02623 $609.79 -13J1% 6.40%
19045 s 57752 $ 75757 $ 631.70 $ 6 2 5 7 7 101014 1.17560 $53240 -12.71% 3.00%
19045 s 46257 $ 60250 $ 63951 $ 635 7 6 054734 052534 $697.05 29.07% 2.60%
19055 s 40757 $ 62759 $ 65359 $ 64X75 057099 057203 $74059 7.85% 4 3 0 %
19055 s 52X03 $ 67552 $ 66554 $ 659.77 152433 152623 $64251 -13.24% 2.00%
19055 s 634.44 $ 005.13 $ 67750 $ 67152 1.19042 1.17560 $571.47 -11.11% 5.90%
1905.4 s 52056 $ 65566 $ 691.15 $ 6045# 055791 052534 $739.70 29.44% 2.60%
19065 s 49951 $ 62562 $ 69056 $ 6 9 0 5 5 05055# 057203 $79141 7.00% 5.10%
19065 s 57759 $ 719.77 $ 70155 $ 69X05 15340# 152623 $67X26 1431% 0.40%
19065 s 66350 $ 02X01 $ 7*557 $ 70351 146674 1.17560 $59X42 -11.77% 2 3 0 %
190X4 s 53050 $ 65159 $ 70453 $ 70500 052467 052534 $76150 2731% 2 3 0 %
19075 s 54559 $ 66455 $ 71456 $ 709 5 5 05372# 057203 $#1251 6.69% 2.60%
19075 s 62953 $ 76151 $ 724.77 $ 71956 155SIS 152623 $70147 -13.74% 4.10%
19075 s 727.44 $ #72.75 $ 737.75 $ 73106 1.19350 1.17560 $62253 -1139% 3.60%
19075 s 59251 $ 705*5 $ 75154 $ 744.40 054715 052534 $00455 2933% 6.00%
190X1 s 60357 $ 71255 $ 76251 $ 756 5 # 054117 057203 $#6747 731% 2.40%
190X2 s 69956 $ 11651 $ 77X77 $ 769 5 4 156101 152623 $75047 -1330% 4.10%
19005 s 705.75 $ 90X60 $ 79523 $ 701.00 146003 1.17560 $66444 -11.44% 2.40%
190X4 s 64651 I $ 73955 $ $ 79954 053669 052534 $05344 28.44% 5.10%
(table continues)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
95
ScaaanV ACGGR CDP
YEAR Actual Real ACGGR 4Q tr. Ccotorcd Irregular T ia i ia l D eteaiotuiB ttd Q uaruH y Q a m u H j
O TR 5CCCR (19925) M ae. A r t. M o r.A rr. Kafttr /«dec* ChabiedGGR G rom tk R a u C m th R a U
1M9.1 S <5X31 S 742.10 S 00154 S 79754 053044 057203 S91X74 7.09% 4.00%
19095 s 70953 S 79359 S 79554 S 79X41 059447 152423 $77X81 -14.86% 3.00%
19095 s 0 10 5 7 s 90X32 s 79559 $ 79X77 1.14143 1.17540 $47X91 -12.99% 2.20%
1909.4 s XS151 s <9452 s 70450 s 79054 057052 052534 $054.10 26.18% 0.40%
199X1 5 454 5 7 s 71159 s 77454 s 70052 051003 057203 $09459 4.74% 3.90%
19905 S 77X34 $ 03X15 s 70755 s 702.10 154703 152423 $742.12 -14.81% 1 30%
19905 S 029.72 s 00050 s 70059 s 70352 1.12304 1.17540 $44X74 -12.51% -1.90%
199X4 S 49X17 s 73353 s 79X27 s 70X33 053443 052534 $04X49 27.29% -4.00%
1991.1 S 45952 s 40459 s 70352 s 70X94 054993 057203 $90150 6.23% -2.10%
19915 S 72155 s 742.75 s 74052 s 772.07 054202 152423 $75254 -16.56% 1.80%
19915 S 04553 s 0*550 s 74159 s 74150 1.14357 1.17540 $44752 -1335% 1.00%
1991.4 S 495.47 s 70750 s 755.11 s 75X40 053200 052534 $01959 26.59% 1.00%
1992.1 s 753.42 s 75954 s 77355 s 74453 059402 057203 $07552 6.87% 4.70%
19925 s 79X79 s 00051 s 70054 s 701.15 152454 152423 $741.10 -13.10% 2.50%
19925 s 923.74 s 922.17 s 79750 s 79251 154302 1.17540 $47457 -11 J9 % 3.00%
19925 s 74152 s 73457 s 00455 s 00X07 051721 052534 $04X40 2832% 4 3 0 %
1993.1 s 74452 s 73X00 s 79X94 s 00051 051201 057203 $917J4 5.98% 0.10%
19935 s 0 39 5 5 s 01954 s 00154 s 799.40 1.02554 152423 $77X97 -15.08% 2.00%
19935 s 9 51 5 7 s 92557 s 002.72 s 96250 155300 1.17540 $402.44 -1239% 2.10%
1993.4 s 749.49 s 74352 s 00451 s 00351 052475 052534 $04057 2739% 530%
1994.1 s 72451 s 495.15 5 79X00 s 000.45 054045 057203 $91750 537% 3.00%
19945 s 05X04 s 01X00 s 79554 s 79X70 152003 152423 $77X44 -15.44% 4.70%
19945 s 997.75 s 94X72 s 00052 s 79X19 150409 1.17540 $47X94 -12.44% 1.80%
1994.4 s 04050 s 00X04 s 01X00 $ 00751 059024 052534 $07X09 2839% 3.60%
1995.1 s 042.02 s 7*7.45 s 03X07 s 02X54 055271 057203 $94X94 8.46% 0.90%
19955 s 94359 s 07754 s 05351 s 04X54 153020 1.02423 $02353 -12.99% 030%
19955 S 154X 70 s 90954 s 0X355 $ 05053 1.15254 1.17540 $730.12 -1139% 3.00%
1995.4 s 09250 s 022.19 5 049.19 s 04X42 054094 052534 $93X32 2834% 23 0%
199X1 s 07X07 s 00159 s 07250 s 07150 052044 057203 $99758 638% 1.80%
199X2 $ 9 7 7 5 4 s 00951 s 07X79 s 07459 151774 152423 $05155 -14.63% 60 0%
199X3 S 1.00254 s 97X41 s 073.13 s 074.44 151910 1.17540 $74354 -12.69% 1.00%
199X4 S 007.74 s 799.05 s 04754 s 07053 051020 052534 $940.44 26.43% 4 30%
1997.1 s 924.77 s 02751 s 07359 s 07051 055037 057203 $99755 6.05% 4.90%
19975 s 9 07 5 0 s 07957 s 071.11 s 07250 1.00010 152423 $050.11 -14.76% 330 %
19975 S 1501.79 s 94054 s 04X47 s 04X79 1.10505 1.17540 $73951 -13.07% 330 %
19975 S 911 5 2 s 01955 s 07152 s 04950 054275 05253 $939.11 27.08% 3.00%
Notes. Sources for ACGGR are the New Jersey Casino Control Commission, Annual 
Gaming Reports (1978-1998); $1992 Chained Index is from U.S. Department o f 
Commerce. (1998); GDP Quarterly Growth Rates are from U.S. Department o f 
Commerce. (1998).
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None of the mature legalized gaming jurisdictions had a significant Pearson r that 
would fail to accept the null hypotheses established in hypothesis 1.2 (See Table 4.9). The 
Pearson r for Las Vegas indicated that a correlation o f at least .684 between GGR and 
GDP was required, but, in fact, the correlation was .067. Similarly, Reno’s correlation of 
GGR to GDP was -0.003, Lake Tahoe’s was 0.010, and Atlantic City’s was -0.040, all 
well below their respective level o f significance. In other words, the null hypothesis 
indicated that there was no measurable level of correlation between GGR and GDP so that 
the use of projected changes in GDP would not appear to be an effective indicator as a 
strategic planning tool in a mature gaming jurisdiction.
Table 4.9
Correlation of selected total gross gaming revenues by jurisdictions CGGR,,) to gross 
domestic product TGDP) for the quarters beginning at their inception and ending 1997.
Jurisdiction GGR GDP Sienificance Sienificance Quarters Quarters
Las Veeas
GGR 1.000 0.067 .067 103 103
GDP 0.067 1.000 .067 103 103
Reno
GGR 1.000 -0.003 .976 103 103
GDP -0.003 1.000 .976 103 103
Lake Tahoe
GGR 1.000 .010 .921 103 103
GDP .010 1.000 .921 103 103
Atlantic City
GGR 1.000 -0.040 .736 74 74
_ GDP -0.040 1.000 .736 74 74
; Motes. Summary o f SPSS output of Pearson r correlation
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Leading and Lagging Comparison of Legalized Gaming Jurisdiction GGR and GDP
Since the concurrent quarters of each legalized gaming jurisdiction GGR and GDP 
did not indicate any significant relationships, computations o f eight lead quarters of GDP 
to GGR and eight lag quarters was undertaken for each area.. The test statistic for 
Hypothesis 1.1 with n >100 at a .05 level o f significance, indicated that the null hypothesis 
should be accepted unless the Pearson r correlation was equal to or exceeded 0.195 
(Gravetter & Wallnau, 1992). In no quarter did the Pearson r reach the required level as 
shown in Table 4.10.
Table 4.10
Matrix of Pearson r correlations for eight lead and lag quarters of Las Vegas gross gaming 
revenue tLVGGRJ to GDP
Period Lead Correlations Concurrent Correlations Lag Correlations
Concurrent 0.067
1 Quarter 0.014 -0.044
2 Quarters 0.119 0.039
3 Quarters 0.008 -0.025
4 Quarters 0.133 0.001
5 Quarters 0.084 -0.128
6 Quarters 0.157 -0.036
7 Quarters 0.033 -0.095
8 Quarters 0.104 -0.056
Mote. Summary of SPSS correlation printouts for conditions and quarters
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Table 4.11
Matrix o f Pearson r correlations for eight lead and lag quarters o f Reno gross gaming 
revenue fRSGGR) to GDP
Period Lead Correlations Concurrent Correlations Lag Correlations
Concurrent -0.003
1 Quarter -0 023 0.041
2 Quarters 0 088 0.020
3 Quarters 0 087 -0.047
4 Quarters 0 003 -0.028
5 Quarters -0.038 -0.002
6 Quarters 0 048 -0.037
7 Quarters 0.019 -0.019
8 Quarters -0 038 -0 017
Note. Summary of SPSS correlation printouts for conditions and quarters
Table 4.12
Matrix o f Pearson r correlations for eight lead and lag quarters o f Lake Tahoe gross 
gaming revenue (LTGGR) to GDP
Period Lead Correlations Concurrent Correlations Lag Correlations
Concurrent 0.010
1 Quarter 0 020 -0.047
2 Quarters 0.014 0.097
3 Quarters -0 084 -0 003
4 Quarters 0.024 0.060
5 Quarters 0.047 -0.076
6 Quarters -0.300 0 066
7 Quarters 0 000 0.042
8 Quarters -0 049 -0 026
Mote. Summary o f SPSS correlation printouts for conditions and quarters
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Table 4.13
Matrix o f Pearson r correlations for eight lead and lag quarters o f Atlantic City gross 
gaming revenue TACGGR) to GDP
Period Lead Correlations Concurrent Correlations Lag Correlations
Concurrent -0.040
1 Quarter -0.077 -0.087
2 Quarters -0.121 -0.178
3 Quarters -0 001 -0.081
4 Quarters 0.034 -0 006
5 Quarters 0.047 0.027
6 Quarters -0.300 0066
7 Quarters 0.000 0.042
__8 Quarters— -0 049 , -0,026
Note. Summary o f SPSS correlation printouts for conditions and quarters
Summary of Research Question 1 
Step 3 o f  researching question 1 was not appropriate in this study because neither 
the national GGR nor the jurisdictional GGRs indicated that there was any correlation to 
the GDP. Although the theory o f strategic planning indicated that an assessment of the 
environment is a  fundamental concept, the economic indicators utilized in this study would 
not seem appropriate in assessing strategic planning in the hotel-casino industry.
Research Question 2; Product Service Life Cycle 
The second question and its counterparts were: Does the product/service life 
cycle for gaming revenues apply to the hotel-casino industry on either a national or 
jurisdictional level? I f  so, can this application be extended to help predict the success or
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failure of hotel-casinos? Answering these questions involved three steps: (a) developing a 
gaming product/service life cycle (PSLC), (b) identifying the stages o f the PSLC that 
existed at each year o f development of the legalized gaming jurisdiction, and (c) 
comparing failure rates of hotel-casinos that opened within the different PSLC stages.
Product/Service Life-Cvcle Development 
Despite the low correlation of USGGR and GDP, PSLCs for other industries have 
all been determined by comparing the growth rate of the industry to the growth rate of the 
GDP. This study has used the same comparative measures. To do so, first, the armual 
USGGR was developed by combining the actual revenues o f all 14 states with legalized 
gaming jurisdictions beginning in 1975 and ending in 1997 (see table 4.14). With the total 
actual USGGR calculated, the U.S. Dept, of Commerce (1998) index o f GDP growth was 
used to chain actual USGGR to 1992 dollars (see table 4.15).
Using the chained real dollars, year-to-year growth rates were determined by 
dividing the difference between current and prior years divided by the prior year. A 
moving 5-year average was calculated to smooth the data. The GDP growth rate, taken 
from U.S. Dept, o f Commerce (1998), was also smoothed with a 5-year average.
Dividing the 5-year moving average of USGGR by the 5-year moving average of GDP 
created an index o f growth to compare to the standard PSLC growth rates (Amling, 1970) 
and, subsequently, to determine the stages of PSLC in each year within the total U.S. 
gaming industry. A growth rate o f greater than 2.5 indicated the introductory stage. 
Therefore, the years 1977 through 1984 all have indices greater than 2.5 and could be 
considered introductory. A growth rate o f 2.5 to greater than 1.5 designated the growth
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
101
stage. The years 1985 and 1986 indicate the growth stage because the indices are both 
Table 4.14
Annual Gross Gaining Revenue o f Legalized Gaming Jurisdictions 0971  to 1997V C$bl
NV AC SD NA lA CO ■MS IL LA CO M O WV m M US
1971 0.63 0.63
1972 0.73 0.73
1973 0.88 0.88
1974 1.00 1.00
1975 1.13 1.13
1976 130 130
1977 1.52 1.52
1978 1.85 0.13 138
1979 2.12 033 2.46
1980 2.38 0.64 3.02
1981 2.53 1.10 3.63
1982 2.63 1.49 4.12
1983 2.84 1.77 4.62
1984 3.08 1.94 5.02
1985 331 2.17 5.48
1986 3.48 2.27 5.75
1987 3.92 2.50 6.42
1988 4.26 2.74 7.00
1989 4.58 2.82 0.00 7.40
1990 5.24 3.00 0.03 0.09 831
1991 5.51 2.94 0.04 030 0.07 0.02 8.80
1992 5.60 3.20 0.04 0.80 0.07 0.18 0.13 0.23 1030
1993 6.00 330 0.04 1.52 0.05 0.26 0.80 0.61 0.02 0.25 12.80
1994 7.00 3.40 0.05 235 0.05 033 1.47 0.98 0.60 0.47 0.11 0.10 16.91
1995 7 3 7 3.75 0.05 3.15 0.46 03 8 1.72 1.18 1.05 0.58 0.47 0.04 0.01 20.19
1996 7.43 3.83 0.04 3.89 0.65 0.41 1.87 1.13 1.21 0.67 0.57 0.06 0.37 0.18 2231
1997 7.80 3.91 0.04 434 0.70 0.43 1.99 1.06 1.25 0.94 0.75 0.10 0.96 030 24.56
Mote. Sources: Ader (1998); Nevada Gaming Abstract (1971-1997); New Jersey Casino 
Control Commission (1978-1997); and Turner (1998)
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Table 4.15
Index o f growth of chained $1992 USGGR to chained $1992 GDP ($bJ
Y ear A ctual USGGR 51992
Index
Real
USGGR
USGGR
G rowth
USGGR 
5-yr. A vf.
GDP
Growth
GDP 
5-yr. Avg.
Index
1971 S0.63 3205 5138 4.84% base 3.30% base na
1972 50.73 3342 52.19 10.71% base 5.50% base na
1973 50.88 3530 52.48 13.41% base 5.80% base na
1974 51.00 3846 52.61 5.10% base -0.60% base na
1975 51.13 .4209 52.68 2.61% 7.33% -0.40% 2.72% 2.69
1976 5130 .4455 52.83 5.87% 7.54% 5.40% 3.14% 2.40
1977 51.52 .4742 53.20 13.07% 8.01% 4.70% 2.98% 2.69
1978 51.98 .5088 53.89 21.51% 9.63% 5.40% 2.90% 332
1979 52.46 .5522 54.43 13.75% 1136% 2.80% 3.58% 3.17
1980 53.02 .6034 55.01 13.25% 13.49% -030% 3.60% 3.75
1981 53.63 .6601 55.50 9.78% 14.27% 2.30% 2.98% 4.79
1982 54.12 .7018 55.87 6.67% 12.99% -2.10% 1.62% 8.02
1983 54.62 .7316 56.31 7.44% 10.18% 4.00% 134% 7.60
1984 55.02 .7592 56.61 4.80% 8.39% 7.00% 2.18% 3.85
1985 55.48 .7853 56.99 5.68% 6.87®/b 3.60% 2.96% 2.32
1986 55.75 .8058 57.14 2.19% 5.36% 3.10% 3.12% 1.72
1987 56.42 .8306 57.73 8.28% 5.68% 2.90% 4.12% 1.38
1988 57.00 .8610 58.12 5.11% 5.21% 3.80% 4.08% 1.28
1989 57.40 .8972 58.25 1.54% 4.56% 3.40% 336% 1.36
1990 58.31 3364 58.88 7.61% 4.95% 1.20% 2.88% 1.72
1991 58.80 3732 59.09 233% 4.97% -0.90% 2.08% 239
1992 51030 1.0000 510.30 1431% 6.16% 2.70% 2.04% 3.02
1993 512.80 1.0264 512.55 20.90% 932% 2.30% 1.74% 536
1994 516.91 1.0509 516.09 28.25% 14.66% 3.50% 1.76% 833
1995 520.19 1.0776 518.73 16.44% 16.43% 2.00% 132% 8.56
1996 52231 1.1022 520.24 8.05% 17.57% 2.80% 2.66% 6.61
1997 524.56 1.1350 521.64 6.89% 16.11% 3.50% 2.82% 5.71
Mote. Sources o f USGGR are from 4.14; GDP annual growth is from U.S. Department of 
Commerce (1998).
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under 2.5 but greater than 1.5. While a growth rate o f 1.5 to 1 connoted the maturity 
stage (1987-1989) and an index of less than 1.0 (USGGR growth less than GDP growth) 
exemplified the decline stage, neither was evident in the USGGR/GDP index.
The data did not produce a typical PSLC. Instead, two distinct cycles emerged in 
concert with the introduction o f new legalized gaming jurisdictions (See Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.1.
The PSLC Index indicates a bimodal characteristic for the past 23 years (1975-1997).
m m 0A m 75‘i99z>
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While a third, but earlier cycle probably exists for Nevada, it was not included because 
there was no national gaming industry prior to 1978. The first cycle since 1975 began 
after 1978, when Atlantic City opened its hotel-casinos, and reached a peak four years 
later. The second cycle began after 1989, when the Indian Gaming Act was passed by 
Congress and other states began legalizing gaming operations. Because o f  these two 
distinct cycles, the hypothetical PSLC does not seem to apply to the gaming industry on a 
national basis. Despite the lack of a national PSLC for the gaming industry, more typical 
PSLCs appeared for each individual jurisdiction.
Comparison of Legalized Gaming Jurisdictions Stages within the Gaming PSLC 
The same procedure was used to create PSLCs for each of the nine legalized 
gaming jurisdictions that include hotel-casinos. That is, an index based on chained and 
smoothed GGR and GDP growth rates was developed and then compared to the standard 
stages of the PSLC.
Southern Nevada PSLC
The PSLC for Southern Nevada (SONVGGR), which represents Clark County 
(see Table 4.16 and Figure 4.2), is far different from any other legalized gaming 
jurisdiction but similar to the national PSLC because it exhibits two separate introductory 
stages occurring 10 years apart. The first introductory stage was in evidence at 1975 and 
was maintained until 1978 while the second introductory stage became evident in 1990 
and lasted until 1995.
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Table 4.16
Growth rates o f Southern Nevada GGR rSQNVGGRl to GDP ($mml
Y ear
SONVGGR
rSmml
Index C hain 
$1992
SONVGGR
$1992
SONVGGR 
G row th Rate
SONVGGR 
5-Y r. Ave.
GDP
Grow th
GDP 
5-Yr. A vr.
PSLC
Index
PSLC
Stage
1970 S 369.286 03048 $1311.568 Base Base 0.10% Base
1971 $ 399.911 03205 $1347.772 2.99% Base 330% Base
1972 S 476.126 03342 $1,424,674 14.18% Base 5.50% Base
1973 S 586.094 03530 $1.660323 16.54% Base 5.80% Base
1974 $ 684.278 03846 $1,779,194 7.16% Base -0.60% Base
1975 S 770302 0.4209 $1,830,131 2.86% 8.75% -0.40% 2.72% 3.22 I
1976 S 845375 0.4455 $1.898334 3.76% 830% 5.40% 3.14% 2.83 I
1977 $ 1.015.463 0.4742 $2,141,423 12.77% 8.62% 4.70% 2.98% 2.89 I
1978 $ 1.236.235 0.5088 $2,429,707 13.46% 8.00% 5.40% 2.90% 2.76 I
1979 S 1.423.620 0.5522 $2,578,088 6.11% 7.79% 2.80% 3.58% 2.18 G
1980 $ 1.617.194 0.6034 $2,680,136 3.96% 8.01% -030% 3.60% 2.23 G
1981 $ 1.676.406 0.6601 $2,539,624 -5.24% 6.21% 230% 238% 2.08 G
1982 $ 1.751.471 0.7018 $2,495,684 -1.73% 331% -2.10% 1.62% 2.04 G
1983 S 1.886.758 0.7316 $2,578,948 334% 139% 4.00% 134% 0.96 D
1984 S 2.008.117 0.7592 $2,645,043 2.56% 0.58% 7.00% 2.18% 0.26 D
1985 S 2332.782 0.7853 $2,843,222 7.49% 1.28% 3.60% 2.96% 0.43 D
1986 S 2392.865 0.8058 $2369.552 4.44% 3.22% 3.10% 3.12% 1.03 M
1987 $ 2.737.656 0.8306 $3395398 10.99% 5.77% 2.90% 4.12% 1.40 M
1988 S 2394.939 0.8610 $3,478,443 5.54% 6.21% 3.80% 4.08% 1.52 G
1989 S 3.289.588 0.8972 $3,666,505 5.41% 6.77% 3.40% 336% 2.02 G
1990 $3,869,985 0.9364 $4,132,833 12.72% 7.82% 1.20% 2.88% 2.72 I
1991 $4.110361 03732 $4323.552 2.20% 7.37% -0.90% 2.08% 3.54 I
1992 $4328.093 1.0000 $4328.093 0.11% 5.19% 2.70% 2.04% 2.55 I
1993 $4,521,123 1.0264 $4,404,835 4.18% 4.92% 230% 1.74% 2.83 I
1994 $5,431,475 1.0509 $5,168,403 1733% 731% 3.50% 1.76% 4.15 I
1995 $5,720,390 1.0776 $5308.454 2.71% 531% 2.00% 132% 2.76 I
1996 $5,783,799 1.1022 $5347.504 -1.15% 4.64% 2.80% 2.66% 1.74 G
1997 $6.151304 1.1350 $5,420,180 3.29% 5.27% 3.50% 2.82% 1.87 G
Mote. Sources: SONVGGR from b evada Gaming Abstracts (1970-1997); GDP growth
rates from U.S. Department o f Commerce. (1998).
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Figure 4.2. The PSLC index for Southern Nevada indicates two cycles similar to the U.S. 
PSLC.
# b N N V 6 G R  M975-1997)
1 2 \ 4  1 5 6 7
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Northern Nevada PSLC
Northern Nevada gross gaming revenue (NONVGGR), which includes Reno, 
Sparks, and Lake Tahoe, as well as smaller jurisdictions, presented a much different 
picture and was more characteristic o f  the hypothetical PSLC. The bimodal peaks 
exhibited by Southern Nevada were not evident, and the combined jurisdictions showed a 
continual stage of decline (See Table 4.17 and Figure 4.3).
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Table 4.17
Growth rates of Northern Nevada GGR. INONVGGRJ to GDP C$mm)
Year NONVGGR
rSmml
Index
$1992
NONVGGR
$1992
NONVGGR 
Growth Rate
NONVGGR 
5-Yr. Ave.
GDP
Growth
GDP 
5-Yr. Ave
PSLC
INDEX
PSLC
Stage
1970 $20532 03048 $67339 Base Base 0.10% Base Base
1971 $233.43 03205 $72832 8.17% Base 330% Base Base
1972 $255.05 03342 $763.15 4.78% Base 530% Base Base
1973 $289.80 03530 $820.95 737% Base 530% Base Base
1974 $318.65 03846 $82831 0.92% Base 0.60% Base Base
1975 $35533 0.4209 $845.64 2.07% 4.70% 0.40% 2.72% 1.73 G
1976 $416.05 0.4455 $93330 10.44% 5.16% 5.40% 3.14% 1.64 G
1977 $503.41 0.4742 $1,061.61 13.67% 633% 4.70% 2.98% 233 I
1978 $609.97 03088 $1498.83 12.93% 8.01% 5.40% 2.90% 2.76 I
1979 $696.02 03522 $1360.45 5.14% 8.85% 2.80% 338% 2.47 G
1980 $765.16 0.6034 $1368.09 0.61% 836% -030% 3.60% 238 G
1981 $856.95 0.6601 $139831 238% 6.94% 230% 2.98% 233 G
1982 $875.96 0.7018 $1348.16 -3.86% 3.44% -2.10% 1.62% 2.12 G
1983 $95736 0.7316 $130838 4.84% 132% 4.00% 134% 136 M
1984 $1,066.96 0.7592 $1,40537 7.40% 237% 7.00% 2.18% 1.04 M
1985 $1,08130 0.7853 $1377.18 -2.01% 1.75% 3.60% 2.96% 0.59 D
1986 $1,08834 0.8058 $135138 -1.87% 0.90% 3.10% 3.12% 039 D
1987 $1,18630 0.8306 $1,428.97 5.74% 2.82% 2.90% 4.12% 0.68 D
1988 $1365.63 0.8610 $1,469.95 237% 2.43% 3.80% 4.08% 039 D
1989 $1,294.40 03972 $1,442.72 -1.85% 038% 3.40% 336% 0.17 D
1990 $136635 0.9364 $1,45937 1.15% 131% 130% 238% 0.42 D
1991 $1394.47 0.9732 $1,43237 -1.82% 132% -0.90% 2.08% 039 D
1992 $1,47635 1.0000 $1,47635 3.03% 0.68% 270% 204% 033 D
1993 $130739 1.0264 $1,468.52 -032% 0.00% 230% 1.74% (0.00) D
1994 $1376.11 1.0509 $1,499.77 2.13% 0.79% 330% 1.76% 0.45 D
1995 $1,648.19 1.0776 $132930 138% 0.96% 200% 132% 030 D
1996 $1,642.67 1.1022 $1,49036 -236% 0.81% 2.80% 266% 030 D
1997 $1,650.02 1.1350 $1,453.76 -2.46% -039% 330% 282% (0.10) D
Mote. Sources; 
rates from U.S.
NONVGGR from Nevada Gaming Abstracts (1970-1997); GDP growth 
Department o f Commerce (1998).
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Figure 4.3. The PSLC for Northern Nevada indicates decline since 1986.
(1975-1997)
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Atlantic City PSLC
Atlantic City, New Jersey, gross gaming revenue (ACGGR) followed the pattern 
exhibited by Northern Nevada with the gross gaming revenue o f that jurisdiction showing 
enormous early growth, but falling into the maturity stage after ten years o f  activity and 
hovering between maturity and decline stages for the past eight years. Real growth o f the 
past two years (See Table 4.18 and Figure 4.4) was negative but is hidden due to the use 
of 5 year moving averages.
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Table 4.18
Growth rates of Atlantic City GGR T ACGGR) to GDP ('Smml
X a r
ACGGR
fSmml
Index
S1392
ACGGR
51392
ACGGR
Growth
ACGGR 
5-Yr. Av*.
GDP
Growth
GDP 
5-Yr. Ava.
PSLC
Index
PSLC
Stare
1978 $ 134 03088 S 263365 base base 640% 2.90% base
1979 S 325 03522 S 588355 123.48% base 2.80% 338% base
1980 S 643 0.6034 S 1,065.628 81.06% base -040% 3.60% base
1981 S 1400 0.6601 S 1,666.414 5638% base 240% 2.98% base
1982 $ 1,493 0.7018 S 2427387 27.66% base -2.10% 1.62% base
1983 S 1,771 0.7316 S 2,420.722 13.79% 60.47% 4.00% 134% 4613 I
1984 $ 1344 0.7592 $2360390 5.78% 3693% 7.00% 2.18% 1694 I
1985 $ 2172 0.7853 $ 2,765.822 8.02% 2232% 3.60% 2-98% 7.49 I
1986 $ 2271 03058 $ 2318317 1.90% 11.43% 3.10% 3.12% 3.66 I
1987 $ 2,496 0.8306 $ 3,005.057 663% 742% 2.90% 4.12% 1-75 G
1988 S 2,735 03610 $ 3476339 5.71% 660% 3.80% 4.08% 137 M
1989 S 2316 0.8972 $ 3438.654 -1.19% 441% 3.40% 336% 145 M
1990 $ 2361 0.9364 $ 3462.110 0.75% 2.76% 140% 2.88% 0-96 D
1991 $ 2342 0.9732 $ 3,023.017 -1.40% 130% -030% 2.08% 0.72 D
1992 $ 3417 1.0000 $ 3417.000 642% 1.46% 2.70% 2.04% 0.71 D
1993 S 3305 1.0264 $ 3419.992 0.09% 033% 240% 1.74% 0.19 D
1994 $ 3,427 1.0509 $ 3461.014 147% 0.83% 330% 1.76% 0.47 D
1995 S 3,747 1.0776 $ 3,477.171 663% 2.00% 2.00% 1.92% 1.04 M
1996 $ 3325 1.1022 $ 3,470332 -040% 2.84% 2.80% 2.66% 1.07 M
1997 $ 3306 1.1350 $ 3,441.410 -0.83% 139% 330% 2.82% 0.49 D
Note. Sources: ACGGR Ader (1998) and Turner (1998); GDP growth 
rates from U.S. Department o f Commerce (1998).
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Figure 4.4. The PSLC of Atlantic City indicated maturity or decline since 1990.
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The indices o f the six remaining legal gaming jurisdictions were calculated by 
dividing the annual GDP growth rates into the annual Jurisdictional growth rates rather 
than using 5-year moving averages. This procedure was adopted due to the limited time 
that these jurisdictions have been in existence. Furthermore, this procedure allowed for a 
more comparable assessment o f the PSLC for the jurisdictions.
Iowa PSLC
The first of the newer jurisdictions was Iowa, which had gross gaming revenues 
dating fi"om 1991, a period of only seven years. The PSLC for Iowa Gross Gaming 
Revenue (lAGGR) was quite sporadic (See Table 4.19 and Figure 4.5). This
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uncharacteristic PSLC may have been due to governmental decree of limited wagering 
during the first three years of legalized gaming; the need to allow open wagering following 
that period due to competition with Illinois, an open wagering jurisdiction; and the 
addition o f land-based wagering at the state’s race tracks.
Table 4.19
Growth rates o f Iowa GGR (TAGGRl to GDP ($mml
lAGGR Index lAGGR lAGGR lAGGR GDP GDP •PSLC PSLC
Year rSmmt $1392 $1392 Growth Rate 5-Vr. Ave. Growth 5-Vr. Ave. Index Staee
1991 566 0.9732 $6732 Base Base -0.90% 2.08% Base
1992 $70 1.0000 $70.00 302 V. Base 2.70% 2.04% 1.19 M
1993 $45 1.0264 $43.84 -3707% Base 200% 1.74% (1605) D
1994 $105 1.0509 $99.91 12739V. Base 300% 1.76% 3604 I
1995 $456 1.0776 $423.16 323.53% Base 2.00% 132% 161.76 I
1996 $653 1.1022 $592.45 40.01% 83.45% 2.80% 2.66% 1409 I
1997 $696 1.1350 $61302 300% 90.81% 300% 232% 1.00 M
‘-Index cfNnpated from annoal growth rates rather than 5-year moving averages
rates from U.S. Department o f Commerce. (1998).
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Figure 4.5. The Iowa PSLC index exhibited sporadic movement.
I
Mississippi PSLC
Mississippi exhibited the typical PSLC (See Table 4.20 and Figure 4.6) o f a 
maturing gaming jurisdiction. Following three years o f an introductory phase, the next 
year indicated growth followed by maturity, when growth of gross gaming revenue exactly 
equaled growth of GDP.
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Table 4.20
Growth rates o f Mississippi GGR (MSGGR’l to GDP ($mm)
Year
MSGGR
rSmm)
Index
S1.992
MSGGR
$1.992
MSGGR 
Growth Rate
MSGGR 
5-Vr. Avg.
GDP
Growth
GDP 
5-Vr. Avg.
•PSLC
Index
PSLC
Stage
1992 s 134 1.0000 S 134.000 Base Base 2.70*/. 2.04*/. Base
1993 s 795 1.0264 S 774.552 478.02*/. Base Z30*/- 1.74*/. 207.84 I
1994 s 1,470 1.0509 S 1,398.801 80.59*/. Base 3.50»/. 1.76*/. 23.03 I
1995 s 1.721 1.0776 $ 1,597.068 14.17*/. Base 2-00»/. 1.92*/. 7.09 I
1996 s 1,866 1.1022 S 1,692.978 6.01*/. Base 2.80*/. 2.66*/. 2.14 G
1997 s 1,989 1.1350 $ 1,752.423 3.51*/. 115.76*/. 3.50*/. 2.82*/. 1.00 M
'-In d ex  com puted from  annual grow th rates ra th e r than  5-year moving averages
Note. Sources: MSGGR Ader (1998) and Turner (1998); GDP growth 
rates from U.S. Department of Commerce (1998).
Figure 4.6. The PSLC Index of Mississippi indicated a typically maturing industry.
^^iMBGGR(t993-199n
00.00
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
114
Dlinois PSLC
Illinois enjoyed three years of the introductory stage followed by two years of 
decline (See Table 4.21 and Figure 4.7). There were two events that probably impacted 
the normal progression through growth and maturity. Iowa, which had originally legalized 
only limited wagering, reversed its position and took the limits off in 1995. Also, in 1995, 
Indiana legalized gaming and the first locations were just east o f Chicago, which most 
likely affected Illinois gaming revenues.
Table 4.21
Growth rates of Illinois GGR (TLGGRI to GDP f$mm)
Y w ILG GRI
Smml
Index
51,992
ILGGR
51392
ILGGR 
Growth Rate
ILGGR 
5-V r. Ave.
GDP
G rowth
GDP 
5-V r. Ave.
PSLC
Index
PSLC
Stage
1992 S 226 1.0000 5 226.000 Base Base 2.70% 2.04% Base
1993 S 606 1.0264 5 590.413 161.24% Base 230% 1.74% 70.11 I
1994 S 980 1.0509 5 932.534 5735% Base 330% 1.76% 1636 I
1995 S 1,178 1.0776 5 1,093.170 17.23% Base 2.00% 1.92% 8.61 I
1996 S 1,131 1.1022 5 1,026.130 -6.13% Base 2.80% 2.66% (2.19) D
1997 51,055 1.1350 5 929.515 -9.42% 46.06% 330% 2.82% (2.69) D
N ote: '-In d ex  com puted ftt>m annual grow th rates ra th e r than  5-ycar moving averages
Note. Sources: ILGGR Ader (1998) and Turner (1998); GDP growth rates fi’om Survey 
of Current Business. 1997
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Figure 4.7. The PSLC Index of Illinois moved rapidly from an introductory stage into 
decline.
fLGGR 11993-1997)
(10 .90)
IOlIX
Louisiana PSLC
Louisiana, like Illinois, exhibited an introductory stage for three years, and then 
skipped the growth and maturity stages to fall into decline (See Table 4.22 and Figure 
4.8). Perhaps the development of the Mississippi coast legalized gaming jurisdiction, 
coupled with the failure o f the Harrah’s development o f  a land-based property in New 
Orleans, led to the skipped stages.
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Table 4.22
Growth rates o f Louisiana GGR (TAGGRl to GDP ($mm’)
Y ear LAGGR
rSmmI
Index
51392
LAGGR
51392
LAGGR 
Growth Rate
LAGGR 
5-Vr. Avg.
GDP
Growth
GDP 
5-Vr. Avg.
•PSLC
Index
PSLC
Stage
1993 516.00 1.0264 51539 Base Base 230% 1.74% Base
1994 5604.00 1.0509 5574.75 3586.99% Base 330% 1.76% 1,024.85 I
1995 51,051.00 1.0776 597532 69.70% Base 2.00% 132% 34.85 I
1996 51310.00 1.1022 51,09730 1236% Base 230% 2.66% 4.49 I
1997 51345.00 1.1350 51,09632 -0.08% Base 330% 2.82% (0.02) D
Note: * - Index comonted from  annual growth rates rather than 5-vear moving averages
Note. Sources; LAGGR Ader (1998) and Turner (1998); GDP growth rates from U.S.
Department o f Commerce. 1997.
Figure 4.8. The PSLC Index o f Louisiana skipped from an introductory to decline stage.
Missouri PSLC
Missouri was still in the introductory stage o f  the PSLC (See Table 4.23 and 
Figure 4.9). In fact, with an index of more than 7 for each o f the three years o f  this study, 
the state was clearly enjoying a high level of development. Perhaps the lack o f proximity 
to other wagering states with legalized gaming served as a catalyst to the gaming demand.
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Table 4.23
Growth rates of Missouri GGR IMOGGRl to GDP TSmml
Year MOGGR
(Smm)
Index
$1992
MOGGR
$1,992
MOGGR 
Growth Rate
MOGGR 
5-Yr. Avg.
GDP
Growth
GDP 
5-Yr. Avg.
PSLC
Index
PSLC
Stage
1994 S 110 1.0509 $ 104.672 Base Base 3.50% 1.76% base
1995 S 466 1.0776 $ 432.442 313.14% Base 2.00% 1.92% 156.57 I
1996 s 571 1.1022 $ 518.055 19.80% Base 2.80% 2.66% 7.07 I
1997 s 746 1.1350 $ 657.269 26.87% Base 3.50% 2.82% 7.68 I
Note: • . Index computed from annual growth rates rather than 5-year moving averages
Note. Sources: MOGGR Ader (1998) and Turner (1998); GDP growth rates from U.S. 
Department of Commerce (1998)
Figure 4.9. The PSLC Index o f Missouri exhibited the introductory stage throughout its 
first three years o f existence.
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Indiana PSLC
Indiana was in the third year o f developing the state’s legalized gaming, and the 
introductory stages for the first two years were similar to other states’ patterns for the 
same time (See Table 4.24 and Figure 4.10). The news o f continual allocation o f sites on
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the rivers and lakes on Indiana’s borders should bode well for continuing the development 
in upcoming periods.
Table 4.24
Growth rates o f Indiana GGR nNGGRI to GDP ISmml
Year
INGGR
fSmm)
Index
$1,992
INGGR
$1,992
INGGR 
Growth Rate
INGGR 
5-Yr. Avg.
GDP
Growth
GDP 
5-Yr. Avg.
PSLC
Index
PSLC
Stage
1995 S 6 1.0776 $ Base Base 2.00% 1.92% Base
1996 S 372 1.1022 $ 5961.62% Base 2.80% 2.66% I
1997 S 962 1.1350 $ 151.13% Base 3.50% 2.82% I
Note: * -  Index computed from annual growth rates rather than 5-year moving averages
Note. Sources: INGGR Ader (1998) and Turner (1998); GDP growth rates from U.S. 
Department o f Commerce (1998).
Figure 4.10. Indiana PSLC indicates a continuing stage of introductory gaming demand.
aclttf INGGR 11996^997)
f , 9 0 0 .9 9
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Summary of PSLC Indices
The PSLC Index for each o f the legalized gaming jurisdictions has been 
summarized in Table 4.25 to consolidate all stages in one convenient table.
Table 4.25
Summary of Identification o f PSLC for Legalized Gaming Jurisdictions, where 
in troducto ry . G=Growth. M=Maturitv. and D=Decline
Ym t Soathcm N orthern A tlantic lA MS IL LA M O lîî
1975 I G
1976 I G
1977 I G
1978 I I I
1979 G G I
1980 G G I
1981 G G I
1982 G G I
1983 M M I
1984 D M I
1985 D D I
1986 M D I
1987 M D G
1988 G D M
1989 I D M
1990 I D D
1991 I D D I
1992 I D D D I I
1993 I D D I I I I
1994 G D D I I I I I
1995 I D M I I r I I I
1996 G D M M G D I I I
1997 G D D D M D D I I
Note. Sources: Tables 4.16-4.24.
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Opening of Hotel-Casinos in the Gaming Industry Product/Service Life Cycle 
Once the gaming industry PSLC was developed, the opening and closing of each 
o f the hotel-casinos was identified (see Appendix A) and summarized in Table 4.26 by 
their PSLC stages. While 158 hotel-casinos were listed in Appendix A, the 16 Indian- 
owned properties were eliminated due to lack of information. However, four hotel- 
casinos failed and were subsequently re-opened and once again failed, making it necessary 
to create double entries for those properties, resulting in 146 hotel-casino openings.
Table 4.26
Summary o f Hotel-Casino Property Opening and Closing during PSLC stages
PSLC Stages Hotel-Casino
Openings
Later Failures of 
Hotel-Casino
Rate of Failure
Pre 1975 37 5 13.51%
Introductory 55 10 18.18%
Growth 31 8 25.81%
Maturity 10 4 40.00%
Decline 13 6 46.15
. .Totals. . ._ 146 33 22.60%
Source: Appendbc A
The four PSLC stages were reduced to two categories (See Table 4.27) by placing 
the excessive growth stages. Introductory and Growth, together and combining the 
Maturity and Decline stages into a category containing normal or reduced growth. The 
combination reduced the total because o f  the elimination of the pre-1975 hotel-casinos and 
included only the hotel-casinos that were opened during the period o f this study.
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Table 4.27
Combined PSLC stages for further analysis
121
PSLC Stages Hotel-Casino
Openings
Later Failures of 
Hotel-Casino
Rate of Failure
Introductory & Growth 86 18 20.93%
Maturity & Decline 23 10 43.48%
Totals 109 28 26.19%
Note: Source Table 4.26
Using this data, the following hypothesis was tested:
Hypothesis 2.1
H :^ GPSLCIF = GPSLC2F 
H,: GPSLCIF # GPSLC2F
Where:
GPSLCIF is the failed number o f hotel-casinos opening in the introductory or 
growth stages of a PSLC, and
GPSLC2F is the failed number of hotel-casinos opening in the maturity or decline 
stages of a PSLC.
The statistical technique of chi-square goodness-of-fit test (%^ ) (Churchill, 1995) was used 
to determine if there was any significant failure rate difference in the two groups at a  level 
of .05. To employ this test it was necessary to calculate the expected number of cases that 
would fall in each category and to compare that with the observed number actually falling 
in the category using the statistic:
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%' = 2  -------------
'=• E,
Where;
Oi is the failure rate o f cases falling in the GPSLCIF,
E, is the failure rate o f cases falling in the GPSLCIF; 
k  is the number of categories (2).
The calculation was;
=  [(86-52)V 52 + (18-52)V 52 + (23-16.5)V 16.5 + (10 - 16.5)V 16.5]
X" = [(34y / 52 +  (-34)" /  52 + (6.5)" / 16.5 + (-6.5)= /  16.5]
%" = [(1156)/52 + (1156)/52 + (42.25)716.5 + (42.25)716.5]
%" = [22.23 + 22.23 + 2.56 + 2.56]
X" = 49.58
The Chi Square distribution (Gravetter & Wallnau, 1992) indicated that a Chi Square of 
3.84 (.05 and 1 degree of freedom) would be the test statistic measure for failure to accept 
the null hypothesis. The calculation of Chi Square produced a value o f 49.58. Therefore, 
the alternative hypothesis was accepted, indicating that the higher rate o f failure for hotel 
casinos opening in the mature and declining stages was significant.
With the acceptance o f the alternative hypothesis, two more statistical processes 
were applied, a chi-square contingency table and the index of predictive association, to 
determine the value of considering the stages of the PSLC when planning the development 
o f a new hotel-casino.
Strength of Association bv Chi-Square Contingency Table
The contingency coefficient indicated the strength of the association between the 
variables (Churchill, 1995), ranging from zero to an upper limit (C^J calculated by the 
formula:
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=  f ( r -Cui V (r-l)/r
Where;
r is the number of rows assuming the number of columns are equal to the 
number of rows (2).
Resulting in:
C^= V (2-l)/2
Q = V ‘/2
Cui = .71
The computation o f Cu, with 2 rows and 2 columns produced an upper limit of .71, 
indicating the contingency coefficient range was from zero to .71. To determine the 
strength of the association between hotel-casino failures and stages o f the PSLC for their 
openings, a contingency coefficient was calculated and placed within the range (0-.71). 
The contingency coefficient (C) formula is:
C =  N x V n  + x^
Where:
n is the sample size (109) o f  active hotel-casinos since 1975, and 
x" is the chi-square (49.58).
The calculation was:
=  iÂ9.C 74 .58/(109-49.58) 
C =  /  49.58/(158.58) 
C =  .3126
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Placing the contingency coefficient into the range o f zero to .71 indicated a moderate rate 
o f association. In other words, the placement on the range of limits (0 to .71) indicated 
that the strength of association was a little more than 44% and permitted the calculation of 
a measure of predictive ability.
Predictive Ability of the Association
The index o f predictive association varies from 0 (no predictive ability) to 1 
(perfect prediction capability). Assuming that the A classification (success/failure) is being 
predicted from the B classification (PSLC stage), then the index of predictive association 
is calculated as follows;
y = b
' '•A .B  --------------------------------------------------
n - n..m
Where:
n m is the largest marginal frequency among the A classifications 
(success/failure), and
nyn, is the largest frequency in the 6th row (or column) o f the table, and
n is the sample size (109) of active hotel-casinos since 1975
The calculation was:
(86  +  10) -  86 
109-28 
10 
81
^ A . B ---------------
~ -------
1 ^  = 0.1235
Given the information that 43.48% of hotel-casinos opening in mature or declining
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phases of the PSLC eventually failed, and 56.52% were a success (See Table 4.22), the 
predictive ability of the association reduces the chances of success by 12.35% and would 
lower the chances of success to 44.17%, a less than 50-50 chance of an ongoing 
successful hotel-casino.
Summarv o f Research Question 2 
This demonstrates the two important questions in association analysis. First, there 
seems to be an association between the criterion (success/failure) and predictor (PSLC 
stage) variables. Second, the predictive ability o f this association is moderate at 44.17%, 
and it would appear that the decision to build a hotel-casino can be improved by taking 
into account the important predictor of the PSLC variables.
Research Question 3: Altman Z Factor 
The third question of this study focused on the internal financial strength o f a 
hotel-casino corporation when undertaking a new building or acquisition project.
Although the opportunity to meet a perceived need may be in evidence, a corporation 
must have the financial ability to react to the opportunity. In the worst possible scenario, 
a hotel-casino corporation facing bankruptcy would decide to attempt further 
development. Therefore, the third research question asked if the Altman Z Factor, a 
predictor of bankruptcy potential, could be adapted to the hotel-casino industry and assess 
whether a hotel-casino corporation is strong enough to undertake a new investment. To 
answer this question, a two step process was developed. The first step was to test the 
Altman Z Factor against its criteria for twelve successful hotel-casino corporations.
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defined as those who were traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and had 
significant financial strength (See Table 3.2). At the same time, the same procedures were 
used to test the Altman Z Factor against its criteria for twelve hotel-casino corporations 
who have either failed or exhibit financial troubles (See Table 3.3). The second step was a 
comparison of the two sets, successful and failed/troubled hotel-casino corporations. 
Testing Successful Hotel-Casino Corporations for Altman Z Values
Financial data for computing the Altman Z Factors for the past three fiscal years, 
ending in Fiscal Year 1997, were obtained fi-om each firm’s filing o f 10-K statements with 
the Security and Exchange Commission (See Table 4.28). The financial data were then
Table 4.28
Financial Data f$mm) of Selected Successful Hotel-Casino Corporations, shares (mml
Corporation 
Fiscal Year
Current
Assets
C urrent
LiabOitles
Total
Assets
Retained
Earnings
EBIT Shares of 
Common
M arket
Price
Total
Debt
Net
Sales
AZTAR
FY 1995 73.13 102.07 101330 24.90 42.70 38.27 55.00 546.05 572.87
FY 1996 11332 12034 1119.58 44.85 58.94 45.00 58.00 67439 777.47
FY 1997 118.82 124.73 109130 46.65 6739 4530 56.94 640.87 78236
BOYD
FY1995 119.42 12930 94931 101.96 11037 57.00 57.94 746.90 66034
FY 1996 86.82 95.81 953.43 130.10 100.79 5731 5838 720.17 77536
FY 1997 9534 99.07 1020.19 52.61 -44.43 61.52 512.63 838.87 81936
CIRCUS
FY 1995 12438 93.92 221139 883.60 25137 112.80 526.75 809.14 1299.6
FV1996 15135 129.77 2729.11 98436 222.17 112.81 522.00 1694.74 13343
FV1997 142.86 166.96 326335 107437 236.50 113.61 520.00 213930 1354.4
GRAND
FY 1995 37937 6733 1128.11 12639 11632 0.41 525.00 51439 37237
FY 1996 193.75 99.91 1122.82 2532 97.41 0.42 513.66 683.14 490.02
_ -E Y lg g ? 289.62 _ .XSL6SÏ . 1333.74 9131 0.42 519.94 -  831.12- 607.42
(table continues)
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Corporation 
Fiscal Y ear
C urrent
Assets
Cnrrent
Liabilities
Total
Assets
Retained
Earnings
EBIT Shares of 
Conunon
M arket
Price
Total
Debt
Net
Sales
HARRAH’S
FY1995 188.84 20137 1636.70 204.84 209.40 102.67 S2435 105130 1578
FY1996 20139 204.64 1974.10 290.80 236.90 102.97 519.88 1254.40 1586.
FY1997 21231 210.95 200530 34939 213.50 101.04 51888 1265.00 1619.
HARVEY’S
FY1995 30.87 24.16 31334 102.06 1835 9.40 517.06 180.94 1733
FY 1996 41.15 29.44 393.77 111.61 34.02 9.82 51731 244.01 247.7
FY 1997 34.63 34.63 403.47 140.42 4138 9.85 51882 224.11 283.5
HrLTON
FY1995 1100.00 917.00 3443.00 909.00 355.00 193.00 516.18 2189.00 3555.
FY1996 1121.00 96800 7587.00 931.00 329.00 249.00 52869 4376.00 3940.
FY1997 1011.00 941.00 7826.00 1040.00 596.00 249.00 530.94 4443.00 5316.
MGM
FY1995 212.74 119.43 128232 30.49 103.82 3878 52430 0.70 7187
FY1996 226.71 190.77 1287.69 13.22 12939 57.88 53.938 030 800.1
FY1997 170.79 181.49 139837 12434 190.97 57.99 54030 030 827.6
MIRAGE
FY199S 214.80 17435 1791.91 650.17 284.09 18334 51538 58237 1330.
FY1996 236.20 21847 2143.49 85632 312.67 17834 524.00 852.61 1367.
FY1997 300.90 25739 334735 1063.79 326.04 179.42 52538 184337 1418
RIO
FY1995 30.93 25.09 30879 49.16 3736 21.14 512.63 145.90 192.9
FY1996 29.87 44.85 49435 6832 37.99 21.17 513.94 312.67 2193
FY1997 66.49 47.65 58816 90.02 60.11 24.64 522.13 317.98 39.00
SHOWBOAT
FY1995 134.73 53.72 649.40 80.43 46.67 15.79 525.19 475.45 4283
FY 1996 11899 60.05 814.67 84.83 42.12 16.18 519.81 62232 433.7
FY1997 122.97 74.65 80035 64.76 26.10 1635 523.81 637.60 5563
STATIONS
FY1995 133.44 9733 82731 2231 69.46 3530 512.00 54834 4663
FY 1996 6937 18537 1234.12 2882 5812 3532 59.94 93537 5833
....... JE2LX331 . 87.42- 19731 -1300,22 1638 ____ 8 4 J? 3SJ1 -  S13J9 .  1QU J3 729.6
' '4otes. Sources of financial data are Form 10-K’s by individual firms filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. EBIT is the abbreviation for earnings before 
interest and taxes.
entered into the Altman Z Factor formula, from which the fiscal year Altman Z Factors 
were computed and the bankruptcy prediction identified (See Table 4.29). The Altman Z
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Table 4.29
Altman Z Factors o f Selected Successful Hotel-Casino Corporations
Coroorate Name Fiscal Year Altman Z Factor Bankruntcv Indication
Aztar Comoration
Fiscal Year 1995 1.0589 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1996 1.2367 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1997 1.2694 Bankruntcv Likelv
Average Z Value 1.1883
Bovd Gaming
Fiscal Year 1995 1.6715 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1996 1.6828 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1997 1.2943 Bankruntcv Likelv
Average Z Value 1.5495
Circus-Circus
Fiscal Year 1995 3.7752 No Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1996 2.1504 Zone of Ignorance
Fiscal Year 1997 1.7429 Bankruntcv Likelv
Average Z Value 2.5562
Grand Casinos
Fiscal Year 1995 2.3544 Zone of Ignorance
Fiscal Year 1996 1.3558 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1997 1.6055 Bankruntcv Likelv
Average Z Value 1.7718
Harrah’s
Fiscal Year 1995 2.9729 Zone of Ignorance
Fiscal Year 1996 2.3821 Zone of Ignorance
Fiscal Year 1997 2.3074 Zone of Ignorance
Average Z Value 2.5541
Harvev’s
Fiscal Year 1995 1.7595 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1996 1.7641 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1997 2.1229 Zone of Ignorance
Average Z Value 1.8822
(table continues)
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Coroorate Name Fiscal Year Altman Z Factor Bankruntcv Indication
Hilton Hotels
Fiscal Year 1995 2.6611 Zone of Ignorance
Fiscal Year 1996 1.8374 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1997 2.1671 Zone of Ignorance
Average Z Value 2.2218
MGM Grand
Fiscal Year 1995 2.0556 Zone of Ignorance
Fiscal Year 1996 5.4869 No Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1997 5.9486 No Bankruntcv Likelv
Average Z Value 4.4967
Mirage Resorts
Fiscal Year 1995 4.7997 No Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1996 4.6999 No Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1997 2.6871 Zone of Ignorance
Average Z Value 4.0623
Rio Hotel Casino
Fiscal Year 1995 2.3691 Zone of Ignorance
Fiscal Year 1996 1.4210 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1997 2.2851 Zone of Ignorance
Average Z Value 2.0251
Showboat
Fiscal Year 1995 1.7217 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1996 1.2440 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1997 1.3545 Bankruntcv Likelv
Average Z Value 1.4401
Stations Casinos
Fiscal Year 1995 1.3941 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1996 0.7617 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1997 0.9989 Bankruntcv Likelv
Average Z Value 1.0516
Average All Firms 2.2333 Zone of Ignorance
'’fote. Computations ofZ  factors are summarized in Appendix B.
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Factors for those three years were then averaged for each corporation. The average 
Altman Z Factors for all twelve successful firms were then combined into an overall 
average of 2.2333. This average was then tested, per hypothesis 3.1, against the Altman Z 
Factor of greater than 2.99 for firms not facing imminent bankruptcy:
Hypothesis 3.1
Hg: Mean AZF^^go ^ 2.99 
H,: Mean AZF^cso ^  2.99
Where:
Mean AZFhcso is the average Altman Z Factor of successful hotel-casino firms; 
2.99 is the lowest Altman Z Factor for firms that do not indicate bankruptcy 
A single means t-test was computed to test the hypotheses. This procedure was 
appropriate when a single sample o f data, the mean Altman Z Factor o f  successful 
projects, was compared to a population with a known mean (Noursis, 1997). The sample 
sizes were compared to t values at the 95% confidence interval in a t distribution. This 
procedure required the computation o f a f statistic: 
t = (Mean AZFhcso ~ 2 . 9 9 ) / S h c s o
Where:
Mean AZFhcso is 2.2333, the average Altman Z Factor of successful hotel-casino 
firms, and
Shcso is 1.0720, the standard deviation of the distribution.
As computed by SPSS, t  = -2.478, which indicated that the Mean AZFhcso was located
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within the 95% confidence interval o f (-1.4478 to -8.56E-02). This result required 
acceptance of the null hypothesis. In other words, the mean Altman Z Factor of 
successful hotel-casinos was not significant in predicting bankruptcy.
Testing Failed or Troubled Hotel-Casino Corporations for Altman Z Values
Financial data for computing the Altman Z Factors for the three fiscal years prior 
to the failure or trouble of hotel-casinos were obtained fi"om each firm’s filing of 10-K 
statements with the Security and Exchange Commission (See Table 4.30). The financial 
data were then entered into the Altman Z Factor formula, fi"om which the fiscal year 
Altman Z Factors were computed and the bankruptcy prediction identified (See Table 
4.31). The Altman Z Factors for those three years were then averaged for each 
corporation. The average Altman Z Factors for all twelve failed or troubled firms were 
then combined into an overall average o f -0.4439. The average was then tested, per 
hypothesis 3.2, against the Altman Z Factor o f less than 1.81 for firms facing imminent 
bankruptcy;
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Table 4.30
Financial Data CSmml of Selected Troubled Hotel-Casino Corporations. Shares fmm')
Corporation 
Fiscal Year
Current
Assets
Current
Liabilities
Total
Assets
Retained
Earnings
EBIT Com’n
Shares
M arket
Price
Total
Debt
Net
Sales
BALLY
FY1991 264.79* 33565* 249730 61.04 6039 4599 S500 1685.40 126231
FY1992 264.79* 33565* 1924.64 88.78 11130 4510 5506 1514.40 1297.00
FY1993 252.46 200.98 1991.60 3931 109.10 4599 5938 217530 126331
BECKER
FY 1995 1032 24036 84.79 -1588 4.47 10.00 50.01** 9136 69.08
FY1996 1230 83.95 7548 -27.10 4.74 10.00 50.01** 93.47 7504
FY1997 1035 89.76 71.01 -3837 030 10.00 50.01** 100.17 6933
BOARDWALK
FY1995 5.65 1037 57.69 -638 -2.63 508 5800 4808 632
FY1996 5.86 7.12 63.17 -10.70 1.62 7.18 5519 51.43 27.91
FY1997 437 5338 6337 -14.18 338 7.18 5435 55.11 41.70
CLARHXIE
FY 1995 5534 40.42 189.07 030 -238 506 50.01** 18332 20335
FY1996 31.75 39.03 164.06 -14.89 -20.7 506 50.01** 174.00 19331
FY1997 37.10 4133 15038 -20.87 598 506 50.01** 165.19 192.75
ELSINORE
FY1993 730 1230 71.92 -5338 -235 12.07 5531 6736 6585
FY 1994 630 1571 6732 -63.02 -10.1 13.14 51.82 6898 62.71
FY 1995 538 518 37.10 -108.77 -28.4 1589 5560 8034 5637
CREATE BAY
FY1995 4630* 53.06* 250.12 -177.42 32.14 519 5232 38833 30434
FY1996 4630* 53.06* 22135 -19838 439 519 53.97 38035 283.64
FY I997 938 10637 1575 -21885 1579 519 51.12 15887 26337
GRIFFIN/SUN
FY I992 107.94 7230 56835 -10836 -1230 7.94 53.15 58521 43633
FY1993 115.42 55731 57579 -210.72 12.90 7.94 57.98 68933 43936
FY 1994 249.42 16136 247331 -109.73 14330 2230 5845 199501 139937
(table continues)
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Corporation 
Fiscal Year
Currant
AsMts
C urrent
Liabilities
Total
Assets
Retained
Earnings
EBIT Com’n
Shares
M arket
Price
Total
Debt
Net
Sales
GOLD RIVER
FY 1995 4.81 82.46 96.83 -13.02 -5.63 0 3 8 30.01** 0.70 718.78
FY1996 638 92,93 35.93 -8336 -6135 0 3 8 $0.01** 030 800.19
FY1997 6.60 86.15 3439 -8533 -134 0 3 8 $0.01** 030 827.60
PLAYER’S
FY1995 61.62 3931 223.79 54.73 7035 29.67 $1530 4565 223.70
FY1996 4138 39.71 413.43 77.05 43.87 2939 $938 22131 291.40
FY1997 6738 5136 42139 30.76 -5637 32.56 $538 265.41 29131
SAHARA
FY1993 4937 39.70 395.09 -1330 3564 8 1 9 $338 342.42 244.77
FY1994 74.10 5739 47836 -30.76 32.97 630 $500 441.63 253.72
FY 1995 155.73 153.10 366.64 -54.13 10.61 630 $4.44 351.75 251.11
STRATOSP’R
FY1995 10438 3862 43331 -7.80 -039 5636 $9.94 241.62 0.06
FY 1996 37.95 45.98 181.08 -356.81 -331.17 5839 $135 31832 10874
FY1997 32.17 13.47 155.98 -37513 2.81 5839 $0.01** 312.98 13732
TRUMP
FY1995 53.46 3530 58435 -130 33.45 10.07 $17.81 53335 195.47
FY 1996 251.08 165.69 2455.63 -157.43 95.09 2230 $1813 1894.9 96594
FYI997 249.42 16136 247331 -109.73 14339 2230 $845 19950 139937
Notes. Sources of financial data fi"om individual firms’ Form 10-Ks filed with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission.
* Estimated due to limited financial data
** Where no market value was available, the market price per share was estimated at $.01 
EBIT is the abbreviation for Earnings Before Interest and Taxes.
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Altman Z Factors of Selected Failed or Troubled Hotel-Casino Corporations
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Corporate Name Fiscal Year Altman Z Factor Bankruptcy Indication
Ballv Entertainment
Fiscal Year 1990 0.6689 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1991 0.9950 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1992 0.9950 Bankruntcv Likelv
Average Z Value 0.8863
Becker Gamine
Fiscal Year 1995 0.5177 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1996 -0.4195 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1997 -1.0774 Bankruntcv Likelv
Average Z Value -0.3264
Boardwalk Casino
Fiscal Year 1995 0.3049 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1996 0.7837 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1997 -0.0425 Bankruntcv Likelv
Average Z Value 0.2471
Oaridge Hotel
Fiscal Year 1995 1.1345 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1996 0.5786 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1997 0.9222 Bankruntcv Likelv
Average Z Value 0.8784
Elsinore
Fiscal Year 1993 0.3723 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1994 -0.8583 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1995 -5.0446 Bankruntcv Likelv
Average Z Value -1.8435
Create Bav Casino
Fiscal Year 1995 0.6322 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1996 0.0867 Bankruntcv Likelv
Fiscal Year 1997 -8.5977 Bankruntcv Likelv
Average Z Value -1.9596
(table continues)
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Coroorate Name Fiscal Year Altman Z Factor Bankruptcy Indication
Griffin/Sun Int’L
Fiscal Year 1992 0.5293 Bankruptcy Likely
Fiscal Year 1993 -0.5429 Bankruptcy Likely
Fiscal Year 1994 0.2134 Bankruptcy Likely
Average Z  Value 0.0666
Gold River Hotel
Fiscal Year 1995 -0.4862 Bankruptcy Likely
Fiscal Year 1996 -0.7670 Bankruptcy Likely
Fiscal Year 1997 -10.4090 Bankruptcy Likely
Average Z Value -3.8874
Player’s Int’L
Fiscal Year 1995 7.6443 No Bankruptcy Likely
Fiscal Year 1996 2.1115 Zone of Ignorance
Fiscal Year 1997 -0.7928 Bankruptcy Likely
Average Z Value 3.5162
Sahara Gaming
Fiscal Year 1993 0.9362 Bankruptcy Likely
Fiscal Year 1994 0.7589 Bankruptcy Likely
Fiscal Year 1995 0.6286 Bankruptcy Likely
Average Z Value 0.7746
Stratosnhere
Fiscal Year 1995 1.5405 Bankruptcy Likely
Fiscal Year 1996 -8.0437 Bankruptcy Likely
Fiscal Year 1997 -2.2909 Bankruptcy Likely
Average Z Value -4.3971
Trump Hotels
Fiscal Year 1995 0.7570 Bankruptcy Likely
Fiscal Year 1996 0.6023 Bankruptcy Likely
Fiscal Year 1997 0.7942 Bankruptcy Likely
Average Z Value 0.7178
Average all firms -0.4439 Bankruptcy Likely
'^ote. Computations o f Z factors are summarized in Appendix B.
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Hypothesis 3.2
Mean AZFhcft^  1.81 
H,: Mean AZFhcft ^ 181
Where:
Mean AZFhcft is the average Altman Z Factor o f failed or troubled hotel-casino 
firms;
1.81 is the lowest Altman Z Factor for firms that indicate bankruptcy 
A single means /-test was computed to test the hypotheses. This procedure was 
appropriate when a single sample o f data, the mean Altman Z Factor o f failed projects, 
was compared to a population with a known mean (Noursis, 1997). The sample sizes 
were compared to t values at the 95% confidence interval in a / distribution. This 
procedure required the computation o f a / statistic: 
t — (Mean A Z F h c f t  " 2 .9 9 )/S h c so
Where:
Mean AZFhcft is -0.4439, the average Altman Z Factor of failed or troubled 
hotel-casino firms, and
Shcft is 2.2265, the standard deviation of the distribution.
As computed by SPSS, t = -2.478, which indicated that the Mean AZFhcft f^ll within the
95% confidence interval o f (-3.6686 and -.8393). This result required acceptance o f the
null hypothesis. In other words, the mean Altman Z Factor of troubled or failed hotel-
casinos was not significant in predicting bankruptcy.
Summary o f Research Question 3
The hypothesis testing o f both successful and troubled or failed hotel-casino
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corporations indicated that the null hypothesis should be accepted, thereby casting doubt 
on the Altman Z Factor to predict bankruptcy. Comparison of the Altman Z Factors for 
successful and troubled hotel-casinos became a moot point. Thus, a hotel-casino firm’s 
financial strength in accepting new projects or acquiring existing properties did not appear 
to be measurable by the Altman Z Factor.
Conclusion
The answers to two of the three research questions offered beneficial planning 
tools for the hotel-casino industry. The environmental consideration o f economic 
indicators was of no use. The Altman Z Factor to assess financial strength did appear to 
be o f value in the hotel-casino industry with minimal adjustments o f the value limits, 
variable ratios, or adjustment o f constants. The use o f Product Service Life Cycle 
procedures seemed to be a highly significant planning tool.
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CHAPTERS
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSIONS,
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The purpose o f this study was to investigate elements o f strategic planning that 
could become useful in project development for the hotel-casino industry by analyzing 
three factors: economic indicators, product life-cycle, and Altman Z Factor bankruptcy 
prediction. It was hoped that these planning considerations might assist in reducing the 
extremely high rate of troubled and failed projects when building or expanding hotel- 
casinos. The results of the study were mixed as to the usefulness o f the three planning 
tools, and it was determined that the classic theory of strategic decision-making may not 
be completely adaptable to this unique industry.
The study resulted in a thorough investigation o f the literature on strategic 
planning and statistical testing o f the research questions to ascertain their applicability to 
the hotel-casino industry. The research questions were selected to consider features of 
environmental factors, and one financial factor, as well as to assist in the capital budgeting 
prediction of future revenues. Many other factors of strategic planning exist, but the study 
has been necessarily limited to those thought to be most important for this preliminary 
analysis.
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Research Question I : Economie Indicators 
The first question asked: Are hotel-casino industry revenues correlated to 
economic indicators on both national and jurisdictional levels? If so, can this correlation 
be extended to help predict failed hotel-casinos which open during one year prior to and 
during the economic downturn?
Discussion and Implications
Harrison (1996) pointed to the environment as the controlling factor in strategic 
planning. Assessment o f the environment, according to other researchers (e.g.. Child, 
1979; Klein, 1979; MacMillan, 1979; Utterback, 1979), began with a consideration o f the 
national economy. In their studies of manufacturing firms. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
was typically a strong indicator o f the economy. However, in the hotel-casino industry, 
GDP did not show any significant concurrent, lead or lag correlations to gross revenues. 
Because of the lack o f research on service firms, it is not clear whether GDP or other 
economic indicators are appropriate measures of the environment for service firms in 
general or the hotel-casino industiy in particular. The GDP is heavily weighted toward 
measuring manufacturing output and, therefore, might not be the correct indicator for the 
hotel-casino industry.
At the same time, the lack of correlation between GDP and gross gaming revenue 
may be due to the limited time that the hotel-casino industry as a national industry, has 
been in existence. Christiansen (1998) viewed the supply of new gaming jurisdictions as 
meeting a pent-up demand for the gaming products, and this factor may have negated any 
effect that the economy might have been able to exhibit. Although both Nevada and New
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Jersey have more than 20 years of history, the preponderance of newer jurisdictions has 
yet to reach ten years. In addition, during those ten years, only one period o f  recession 
has been experienced. Therefore, serious effects o f economic variability have not been 
experienced by the majority o f the legalized gaming jurisdictions.
In earlier studies, Cargill (1979) and Eadington and Hattori (1977) posited that 
gaming revenues were “recession proof,” yet Ismail (1993) found lodging revenues to be 
highly correlated with the GDP. Although the gaming revenues in mature jurisdictions are 
only marginally greater than lodging revenues, perhaps gaming revenues more heavily 
impact this combination of two industries. If this is, in fact, the case, then the industry 
may, indeed, be recession proof, and strategic planners need not consider the state o f the 
economy when deciding whether to create a new project. As time passes, this factor may 
become more important, but at this phase of development, it would seem that the 
economy is of limited concern.
Conclusion
The answer to the first part of this question has been assessed only in relation to 
the economic indicator of GDP, and it was found that the specific indicator was not 
correlated at either the national or at jurisdictional levels. Therefore, the second part of 
the question could not be tested. However, there may be other economic indicators that 
would show a correlation with gross gaming revenue, and if the proper measure can be 
found, the second part of the question could then be measured. Other studies have 
selected different economic indicators (Cargill, 1975; Ismail, 1993) and found correlations, 
but none of those studies combined the total revenues o f the hotel-casino industry. In
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addition, the annual gaming studies by Ader (1998), Christiansen (1998), and Turner 
(1998) were primarily concerned with gaming revenues, and they used economic 
indicators that did not consider the lodging, food and beverage, and miscellaneous 
revenues o f  the hotel component. Therefore, economic indicators for gaming can be 
correlated, and other economic indicators for lodging can be matched, but the combined 
revenues o f  the hotel-casino industry must be tested further to search for a satisfactory 
measure for correlation.
Future Research
Measures dealing with leisure expenditures and disposable gross income would 
seem to offer a starting place for future studies because these indicators are more closely 
matched with the services offered by hotel-casinos. However, GDP would still have to be 
considered because it is the sole criterion of recession. I f  a correlation between a new 
measure o f  the industry and GDP is found, a means o f forecasting these measures is 
needed because o f the lengthy time frame between the go-ahead decision for a new project 
and the opening o f the project. Ex post facto research would have to be used to test the 
failure or trouble rates o f projects opening in non-favorable economic stages.
Research Question 2: Product Service Life Cvcles 
The second question was; Does the product/service life cycle apply to the hotel- 
casino industry on either a national or jurisdictional level? If  so, can this application be 
extended to help predict the success or failure of hotel-casinos?
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Discussion and Implications
Strategic management research by Anderson and Zeithall (1984) and Hofer (1975) 
showed that knowledge of the product/service life cycle (PSLC) is critical to informed 
forecasting and strategy development. On a national basis, however, the gaming industry 
did not appear to have a classic life cycle smoothly flowing upward firom the introductory 
stage to the growth stage and then downward fi-om maturity to decline. Instead, the 
national life cycle was bimodal over the period studied, apparently a result o f the recent 
development of new legalized gaming jurisdictions. Thus, a national PSLC based on gross 
gaming revenues from all jurisdictions was not useful in this industry. However, when 
decomposing the national gaming revenue into legalized gaming jurisdictions, the value of 
the product/service life cycle (PSLC) became very evident. When projects were opened 
in the maturity or decline stages o f  the business cycle, failure rates were significantly 
higher than failure rates for projects opening in introductory or growth stages.
There have been some notable exceptions to this finding. An example occurred in 
Southern Nevada in 1987 when the PSLC indicated a mature stage and builders were able 
to create properties such as The NCrage and Excalibur. The maturity stage reverted to 
growth and then introduction due to the gross revenues that developed. This apparent 
contradiction to the classic PSLC has been explained by Eadington and Cornelius (1992) 
as the development of must-see hotel-casinos that create a new invigorated demand by 
visitors who want to experience the new concepts in hotel-casino design.
Unless strategic plarmers can count on their project being a must-see property, the 
findings indicate that planners—prior to the go ahead decision—should forecast the PSLC
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stage that will exist during the opening o f  the project. Wind (1981) concluded that 
accurate forecasting can be accomplished based on knowledge o f present life cycle 
positions. The hotel-casino industry appears to be no different in this respect, and 
understanding the stage o f the PSLC would seem a mandate to strategic plarmers to assure 
that they are committing to a project which will profit from a receptive business cycle.
Not only can the demand for the service be more assured, but the probability o f attaining 
necessary revenues can become less risky.
Conclusion
The PSLC, on a jurisdictional level, offers a new tool for strategic plarmers to use 
during their deliberations. The index of predictive association between PSLC and failure 
of hotel-casino projects showed that opening in a mature or declining PSLC gave the 
projects less than a 50% chance of success. Such a strong association should not be 
ignored.
Future Research
This study should be replicated with additional data. As the industry matures or if 
more jurisdictions are legalized, the potential for failures will also expand. Should more 
publicly traded hotel-casino corporations succeed or become troubled or fail, the new data 
should be analyzed in light o f  this study. Also, if privately held hotel-casino corporations 
become public, their past data could also be included to expand the scope of this study. 
This added data should allow for increased support o f the concept of PSLC stages and the 
analysis of potential failure for industry participants. Added data would also allow for 
grouping into 3- or 5-year periods which might smooth the PSLC. Should the classic
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shape of the PSLC become distorted either yearly or in grouped years, however, the 
reason for the distortion should be studied to see if the must-see effect has taken place or 
a new phenomenon has occurred.
Research Question 3 : Altman Z Factor 
The third research question was involved with determining the financial strength of 
the firm by looking at a worst case scenario: Can the Altman Z Factor, a predictor of 
bankruptcy potential, be adapted to the hotel casino industry and assess whether a hotel- 
casino corporation is strong enough to undertake a new investment?
Discussion and Implications
The necessity of assuring that the firm can successfully finance a new project has 
been characterized as an internal assessment by Harrison (1996). The most severe internal 
test would be one that indicates if the firm is facing bankruptcy. The Altman Z Factor is 
arguably the best known o f  all bankruptcy prediction models and was the model chosen to 
apply to the hotel-casino industry in this study. The Altman Z Factor was developed using 
a multivariate approach through multiple discriminant analysis which resulted in using 
constants to multiply five financial ratios and resulted in a Z score that indicated whether 
bankruptcy was likely. Both the constants and financial ratios were determined firom 
studying manufacturing firms. The results of the study were very successful in predicting 
bankruptcy as much as five years in advance o f the actual event. While Altman’s model 
was predicated upon manufacturing firms, it was characterized as applicable to a service 
industry. However, in the hotel-casino industry, a service industry, the mode! did 
differentiate between successful and failed firms, but did not meet the limiting values that
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were proposed by the manufacturing studies. The failed or troubled hotel-casinos were 
readily apparent, but the successful hotel-casinos did not quite meet the upper limit o f the 
Altman Criteria.
A test o f financial solvency for a firm in the hotel-casino industry would be 
extremely valuable to investors as well as regulatory agencies in their licensing 
deliberations. Such a test might have helped stockholders save their investments in the 
Stratosphere Corporation which declared bankruptcy less than a year after its opening.
The Altman Z Factor could distinguish between successful and failed firms, fi"om a 
hypothetical confirmation, and it was able to forecast the Stratosphere bankruptcy more 
than a year before the actual filing.
Conclusion
Although the Altman Z Factor could not pass the hypothesis test, it does offer 
hope that modification could create a useable measure. The need for such a measure is 
very evident, and the value o f an accurate forecast could serve a multitude of interested 
parties. The search for an accurate measure of financial strength and stability is sorely 
needed in an industry which exhibits such a high percentage o f failed or troubled 
properties.
Future Research
Future research should look deeper into the Altman Z Factor computations. The 
methodology seems sound, but the constants and financial ratios need to be examined in 
relation to the firms in the hotel-casino industry. The gaming segment of the industry is 
related to financial services, with an emphasis on the use of currency. The hotel segment
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involves extremely large capital outlays. In the Altman methods, neither o f these factors 
are weighted heavily in the algorithm. Therefore, the types of financial ratios that are 
most important to the hotel-casino industry are probably quite different than those used in 
manufacturing, and the constants need to be reevaluated.
The Altman Z Factor determines the likelihood o f bankruptcy through a 
comparison o f the Z Factor with predetermined standards which state that if the Z Factor 
is greater than 2.99, bankruptcy is not likely, but if below 1.81, bankruptcy is likely. The 
middle ground is known as the zone of ignorance where no determination can be made.
In the actual study, the twelve successful firms had an average Altman Z Factor of 2.2333 
which indicated the zone of ignorance. The twelve failed or troubled firms had an average 
Altman Z Factor o f -0.4439, indicating that bankruptcy was very likely.. Although there 
was a substantial difference in the factors between the two groups, it was not statistically 
significant. It would appear that minor changes in either the constants, financial ratios, or 
status levels could make this a useful concept.
Final Comment
Although this study is perhaps the first to undertake an in-depth study of strategic 
planning in the hotel-casino industry, the need for such an undertaking has been long 
overdue. When an industry is characterized by a nearly 30% failure rate and substantial 
losses to developers and investors, the regulatory agencies need to look not only at the 
licensing of individuals that promote new projects, but also at the chances of success or 
failure o f these new ventures. By doing so, they fulfill their responsibility by protecting the 
monetary interests o f  bondholders and stockholders, the employment security of
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thousands of employees, and the goodwill of gaming customers. Gaming, by definition, is 
a gamble: But should it be so for those who provide the monetary support for new 
projects?
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UNITED STATES HOTEL-CASINOS - DECEMBER 31.1997
No. Hama Location  | Ownanhip Poom a Caalno-a<i. f t Data O panad
C A U F O R N IA 1
1 Spa Hotel & Casino Palm Springs Indian Ownership 230 30.000 na
C O N N E C T IC U T
2 Foxwoods Resort Casino Ledyard Indian Ownership 592 314.492 na
IL U N O IS
3 Par-A-Dice East Peoria Boyd Gaming 217 33.000 11/20/91
INDIA NA
4. Casino Aztar Evansville Aztar 250 35.000 D ec-95
S Grand Victoria Casino Rising Sun Hyatt Hotels 201 45.000 7/21/97
IO W A
e Harvey's Kaneville Casino Council Bluffs Harvey's 240 26.000 1/1/96
L O U ISIA N A
7 Flamingo Casino New  Orleans Hilton Hotels 1600 20.000 1994
• Grand Casino-Avoyelies Marksville Indian Ownership 219 100.000 na
9 Horseshoe Casino Hotel Bossier City Horseshoe Gaming 201 30.000 Jul-94
10 Isle o f Capri Bossier City Casino America 235 35.000 Mar-94
11 Isle o f Capri Lake Charles Casino America 251 48 .900 Oct-97
M ICH IGAN
12 Kewadian Casino Sauit Ste. Marie Indian Ownership 320 85 .123 na
13 Soaring Eagle Casino & Resort ML Pleasant IrxJian Ownership 518 205.000 na
M IN N E S O T A
14 Black Bear Casino & Hotel Carlton Indian Ownership 218 65 .000 na
IS Grand Casino Hinckley Hinckley Indian Ownership 535 90 .000 na
IS Grand Casino Mille Lacs Onamia Indian Ownership 324 120.000 na
n Mystic Lake Casino & Hotel Prior Lake IrxJian Ownership 216 45 .000 na
11 Shooting Star Casino Mahnomen IrxJian Ownership 255 70 .000 na
19 Treasure Island Casino W elch IrxJian Ownership 278 100.000 na
M IS S IS S IP P I
20 Bally's Saloon & GamtWing Hall Rotxnsonville Ballys 208 40.000 D ec-95
21 Casino Magic Bay Saint Louis Casino Magic 223 39.500 Sep-92
22 Fitzgeralds Casino Robinsonville Private 577 36.000 6 /2 2 S 4
23 Grand Casino - Biloxi Biloxi Park Place (Hilton) 508 110.000 Apr-95
24 Grand Casirm - Gulfport Gulfport Park Place (Hilton) 433 105.000 5/15® 3
2S Grand Casino - Tunica Tunica Park Place (Hilton) 834 140.000 Jun-96
2S Harrah's Tunica Mardi Gras Rotxnsonville Harratis 200 50.000 6/14/95
27 Hollywood Casino Rotxnsonville Hyatt Hotels 532 54.000 8/17/94
29 Horseshoe Casirx) Hotel Rotxnsonville Horsestxie Gaming 500 30 .000 Fet)-95
29 Imperial Palace Casino Biloxi Private 1.014 70 .000 D ec-97
30 Isle of Capri - Biloxi Biloxi Casino America 367 32.500 8/1/95
31 President Casino Biloxi President Casirxas 800 38.000 7/1/97
32 Sam ’s  Town Hotel & Gamt)ling Hall Rotxnsonville Boyd Gaming 857 96.000 5/15/94
33 Silver State Hotel & Casino Philadelphia IrxJian Ownership 500 40 .000 na
34 Treasure Bay Casino - Biloxi Biloxi Private 268 56.000 4/18/94
M IS S O U R I
35 Harrah's North Kansas City No. K ansas City Harrah's Entertain. 200 77 .000 12/4/96
35 Harrah's S t  Louis St. Louis Harrah's Entertain. 291 60.000 3/12/97
37 Player's Island Casino S t  Louis Player's IsiarxJ 291 60.000 Mar-97
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UNITED STATES HOTEL-CASINOS - DEGEM BER 31,1997
No. Nome Location O wnanhip R oom s C asin o-sq .tL Data O pened
NEVADA
3 t Arizona Charlie's Hotel & Casino Las V egas B ecker (Saming, In 258 56.316 7/1/78
M Atlantis Casino Resort Reno Monarch C asim 616 32 .000 D ec-89
40 Avi Casino Resort Laughiin Indian Reservation 330 25.000 na
41 Bally's Las Vegas Las V egas Hilton Hotels 3036 65 .128 1984
41 Bartiary Coast Las V egas C oast Resorts, Im. 212 32 .000 3/2/79
43 Binion's Horseshoe Las V egas Private 360 56.929 8/1/51
44 Boomtown (now Silverton) Las V egas Private 300 43.750 May-94
45 Boulder Station Hotel & Casino Las V egas Station Casinos. In 306 66.073 8/23/95
45 Buffalo Bill's Resort & Casino Primm MGM Grand 1257 62.130 8/9/94
47 C actus Pete's Resort Casino Jackpot Ameristar Casinos. 299 25.351 10/4Æ6
4» C aesar's Palace Las V egas Starwood 3518 118.000 8 /5/66
48 C aesar's Tahoe Lake Tahoe Starwood 480 40 .500 6/12/80
SO Cal Neva Lodge & Casino Crystal Bay Private (Jim Kelly) 200 17.000 3/23/31
S I California Hotel & Casino Las V egas Boyd Gaming 855 35 .848 1/1/75
S3 Circus Circus Hotel & Casino Las V egas Circus Errterprises 2942 111.000 1969
S3 Circus Circus Hotel & Casino Reno Circus Enterprises 1572 40 .150 10/1/68
54 Colorado Belle Hotel & Casino Laughiin Circus Enterprises 1226 44.161 7/1/78
55 C om stock Hotel & Casino Reno Private 310 15.900 10/10/80
55 Continental Hotel Las V egas Private 400 22 .900 7/1/78
57 D ays Inn Town Hall Casino Las V egas Private 357 4.600 12/1/89
55 D esert inn Resort & Casino Las V egas Starwood 821 28.360 4/24/50
55 DiamorxJs Casino at Holiday Inn Reno Private 286 10.000 12/1/56
50 Don Laughlin's Riverside Laughiin Private (Don LaughI 1404 77.763 8/12/66
SI Edgewater Hotel & Casino Laughiin Circus Enterprises 1452 53.246 11/1/81
S t El Cortez Hotel Casino Las V egas Private 308 41 .300 11/7/41
S3 Eldorado Hotel Casino Reno Private 944 81.500 5/1/73
54 Ellis Island Casirw Las V egas Private 290 10.000 Nov-95
55 Excalibur Hotel Casino Las V egas Circus Enterprises 3117 123.944 6/19/90
55 Fitzgeralds Casino & Hotel Reno Private 359 26 .260 5/27/76
57 Fitzgeralds Casino & Hotel Las V egas Fitzgeralds Gaming 638 33 .800 7/1/80
55 Flamingo Hilton - Las V egas Las V egas Hilton Hotels 3851 80.334 12/26/46
55 Flamingo Hotel -  Laughiin Laughiin Hilton Hotels 2004 57.680 8/1/90
70 Flamingo Hotel - Reno Reno Hilton Hotels 668 53 .000 7/1/89
7» Four Q ueens Las V egas Elsinore Corporatio 740 32.296 6/2/66
77 Frontier Hotel Las V egas Private 984 41.325 10/30/42
7* Gold C oast Hotel & Casino Las V egas C oast Resorts. Im. 776 71.000 12/21/86
74 Gold River GamtWing Hall 4  Resort Laughiin Gold River H4C Co 1003 71 .300 12/20/84
(Re-opened) Gold River Laughiin Gold River H4C Co 1991
75 Gold Strike Hotel 4  Gambling Hall Jean Circus Enterprises 813 37 .006 12/23Æ7
75 Gold Strike Inn 4  Casino Boulder City Private (Ensign) 378 27.440 1955
77 Golden Nugget - Las V egas Laughiin Mirage Resorts. Im 304 32.600 10/1/88
75 Hard Rock Hotel Las V egas Harveys C asim 368 28 .000 3/12/95
75 Harrah's Casino Hotel Laughiin Harrah's Entertain. 1695 47.000 8/29/88
50 Harrah's Casino Hotel Lake Tahoe Hanah's Entertain. 632 79.368 1959
57 Harrah's Casino Hotel Las V egas Harrah's Entertain. 1736 103.325 7/2/73
57 Harrah's Casino Hotel R em Harrah's Entertain. 516 54 .500 10/1/45
57 Harvey's Resort Hotel Casino Lake Tahoe Harveys C asim 776 91 .296 6/1/44
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UNITED STATES HOTEL-CASINOS - DECEMBER 3 1 ,1 9 9 7
N o . N a m e L o c a tio n O w n a n h ip R o o m s CBs/no-sq. It D ate O p e n ed
NEVADA-Continucd
M Monday Inn Boardwalk Las V egas Mirage Resorts, Im 213 66.000 7/1/80
*S Horizon Casino Resort Lake Tahoe Private 539 40.000 12/26/83
M Hyatt Regency Resort & Casino Lake Tahoe Hyatt 460 18.900 1973
t r Imperial Palace Hotel & Casino Las V egas Private (Engiestadt] 2925 75.000 11/1/79
u John Ascuaga's Nugget Sparks Private (Ascuaga) 1550 78.000 4/1/68
M King 8 Hotel & Gambling Hall Las V egas Station Casinos. In 308 4.516 5/1/74
to Lady Luck Las V egas Las V egas Private 926 18.350 1/1/64
t1 Las V egas Club Hotel & Casino Las V egas Private (Gaughan) 423 40.000 4/1/31
93 Las V egas Hilton Las V egas Hilton Hotels 3.205 87.000 7/1/73
93 Luxor Hotel & Casirx) Las V egas Circus Enterprises 4864 100.000 10/15/93
94 Main Street Station Hotel & Casino Las V egas Boyd Gaming 406 28.500 1991
9S Maxim Hotel Las V egas Private 838 21.084 7/1/77
99 MGM Grand Hotel/Casim Las V egas MGM Grand. Im. 5009 211.219 12C1/93
t r Monte Carlo Resort & Casino Las V egas Mirage/Circus 4014 102.200 6C1/96
99 Nevada Landing Hotel & Casino Jean Circus Enterprises 303 37.006 9/20/89
99 Nevada Palace Las V egas Private 210 13.425 7/3/79
100 New York -  New York Hotel & Casin Las V egas MGM Grand. Im. 2289 84.000 1/4/97
101 Orleans Hotel and Casirx) Las V egas C oast Resorts. Im. 840 92.000 12/18/96
103 Ormsby House Carson City Private 200 8.746 1982
(Re-Opened) Ormsby House Carson City Private 1990
103 Palace Station Hotel & C asim Las V egas Station Casinos. In 1030 76.490 5/1/75
104 Peppermill Hotel C asim R em Private 1170 30.785 6/20/80
106 Peppermill Hotel C asim W endover Private 210 24.680 1984
109 Pioneer Hotel & Gambling Hall Laughiin Santa Fe Gaming 415 20.600 1/1/82
107 Pioneer Inn C asim R em Private 252 5.195 1972
109 Casablarxa Hotel C asim Mesquite Private 500 26.365 Jun-95
109 Union Plaza Hotel & C asim Las V egas Union Plaza 1077 57.120 7/22/71
110 Primm Valley Hotel C asim Primm MGM Grand 665 23.049 5/21/90
111 Quality Inn Las V egas Private 325 7.500 Sep-97
113 Ramada Express Laughiin Aztar Corporation 1553 52 .000 6/6/88
113 Rancho Mesquite Mesquite Nevstar. Im. 200 45.000 Mar-97
114 Red Lion Inn & C asim Elko Private 225 15.356 7/1/87
IIS R em  Hilton Resort R am Hilton Hotels 2001 114.600 1984
119 Rio Suite Hotel & C asim Las V egas Rio Hotel 2563 120.000 1/15/90
117 Riverboat Hotel & C asim R em Private 297 13.380 4/22/88
l i t Riviera Hotel & C asim Las V egas Riviera Holdings 2254 102.300 Mar-55
(Re-Opened) Riviera Las V egas Riviera Holdings 1986
119 Sahara Hotel & C asim Las V egas Private (Bennett) 2 04 9 26 .956 12/2/52
130 Sam Boyd's Frerrxxrt Hotel & C asim Las V egas Boyd Gaming 428 27 .618 5/18/56
131 Sam's Town Hotel & Gambling Hall Las V egas Boyd Gaming 650 118.000 3/22/79
133 San Remo Hotel Las V egas Private 711 22.500 1/1/79
133 Sand's R egem y Hotel R em The Sartds R egenc 938 27.000 7/1/78
1U Santa Fe Hotel Casino Las V egas Santa Fe Gaming 200 77 .882 2/14/91
13S Showtxjat Hotel & C asim Las V egas Harrah's Entertain. 4 8 5 75 .239 4/1/55
139 Si Redd's O asis Resort Hotel Casin Mesquite Private (Redd) 1100 33 .557 10/30/81
137 Silver Club Hotel C asim Sparks Private 20 7 17.502 2/20/63
139 Silver Legacy Resort C asim R em Eldorado/Circus 1861 85 .000 7/28Æ5
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UNITED STATES HOTEL-CASINOS -  DECEM BER 3 1 ,1 9 9 7
No. Nonrn LaemUon Ownanhip R oom s C ss/n o -sq . It Data O pened
NEVADA-Continued
129 Stardust Resort & Casino Las V egas Boyd Gaming 2501 65.538 7/2S8
120 Stateiine/Silver Smith Casino W est WerxJover Private 548 22.671 3/1/71
131 Stratosphere Tower, Hotel, & Casino Las V egas Stratosphere Corp. 1500 97.000 7/13^7
132 Surxlowner Hotel & Casino Rerw Private 593 19.040 1975
133 Sunset Station HerxJerson Station Casinos, Irw 448 40.000 6/10/97
134 Texas Station Gambling Hall & Hotel Las V egas Station Casinos. Irw 200 60.000 7/12®5
13S The Golden Nugget Las V egas Mirage Resorts. Irw 1907 34.680 801/46
136 The Mirage Las V egas Mirage Resorts. Inc 3328 95.300 11/2209
137 Treasure IslarxJ at the Mirage Las V egas Mirage Resorts. Inc 2900 75.294 1007/93
139 Tropicana Resort & Casino Las V egas Aztar Corporation 2028 45.194 4/4/57
130 Vacation Village Hotel Casirw Las V egas Private 321 17.640 11/9/90
140 Virgin River Hotel Casirw Mesquite Private 722 27.900 9/1/90
141 Western Village Inn & Casirw Sparks Private 285 27.000 11/2307
142 Westward Ho Casino Las V egas Circus Enterprises 837 34.457 4/1/71
143 Whiskey Pete's Hotel Casirw Primm MGM Grand 781 36.400 1/1/78
NEW JERSEY
144 Atlantic City Hilton Atlantic City Hilton Hotels 814 58.124 12/12/80
146 Ballys Park Place Casino Atlantic City Hilton Hotels 1163 71.380 12/29/79
146 Caesar's Atlantic City Atlantic City Stanwood 1318 70.000 6 0 6 0 9
14T Claridge Hotel Atlantic City Claridge 507 58.705 7/2300
149 Harrah's Marina Casirw Hotel Atlantic City Harrahs 1176 80.775 1108 0 0
149 Resorts International Casirw Hotel Atlantic City Sun International 692 67.665 5/26/78
(Re-Opened) Resorts International Atlantic City Sun International 1994
ISO Sands Hotel & Casirw Atlantic City Sarxte 534 53.427 8/1300
161 Slwwtxwt Casino - Hotel Atlantic City Showboat 755 79.658 4/207
182 TropworW Casino Atlantic City Aztar 1624 114.205 11/2601
163 Trump Marirw Casirw Resort Atlantic City Trump Hotels 725 74.251 5/26/85
164 Trump Plaza Atlantic City Trump Hotels 1404 138.305 5 0 6 0 4
166 Trump Taj Mahal Casirw Resort Atlantic City Trump Hotels 1350 116.019 401/90
NEW MEXICO
166 Inn of the Mountain Gods Casirw Mescalero IrxJian Ownership 250 na
NEW YORK
1ST Turning Stone Casirw Resort Verona IrxJian Ownership 307 90.000 na
WISCONSIN
159 Oneida Bingo & Casirw Green Bay Indian Ownership 330 na
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DEVELOPMENT OF ALTMAN Z FACTORS
CorDondon Nama F vZ  Valua Indication Cur. A ssats Cur. Llab. NatW/C Tot. A ssats i l
Aztar Corooratlon
Plaçai Yaar 1995 1.0683 Bankruptcy S 73.134 $ 102,068 $ (28,934) $ 1,013,238 (2.86)
F iscal Yaar 1996 1.2367 Bankruptcy S 113.320 $ 120,238 $ (6,918) $ 1.119,582 (0.62)
F iscal Yaar 1997 1JN94 Bankruptcy S 118.818 $124,729 $ (5,911) $ 1,091,496 (0.54)
A vaiaga Z F actorlastS  yaars 1.1883
Bovd Oamina
F iscal Yaar 1995 1.6716 Bankruptcy S 119.417 $129.300 $ (9,883) $ 949.513 (1.04)
Fiscal Yaar199S 1.6826 Bankruptcy S 86.816 $ 95.814 $ (8,998) $ 953,425 (0.94)
Fiscal Yaar 1997 1.2843 Bankruptcy S 95.540 $ 99.070 $ (3.530) $ 1,030,185 (0.34)
Avarwga Z F actorlastS  yaars 1.6496
Circus Circus
Fiscal Yaar 1995 3.7762 No Bankruptcy S 124.380 $ 93,922 $ 30.458 $ 2.211,893 1.38
F iscal Yaar 1996 2.1604 Zona o f Ignoranca S 151.849 $129,768 $ 22.081 $ 2,729,111 0.81
Fiscal Yaar 1997 1.7428 Bankruptcy S 142.863 $166,958 $ (24.095) $ 3,263,548 (0.74)
Avaraga Z Factor la st 3  yaars 3.8342
Grand Casinos
F iscal Yaar 1995 2.3644 Zona o f  Ignoranca $ 379,869 $ 67,832 $ 312,037 $ 1,128,108 27.66
F iscal Yaar 1996 1J666 Bankruptcy $ 193.754 $ 99,907 $ 93,847 $ 1.122,816 8.36
F iscal Yaar 1997 1.6066 Bankruptcy $ 289,621 $167,602 $ 122.019 $ 1.333,737 9.15
Avaraga Z F actorlastS  yaars 1.7718
Harrah's Entartalnmant
Fiscal Yaar 1995 2.8728 No Bankruptcy $ 188,836 $201,566 $ (12.730) $ 1,636,700 (0.78)
F iscal Yaar 1996 2.3821 Zona o f  Ignoranca S 201,587 $204,642 $ (3,055) $ 1,974,100 (0.15)
F iscal Yaar 1997 2.3074 Zona o f Ignoranca S 212,310 $210,950 $ 1,360 $ 2,005,500 0.07
Avaraga Z Factor la s ts  yaars 2A641
Harvavs Casino/Resort
F iscal Yaar 1995 1.7686 Bankruptcy $ 30,874 $ 24,158 $ 6,716 $ 313,244 2.14
Fiscal Yaar 1996 1.7641 Bankruptcy S 41,148 $ 29,435 $ 11.713 $ 393,768 2.97
Fiscal Yaar 1997 2.1228 Zona of ignoranca $ 68,056 $ 34.625 $ 33,431 $ 403,465 8.29
Avaraga Z F actorlastS  yaars 1.8822
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DEVELOPMENT OF ALTMAN Z FACTORS
OtLMMTI. & ÊÊir & ¥Y 5Ç /5 ÊÊattmtVmlum &
&
A gK C aM W hm
nmemlYm^irnS S 3AJ206 178 5 42.701 431 38365.813 S 8.00 5 306.126304 5 546.05ZOOO 5506 S 57Z860 0.5654
nmemtYwÊrlSm t  45.000 4.02 5 58343 536 45.000387 S 500 5 360.002396 5 674.286.000 5330 S 777.472 0.6044
HrnMYwrn'imT S 45.054 4.46 5 67382 6.17 45.108.880 S 594 5 313.680390 5 640.665.000 4505 S 782357 57168
4twee» Z  A e to rW  J  r w »
fcwdOamfciQ
naeatYm r1$6S 5101.055 10.74 5110.570 11.04 56.000.018 5 7.04 5 452372303 5 746.000.000 60.50 5 746.000 0.7866
Hm M Ywm'ltoe 5130.102 13.05 5100.780 1037 57313.720 5 838 5 470.450.074 S 720.168.000 6637 5 720.188 0.7553
nm em lY t^ irn r 552.610 5.11 5(44.426) (431) 61323,088 5 1Z63 S 777.047368 5 835860.000 8Z63 S 838.860 0.8143
4vwe»» Z  Feceor l * t  J  jmsr*
nmem/Ymm-ltêS 5 583.003 30.05 5251373 1136 112705000 5 26.75 53.017366350 5 808.136.000 37Z90 51300306 03875
m w ew v ^f# # # 5 084.303 36.07 5222.100 6.14 112808000 5 2ZOO 5Z481.778.000 51.694.737.000 146.44 51334350 0.4880
nmemiYmr1997 51.074.271 32.02 5236300 735 113608000 5 2030 5Z27Z180.000 5Z130.708.000 106.10 51354.487 0.4150
AtmmgêZfmetoflmtOyman
OsmsA S mêcoo
nme^Ywm’ltOS 5 126.200 11.10 5116.315 1031 40.086 5 2530 5 1.024.700 5 514385 19031 5 37Z872 03305
nmcAtYmm’irn* 5 25.321 236 5 07.400 8.08 41.706 5 13.68 5 570.033 S 683.143 8337 5 400.019 0.4364
S 01.512 6.86 5137.050 1032 41.866 5 10.94 5 836.802 5 831.121 100.68 S 607.421 0.4554
4w w egr Z  A c to r le st J  y e w
H T ih 'i tf»f!M tam «a
nwemlYmrlwae 5 204.838 1232 5200.400 1Z70 102.674.000 5 2435 5Z489.844300 51.051300.000 23636 51.575800 03646
nmemtY^m'ItOÔ S 280.707 14.73 5236300 1Z00 102370.000 S 18.88 5Z047.043.800 51354.400.000 163.10 51386.000 03034
nmern/YmarimT 5 340386 17.42 5213300 10.65 101.036.000 5 1588 51.007.560.680 51385.000.000 150.80 51.610300 0.8074
A\>mrwgê Z l i t  9  y ê n
"1-----
nmemiYmÊrirne 5 102.004 3235 5 18354 5.86 0.402.657 S 17.06 5 160.408328 5 180.843.000 8565 5 173300 03520
MmcaiYmm-199e 5 111.007 28.34 5 34.021 8.04 0,818322 S 1731 5 168355.154 5 244.005,000 60.65 5 247.749 0.6202
nm calYm rirnT 5 140.415 3430 5 41380 1033 0.853.488 S 1582 5 185.44Z644 S 224,108.000 8Z75 5 283363 0.7028
AvfmgêZfmetottÊÊtSymms
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DEVELOPMENT OF ALTMAN Z FACTORS
CoroonOon Mama Fv Z Valua Indication Cur. A ssats Cur. Uab. NatW/C T o t A ssats Xl
HIKon Hotels
R acal Yaar 1995 2.SC11 Zona o f  Ignoranca $ 1.100,000 $917,000 $ 183,000 $ 3,443,000 5.32
F iscal Yaar 1996 1 3 * 7 4 Zona o f  Ignoranca $ 1,121,000 $968,000 $ 153,000 $ 7,587,000 2.02
Fiscal Yaar 1997 2.1 «71 Zona o f  Ignoranca S 1,011,000 $941,000 $ 70,000 $ 7,826,000 0.89
Avaraga Z F actor la st 3  yaars 2 3 2 1 8
MOM Grand
F iscal Yaar 1995 2.066S Zona o f  Ignoranca S 212,744 $119,430 $ 93,314 $ 1,282,222 7J28
F iscal Yaar 1996 6  4868 No Bankruptcy S 226,708 $190,771 $ 35,937 $ 1,287,689 2.79
F iscal Yaar 1997 6.8486 No Bankruptcy $ 170,791 $181,490 $ (10,699) $ 1,398,374 (0.77)
Avaraga Z F actor la st 3  yaars 4.4867
Mlraoa Rasorls
F iscal Yaar 1995 4.7887 No Bankruptcy $ 214,816 $174,351 $ 40,465 $ 1,791,913 2.26
F iscal Yaar 1996 4.6888 No Bankruptcy $ 236,283 $218,465 $ 17,818 $ 2,143,490 0.83
Fiscal Yaar 1997 2.6871 Zona o f  Ignoranca $ 300,922 $257,387 $ 43,535 $ 3,347,350 1.30
Avaraga Z F actor la st 3  yaars 4.0623
Rio Hotel Casino. Inc.
F iscal Yaar 1995 2.3681 Zona o f Ignoranca $ 30,930 $ 25,092 $ 5,838 $ 308,792 1.89
F iscal Yaar 1996 1.4210 Bankruptcy $ 29,867 $ 44,851 $ (14,984) $ 494,550 (3.03)
Fiscal Yaar 1997 2 3 8 6 1 Zona o f Ignoranca $ 66,494 S 47,650 $ 18,844 $ 588,155 3.20
Avaraga Z F actor la st 3  yaars 2.0261
Show tw at
F iscal Yaar 1995 1.7217 Bankruptcy S 134,731 $ 53,715 $ 81,016 $ 649,395 12.48
F iscal Yaar 1996 1 3 4 4 0 Bankruptcy S 118,990 $ 60,051 $ 58,939 $ 814,669 7.23
F iscal Yaar 1997 1 3 6 4 5 Bankruptcy $ 122,967 $ 74,645 $ 48,322 $ 800,547 6.04
Avaraga Z F actor la st 3  yaars 1.4401
Station C asinos. Inc.
Fiscal Yaar 1995 13841 Bankruptcy $ 133,439 $ 97,326 $ 36,113 $ 827,314 4.37
Fiscal Yaar 1996 0.7617 Bankruptcy S 69,369 $185,266 $ (115,897) $ 1,234,118 (9.39)
F iscal Yaar 1997 0.8888 Bankruptcy $ 87,491 $197,509 $(110,018) $ 1,300,216 (8.46)
Avaraga Z F actor la st 3  yaars 1.0616
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DEVELOPMENT OF ALTMAN Z FACTORS
OuimfuiWuiiAhmm A te men. & m a & S m a U S S M etarV tfa* & we aw &
naatMftff
nw B Ê /'m rim s S 000.000 26.40 $355 000 10.31 193,000.000 $ 16.18 $3.121740.000 $1169,000.000 14166 $3355.000 1.0325
nwBHtvmriam S 031.000 12Z7 $329.000 4.34 249.000.000 $ 28.60 $7.143.610.000 $4376.000.000 16335 $3.840.000 03193
HweaiYÊm’im r S 1.040.000 13Z9 $596.000 7.62 249,000.000 $ 30.94 $7.704.060.000 $4.443.000.000 173.40 $5316.000 0.6793
A w RgeZ JÉ* J  jw *
naLaood
rnWmfVWrf#* S 103.023 6.10 $103Z23 6.10 48.774.856 $ 24.50 $1.194363.072 $ 607.674,000 17136 $ 718.781 03606
U n tY r n r ls m S 12OZ04 10.04 $120104 10.04 57.993.766 $ 3038 $1283.794305 $ 314307.000 726.61 $ 800.180 0.6214
RwoalYmrimT $ 100.970 13.66 $100170 13.66 57,964.873 $ 4030 $2336.700.382 $ 206.751000 787.46 $ 827307 03018
A W 1B» Z  le t  3 )*»
nrna iY m rim e S «50.170 36Z6 $284,067 15.65 183.341.494 $ 1538 $1011.461025 $ 562370.000 40033 $1330.744 0.7426
n m Y é Ê r i tm % 850Z1S 30.94 $312.670 14.59 176.335.015 $ 24.00 $4380.061360 $ 851007.000 50100 $1367344 0.6380
nmsa/Ymmimr SI.063.703 31.76 $326.041 9.74 179.421 Z22 $ 25.36 $4353.725.842 $1.643,866.000 24637 $1.416351 0.4236
A te r ^  Z  A eaor M  3 jew v
Md H aiti CMÉiD.kw.
M totf M erfm S S 40.157 15.02 $ 37158 1116 21.130,146 $ 1183 $ 266.067.414 $ 145.004.000 18199 $ 191958 0.6249
m rnalYm rltm % 68.522 13.66 $ 37194 7.66 21.170.441 $ 1334 $ 205.115346 $ 311674.000 9436 $ 210361 0.4440
AnlVtarfWZ S 00.016 15J0 $ 60.106 1012 24.643.141 $ 2113 $ 545351710 $ 317.860.000 17131 $ 301148 0.6667
A M raM tZ M v IMC 3 y ttrs
•w tO oM
n w > ta r  IMS t  80.434 1Z30 $ 46.674 7.10 15.794.576 $ 25.10 $ 307.865.420 $ 475.454.000 63.68 $ 426.502 0.8600
naoÊiYÊÊrim $ 84,828 10.41 $ 41121 5.17 16.181.100 S 18.81 $ 320.540.552 $ 622324.000 51.49 $ 433.705 03324
$ 64.761 6.00 $ 26.101 316 16.350340 $ 23.81 $ 380313.715 $ 637.604.000 81.06 $ 556316 0.6955
A w rt0 t  Z  Aeoor M  3 je tr t
naeÊtVÊÊrims S 22.305 170 $ 60.464 6.40 35303346 $ 1100 $ 423.640.152 $ 548.844300 77.19 $ 466.857 0.5643
A n lY tarfflM S 26,823 2.34 $ 56.123 4.71 35316.057 $ 0.44 $ 333.401456 $ 835370.000 35.65 $ 583.515 0.4728
ftaü D tarfW Z S 16.382 118 $ 84.166 6.47 35.310.623 $ 1310 $ 460378.180 $1,013320.000 4631 $ 760.610 0.5019
A teroB» Z  A iciar l i e  3 le w
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DEVELOPMENT OF ALTMAN Z FACTORS
HatmkCasino S  C otB ondon FvZ Valua Indication Cur. A ssats Cur. Uab. NatW/C T o t Assats £ i
Sands - Atlantic City
Create Bay Casino Corporation ACOC 1 2 0 1 4 7
Fiscal Yaar 1995 0 * 3 2 2 Bankruptcy $ 46,203 $ 53,063 $ (6,860) $ 250,116 (2.74)
Fiscal Yaar 1996 0.08*7 Bankruptcy $ 46,203 S 53,063 $ (6,860) $ 221,345 (3.10)
Fiscal Yaar 1997 4 .5 8 7 7 Non-bankruptcy $ 9,381 $106,372 $ (96,991) $ 15,752 (615.74)
Avaraga Z  Factor la s t 3  yaars -14 6 8 * Bankrunt 1/5/88
Arizona Charlie s  -LV_L@c#!
BecKer Gaming, Inc. ACOC * 0 0 4 7
Fiscal Yaar 1995 0.5177 Bankruptcy $ 10,221 $ 24,962 $ (14,741) $ 84,786 (17.39)
Fiscal Yaar 1996 -0.4186 Bankruptcy $ 12,803 $ 83,947 $ (71,144) $ 75,477 (94.26)
Fiscal Yaar 1997 -1.0774 Bankruptcy S 10,253 S 89,760 $ (79,507) $ 71,009 (111.97)
Avaraga Z  Factor la s t 3  yaars •0.32*4 BankruDt 1/2448
StratoSDhara -  LV Strlo
Stratosphere Corporation ACOC 1201/8*
Fiscal Yaar 1995 1.5406 Bankruptcy $ 104,279 $ 38,616 $ 65,663 $ 433,906 15.13
Fiscal Yaar 1996 -8.0437 Bankruptcy $ 37,951 $ 45,983 $ (8,032) $ 181,080 (4.44)
Fiscal Yaar 1997 -2 4 8 0 8 Bankruptcy S 32,170 $ 13,471 $ 18,699 $ 155,976 11.99
Avaraga Z  Factor la s t 3  yaars -4.3871 Bankrupt 1/2747
Cold RIvar Hotel -  Lauchlln
GokJ River Hotel ACOC * 0 0 4 *
Fiscal Yaar 1994 -0.48*2 Bankruptcy $ 4,809 $ 82,460 $ (77,651) $ 102,212 (75.97)
Fiscal Yaar 1995 4 .7 * 7 0 Bankruptcy $ 4,809 S 82,460 $ (77,651) $ 96,833 (80.19)
Fiscal Yaar 1996 -10.4080 Bankruptcy S 6,582 S 92,931 $ (86,349) $ 35,926 (240.35)
Avaraga Z  Factor la st 3  yaars -34874 Bankrupt 2/8/8*
Four Ouaans - LV Downtown
Elsinore Corporation ACOC 1201/83
Fiscal Yaar 1993 0.3723 Bankruptcy Î  7,499 $ 12,799 $ (5,300) $  71,923 (7.37)
Fiscal Yaar 1994 •0.8583 Bankruptcy $ 6,204 $ 16,709 $ (10,505) $ 67,315 (15.61)
Fiscal Yaar 1995 •6.044* Bankruptcy $ 5,578 S 6,182 $ (604) $ 37,101 (1.63)
Avaraga Z Factor la s t 3  yaars -1.8436 Bankrupt 1001/86
Resorts intamational -  AC
Griffin Gaming & Sun International
Fiscal Yaar 1992 0.5283 Bankruptcy $ 107,937 S 72,500 $ 35,437 $ 568,950 6.23
Fiscal Yaar 1993 •0.5428 Bankruptcy $ 115,419 $557,907 $(442,488) $ 575,785 (76.85)
Fiscal Yaar 1994 0 4 1 3 4 Bankruptcy $ 58,724 $ 41,051 $ 17,673 $ 317,248 5.57
Avaraga Z  Factor la s t 3  yaars 0.0*** Bankrupt 4/84
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DEVELOPMENT OF ALTMAN Z FACTORS 1
& a a Xi Shares 0 5 m v s o s WarhsLVah# & m tSalrn &
Q rw tt Bay CbW  Ccrperatian
n n rv w iM S $(177.415) (70Æ ) $ 32.135 12.85 5.140.627 $ 212 $ 1Z032.975 $ 346.531100 3.10 $ 304137 11168
n W V ta rffM $< 19120 (99J4) $ 4044 1.94 5.190.627 $ 3.97 $ 20190.000 S 340152.000 541 $ 243.540 11014
nW V M rlW Z $(218.447) (114903) $ 16.704 10004 5.140.627 $ 1.12 $ 5.809.022 $ 156,004,000 3.40 $ 263.300 14.7195
AMram» Z Alcaar ii«  3 jM n
M n m C M ilH iy L tfiil
Bacfcar GanAio. Ine.
nÊO tVm rim s •$15.474 (14.72) $ 4.447 517 10.000.000 $ 0.01 $ 100,000 $ 91150.000 0.11 $ 69.079 01147
m w Y W f## # •$27.1(0 05A1) $ 4.742 014 10.000.000 $ 0.01 $ 100.000 $ 93.474.000 0.11 $ 78.037 1.0074
A W y ta rfM r •$34144 (S3A9) $ 004 117 10.000.000 $ 0.01 $ 100,000 $ 100.172.000 0.10 $ 09.525 0.9791
Z Aaeaar iMl 3 year»
T M aW a-L V H rie
SM oapfiara Corporadon
MaeafVlmaffWS $ (7.972) (1.44) $ (447) (010) 56301117 $ 9.04 $ 500129103 $ 241.615.707 231.47 $ 00 0.0001
fln T Y ta rfM f $056.414) (197.05) $031.166) (14Z44) 54393105 $ 1.05 $ 104.027144 $ 310122.747 33.02 $ 100.739 0.6005
nacarV tarfW Z $076.129) (241.15) $ 2005 1.80 54393105 $ 0.01 $ 583.031 $ 312.975.701 0.19 $ 137116 01016
Aewega Z  Aaeaer Iw  3 leer»
OaM M M THolal.LeaM n
OeUIUMrHaM
n m rifW ftM $ (4.396) (400) $ (4.390) (400) 501.494 $ 0.01 $ 5.015 $ 87.447.000 0.01 $ 64102 0.6201
A K arytarfM S $ (13A20) (1300) $ (5.631) (502) 541.404 $ 0.01 $ 5.015 $ 85.609.000 0.01 $ 50.477 01632
PWcafVlMrf### $ (43.300) (232.03) $ (01.350) (170.77) 541A04 $ 0.01 $ 5.815 $ 07,132.000 0.01 $ 48.671 11603
Avwipe Z F e w le t3  years
F a v  Ikiaant •  LV Dewsovm
E taera Corportton
n Ê catY m rim $ (53.542) (7400) $ (2152) 0.13} 12,070,017 $ 011 $ 76.161.807 $ 67150.000 113.07 $ 66.452 01295
FWcaf % arf#M $ (63.023) (93.62) $ (10.176) (15.12) 13.135H4 $ 1.82 $ 23.906.049 $ 60179.000 34.00 $ 62.700 01315
Aacaf rea r f « 5 $(104.772) (293.10) $ (20.475) (70.75) 15.491.743 $ 0.86 $ 10.444.543 $ 40.542.000 13.02 $ 50.973 11356
A w fi^  Z Facaar I *  3 years
Raeerts WanvÉienal -  AC
GrSIn Oawtig 4  Sun Mamatioret
F InrV barfN Z 1(104.556) (10.08) $ (12154) (2.15) 7134.435 $ 3.15 $ 25,007130 $ S40H2.OOO 417 $ 430134 0.7840
maeaf year faS3 $(210.720) (36.60) $ 12.694 214 7.934.435 $ 710 $ 63151103 $ 849120.000 0.19 $ 439154 0.7634
nacafYVarffM $(119.603) 07.70) $ (44.570) (1501) 7,934.835 $ 4.34 $ 34.772.007 $ 307117.000 1112 $ 353.016 1.1127
A venga Z Faeaar laar 3 years
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Coroormdon Nmm» F vZ  Value Indication Cur. A ssets Cur. Llab. NetW /C T o t A ssets £ i
ClaridCM Hotel -  Attantic Citv
Oaridge Hotel ACGC-12/31/87
F iscal Y»ar 1995 1.1346 Bankruptcy S 55,542 $ 40,420 $ 15,122 $ 189,074 8.00
F iscal Y aw  1996 0.6786 Bankruptcy S 31,753 S 39,027 $ (7,274) $ 164,163 (4.43)
Fiscal Yaar 1997 0 S 2 2 2 Bankruptcy $ 37,096 S 41,234 $ (4,138) $ 150,380 (2.75)
A vaiaga Z Factor la st 3  yaars 0 S 7 8 4 Non-bankruut
Plavof's Island •M asaulte. NV
Players International
Fiscal Yaar 1995 7.6443 Bankruptcy $ 61,622 S 39,307 $ 22,315 $ 323,790 6.89
Fiscal Yaar 1996 2.1116 Bankruptcy $ 41,583 S 39,705 $ 1,878 $ 413,432 0.45
Fiscal Yaar 1997 0.7828 Bankruptcy $ 67,576 $ 51,856 $ 15,720 $ 421,289 3.73
A van ça  Z Factor la st 3  yaars 3.6162 L oss $67mm -  Sold
Tm m o Hotels •  Atlantic CKv
Toimp Hotel & Casinos
F iscal Yaar 1995 0.7670 Bankruptcy S 53,461 S 35,302 $ 18,159 $ 584,545 3.11
Fiscal Yaar 1996 0.6023 Bankruptcy S 251,078 5165,688 $ 85,390 $ 2,455,639 3.48
F iscal Yaar 1997 0.7842 Bankruptcy S 249,415 $161,357 $ 88,058 $ 2,473,305 3.56
AvmragaZ Factor la st 3  y a a n 0.7178 Accumulated deficits
Balivs Oran«W.V A Reno
y Entertainment & Bally Manutectunng
F iscal Yaar 1990 0.6688 Bankruptcy $ 264,788 $335,646 $ (70,858) $ 2,497,200 (2.84)
F iscal Yaar 1991 0.8860 Bankruptcy S 264,788 $335,646 $ (70,858) $ 1,924,636 (3.68)
F iscal Yaar 1992 0.8860 Bankruptcy S 252,461 $200,976 $ 51,485 $ 1,991,600 2.59
Average Z Factor la st 3  y a a n 0.8863 BankruDt 8/20183
Boardwalk Casino- LV Strio
Boardwalk Hotel & Casino A C O C S«V 86
F iscal Yaar 1995 0.3048 Bankruptcy S 5,645 $ 10,872 $ (5,227) $ 57,694 (9.06)
F iscal Yaar 1996 0.7837 Bankruptcy $ 5,860 $ 7,116 $ (1.256) $ 63,171 (1.99)
F iscal Yaar 1997 •0.0426 Bankruptcy S 4,372 $ 53,275 $ (48,903) $ 63,368 (77.17)
A van ça  Z  Factor la st 3  y a a n 0JA71 Sold toM lraae
Sahara Hotel
Sahara Gaming Corp. A C O can o /8 6
Fiscal Yaar 1993 0.8362 Bankruptcy $ 49,370 $ 39,699 $ 9,671 $ 395,089 2.45
Fiscal Yaar 1994 0.7688 Bankruptcy $ 74,101 $ 57,589 $ 16,512 $ 478,555 3.45
Fiscal Yaar 1995 0.6286 Bankruptcy $ 155,732 $153,099 $ 2,633 $ 366,638 0.72
A varaçaZ  Factor la st 3  y a a n 0.7746 Sold to Bennett
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DEVELOPMENT OF AUFMAN Z FACTORS
& a a 2> S fm m C n E K lS a jmUÊÊOÊVütL ro c.c—f & r a r T a f i f &
C M ptH oW
n K tfv w fw s t  502 027 9 (2271) (120) 5.082200 9 0.01 9 50.625 9 183210.000 0.03 9 203248 12755
m e a tY ê a rim t 9 (M.M7) (0-07) 9 (20.767) (1286) 5.062200 9 0.01 9 50.625 9 173.907.000 0.03 9 193211 1.1778
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